**Supplementary Online Material**

**Pre-Registration**

URL to anonymized pre-registration (adapted from Ledgerwood, 2015): https://osf.io/vb637/?view\_only=d94baaceee89426b8c95f0085f41bfdc

1. **Different Effects of Survey Time for Clinton versus Trump Supporters**

Table S1. *Descriptive statistics across survey waves and candidate support groups for each of the outcome variables, measured among Trump and Clinton supporters.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** |  |  | ***M*** | ***SD*** |
| 1. Modern Sexism | Survey time | Pre-election | 2.50 | 0.84 |
| Post-election | 2.55 | 0.89 |
| Candidate support | Trump supporters | 3.00 | 0.80 |
| Clinton supporters | 2.23 | 0.77 |
| 2. Disturbance with the gender pay gap | Survey time | Pre-election | 5.40 | 1.54 |
| Post-election | 5.37 | 1.64 |
| Candidate support | Trump supporters | 4.72 | 1.81 |
| Clinton supporters | 5.80 | 1.27 |
| 3. Perceptions of gender discrimination against women | Survey time | Pre-election | 6.79 | 2.03 |
| Post-election | 6.78 | 2.16 |
| Candidate support | Trump supporters | 5.70 | 2.14 |
| Clinton supporters | 7.47 | 1.76 |
| 4. Perceptions of gender discrimination against men | Survey time | Pre-election | 3.84 | 2.15 |
| Post-election | 4.05 | 2.24 |
| Candidate support | Trump supporters | 4.28 | 2.27 |
| Clinton supporters | 3.74 | 2.13 |
| 5. Perceptions of progress towards gender equality | Survey time | Pre-election | 3.81 | 1.04 |
| Post-election | 3.81 | 1.12 |
| Candidate support | Trump supporters | 4.38 | 1.11 |
| Clinton supporters | 3.45 | 0.90 |
| 6. Perceived female representation at top levels | Survey time | Pre-election | 30.56% | 18.98% |
| Post-election | 30.51% | 19.38% |
| Candidate support | Trump supporters | 31.69% | 16.70% |
| Clinton supporters | 29.80% | 20.59% |

*Note.* *N* = 2,010. All between-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 1, and all within-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 2,006.

**2. Gender Differences**

The sample size for these analyses (*N* = 2,287; *npre-election* = 1,095, *npost-election* = 1,192) was smaller because we did not include third-gender participants, whose sample size was too low in the pre-election survey and null in the post-election survey.

**Main effect of gender.** We conducted a *t*-test on each outcome variable to assess whether there were any significant gender differences. As would be expected, there was a significant effect of gender on each gender-related outcome variable (see Table S2). Compared to women, men expressed significantly more modern sexism, were significantly less disturbed by the gender pay gap, perceived significantly lower discrimination against women and significantly greater discrimination against men, and perceived significantly greater progress towards gender equality and greater levels of female representation at top levels in the U.S.

**Survey time effects among men and women.** We conducted a 2 (Survey time: pre- vs. post-election) X 2 (Gender: male vs. female) ANOVA on each outcome variable to assess whether gender moderated a relationship between survey time and any of our gender-related outcome variables (see Table S3a for means and standard deviations). Results showed that participant gender did not significantly interact with survey time for any of the outcome variables (see Table S3b).

**Survey time x Candidate support effects among men and women.** We conducted a 2 (Survey time: pre- vs. post-election) X 2 (Candidate support: Trump vs. Clinton) X 2(Gender: male vs. female) ANOVA on each outcome variable to assess whether gender moderated the relationship between the survey time X candidate support interaction and any of our gender-related outcome variables. Results showed that participant gender did not significantly interact with the survey time X candidate support interaction for any of the outcome variables.

Table S2. *Comparison of men and women samples across variables measured.*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** | **Men**  ***M* (*SD*)** | **Women**  ***M* (*SD*)** | **Mean difference**  **(*SE*)** | **95% CI** | | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** | ***Cohen’s d*** |
| **Lower bound** | **Upper bound** |
| 1. Modern Sexism | 2.77  (0.85) | 2.29  (0.81) | -0.47  (0.03) | -0.54 | -0.41 | -13.71 | 2285 | < 0.001 | 0.58 |
| 2. Disturbance with the gender pay gap | 4.74  (1.71) | 5.91  (1.29) | 1.18  (0.06) | 1.05 | 1.30 | 18.43 | 2028.06 | < 0.001 | 0.77 |
| 3. Perceptions of gender discrimination against women | 6.44  (2.14) | 7.09  (1.98) | 0.65  (0.09) | 0.48 | 0.82 | 7.54 | 2231.50 | < 0.001 | 0.32 |
| 4. Perceptions of gender discrimination against men | 4.43  (2.27) | 3.58  (2.04) | -0.85  (0.09) | -1.03 | -0.67 | -9.37 | 2212.13 | <0.001 | 0.39 |
| 5. Perceptions of progress towards gender equality | 4.07  (1.06) | 3.57  (1.06) | -0.51  (0.04) | -0.59 | -0.42 | -11.37 | 2285 | < 0.001 | 0.47 |
| 6. Perceived female representation at top levels | 31.01%  (20.10%) | 28.99%  (17.34%) | -2.02%  (0.78%) | -3.57 | -0.47 | -2.56 | 2174.84 | 0.010 | 0.11 |

*Note.* *N* = 2,287. Where *df* are not a whole number, the test does not assume equality of variances.

Table S3a. *Means and standard deviations among male and female participants* *for each of the outcome variables.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** |  |  | ***M*ean** | **Standard deviation** |
| 1. Modern Sexism | Survey time | Pre-election | 2.50 | 0.83 |
| Post-election | 2.54 | 0.88 |
| Gender | Men | 2.77 | 0.85 |
| Women | 2.29 | 0.81 |
| 2. Disturbance with the gender pay gap | Survey time | Pre-election | 5.34 | 1.57 |
| Post-election | 5.35 | 1.66 |
| Gender | Men | 4.74 | 1.71 |
| Women | 5.91 | 1.29 |
| 3. Perceptions of gender discrimination against women | Survey time | Pre-election | 6.80 | 2.01 |
| Post-election | 6.76 | 2.15 |
| Gender | Men | 6.44 | 2.14 |
| Women | 7.09 | 1.98 |
| 4. Perceptions of gender discrimination against men | Survey time | Pre-election | 3.92 | 2.15 |
| Post-election | 4.06 | 2.23 |
| Gender | Men | 4.43 | 2.27 |
| Women | 3.58 | 2.04 |
| 5. Perceptions of progress towards gender equality | Survey time | Pre-election | 3.80 | 1.04 |
| Post-election | 3.82 | 1.13 |
| Gender | Men | 4.07 | 1.06 |
| Women | 3.57 | 1.06 |
| 6. Perceived female representation at top levels | Survey time | Pre-election | 29.83% | 18.54% |
| Post-election | 30.08% | 18.93% |
| Gender | Men | 31.01% | 20.10% |
| Women | 28.99% | 17.34% |

*Note.* *N* = 2,287. All between-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 1, and all within-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 2,283.

Table S3b. *Tests of the interactions between Survey Time and Gender**on each of the outcomes variables.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** |  | ***F*** | ***p*** | ***η2*** |
| 1. Modern Sexism | Survey time | 1.74 | 0.19 | 0.001 |
| Gender | 187.28 | < 0.001 | 0.08 |
| Interaction | 0.36 | 0.55 | < 0.001 |
| 2. Disturbance with the gender pay gap | Survey time | 0.002 | 0.97 | < 0.001 |
| Gender | 346.11 | < 0.001 | 0.13 |
| Interaction | 0.08 | 0.78 | < 0.001 |
| 3. Perceptions of gender discrimination against women | Survey time | 0.24 | 0.62 | < 0.001 |
| Gender | 56.90 | < 0.001 | 0.02 |
| Interaction | 0.12 | 0.73 | < 0.001 |
| 4. Perceptions of gender discrimination against men | Survey time | 2.83 | 0.093 | 0.001 |
| Gender | 87.95 | < 0.001 | 0.037 |
| Interaction | 1.08 | 0.30 | < 0.001 |
| 5. Perceptions of progress towards gender equality | Survey time | 0.19 | 0.67 | < 0.001 |
| Gender | 128.99 | < 0.001 | 0.05 |
| Interaction | 0.01 | 0.92 | < 0.001 |
| 6. Perceived female representation at top levels | Survey time | 0.12 | 0.73 | < 0.001 |
| Gender | 6.68 | 0.010 | 0.003 |
| Interaction | 0.02 | 0.90 | < 0.001 |

*Note.* All between-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 1, and all within-groups degrees of freedom were equal to 2,283. *N* = 2,287.

**2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

To test whether our six measures represented distinct constructs, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). A six-factor and a five-factor model failed to converge, but a four-factor model fitted the data (RMSEA = 0.11, CFI = 0.86, SRMR = 0.079, χ2(203) = 5760.25). The factors were: modern sexism, disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceived female representation at the top, and a factor combining perceptions of progress toward gender equality and perceptions of discrimination against women and men. The fit was better than a one-factor model (RMSEA = 0.17, CFI = 0.65, SRMR = 0.135, χ2(209) = 14119.63, Δχ2(1) = 8359.38, *p* < 0.001), a two-factor model (modern sexism vs. all other measures; RMSEA = 0.15, CFI = 0.73, SRMR = 0.127, χ2(208) = 10849.34, Δχ2(1) = 5089.09, *p* < 0.001), and a three-factor model (modern sexism vs. disturbance with the gender pay gap vs. all other measures; RMSEA = 0.13, CFI = 0.79, SRMR = 0.093, χ2(206) = 8311.77, Δχ2(1) = 2551.52, *p* < 0.001). Thus, the results of the CFA analysis confirm that modern sexism represents a distinct construct from the other measures.

**3. Robustness Checks**

**(1) Choice of moderator.** First, in order to offer some evidence that our results were robust to the specific choice of moderator, we tested whether comparable effects emerge using political ideology as a predictor (measured on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 “Extremely liberal” to +3 “Extremely conservative”). Because there was a moderate correlation between candidate support and reported political ideology (*r* = 0.560, *p* < 0.001), we explored whether liberals’ versus conservatives’ social attitudes would follow the same pattern as those of Trump versus Clinton supporters’ pre- versus post-election. If political ideology moderated the effects of survey time in the same way as candidate support did (including indirect effects), it would offer evidence of the robustness of the previously reported results.

We regressed each dependent variable in turn on survey wave, political ideology, and their interaction. Political ideology only significantly moderated the relationship between survey time and modern sexism (see Table S4).

Table S4. *Tests of the interactions between Survey Time and Candidate support on each of the outcome variables measured, and simple slopes for each of the significant interactions.*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** | **Predictors** |  | ***b*** | ***SE*** | **95% CI** | | ***t*** | ***p*** |
| **Lower bound** | **Upper bound** |
| 1. Modern Sexism | Survey time |  | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.05 | 0.77 | 0.44 |
| Political conservatism |  | 0.21 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 21.72 | < 0.001 |
| Interaction |  | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.001 | 0.04 | 2.04 | 0.042 |
| *Simple slopes analysis* | Liberals | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.07 | 0.03 | -0.90 | 0.37 |
| Conservatives | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.001 | 0.09 | 1.98 | 0.047 |
| 2. Disturbance with the gender pay gap | Survey time |  | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.05 | 0.08 | 0.55 | 0.59 |
| Political conservatism |  | -0.29 | 0.02 | -0.33 | -0.25 | -15.11 | < 0.001 |
| Interaction |  | -0.001 | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.04 | -0.04 | 0.97 |
| 3. Perceptions of gender discrimination against women | Survey time |  | -0.004 | 0.04 | -0.09 | 0.08 | -0.09 | 0.93 |
| Political conservatism |  | -0.39 | 0.03 | -0.44 | -0.34 | -15.74 | < 0.001 |
| Interaction |  | -0.05 | 0.03 | -0.09 | 0.003 | -1.86 | 0.064 |
| *Simple slopes analysis* | Liberals | 0.07 | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.19 | 1.25 | 0.21 |
| Conservatives | -0.08 | 0.06 | -0.20 | 0.03 | -1.38 | 0.17 |

*Note.* All degrees of freedom were equal to 2,286. *N* = 2,290. For significant interactions, simple slopes were computed for conservatives and liberals at +1*SD* and -1 *SD* respectively.

Table S4 Continued.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** | **Predictors** |  | ***b*** | ***SE*** | **95% CI** | | ***t*** | ***p*** |
| **Lower bound** | **Upper bound** |
| 4. Perceptions of gender discrimination against men | Survey time |  | 0.07 | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.16 | 1.44 | 0.15 |
| Political conservatism |  | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 6.75 | < 0.001 |
| Interaction |  | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.07 | 0.03 | -0.75 | 0.45 |
| 5. Perceptions of progress towards gender equality | Survey time |  | -0.001 | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.04 | -0.06 | 0.95 |
| Political conservatism |  | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 16.94 | < 0.001 |
| Interaction |  | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.04 | 1.24 | 0.22 |
| 6. Perceived female representation at top levels | Survey time |  | 0.05 | 0.39 | -0.72 | 0.81 | 0.12 | 0.91 |
| Political conservatism |  | 1.70 | 0.23 | 1.25 | 2.16 | 7.41 | < 0.001 |
| Interaction |  | 0.25 | 0.23 | -0.20 | 0.71 | 1.10 | 0.27 |

*Note.* All degrees of freedom were equal to 2,286. *N* = 2,290. For significant interactions, simple slopes were computed for conservatives and liberals at +1*SD* and -1 *SD* respectively.

We also found indirect effects of political ideology consistent with those found for candidate support through modern sexism (see Table S5). The post-election increase in the expression of modern sexism for conservatives was associated with less disturbance with the gender pay gap, *b* = -0.05, *SE =* 0.03*,* 95% CI [-0.104; -0.001], lower perceived discrimination against women, *b* = -0.07, *SE =* 0.04*,* 95% CI [-0.148; -0.0004], higher perceived discrimination against men, *b* = 0.02, *SE =* 0.01*,* 95% CI [0.001; 0.053], and a higher proportion of women at top levels in the U.S., *b* = 0.29, *SE =* 0.15*,* 95% CI [0.007; 0.610] for the indirect effects and their 95% CIs in moderated mediation analyses. For conservatives, the post-election increase in expressing modern sexism was directionally associated with perceiving greater progress towards equality for women, though this effect was not statistically significant as the 95% included 0, *b* = 0.04, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [-0.0004; 0.082]. No significant indirect effects emerged for liberals, which again replicated the pattern among Clinton voters (see Table S5). The index of moderated mediation was significant for each variable except for perceived progress towards equality for women, indicating that the indirect effects on disturbance with the gender pay gap, and perceived discrimination against women and men were significantly larger for conservatives than for liberals (see Table S5). Thus, attesting to robustness, a similar pattern of results emerged for conservatives as for Trump supporters.

Recall that Clinton supporters, but not Trump supporters, reported perceiving more discrimination against women after the election than before. The same finding did not emerge when we replaced candidate support with political ideology (see Table S5). That is, political ideology was only a marginal but nonsignificant moderator of the election on this dependent measure, *b* = -0.05, *t*(2,286) = -1.86, *p* = 0.064, and the simple effects of election on this measure were not significant for either liberals or conservatives, *b*s = 0.07 and -0.08, *t*s(2,286) = 1.25 and -1.38, *p*s = 0.21 and 0.17, respectively. These results suggest that the election effect on perceptions of discrimination against women may either be weaker among liberals than among Clinton supporters, or may not be as robust as the other findings.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** |  |  | **A path** | **B path** | **Indirect effect** | **Direct effect** | **Difference in indirect effects (index of moderated mediation**) |
| 1. Disturbance with the gender pay gap | Conservatives | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | 0.05  (0.02)  [0.001; 0.091]  0.047 | -1.12  (0.03)  [-1.182; -1.049]  < 0.001 | -0.05  (0.03)  [-0.104; -0.001] | 0.07  (0.04)  [-0.006; 0.142]  0.07 | -0.02  (0.01)  [-0.045; -0.001] |
|  | Liberals | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.066; 0.025]  0.37 | -1.12  (0.03)  [-1.182; -1.049]  < 0.001 | 0.02  (0.03)  [-0.028; 0.074] | -0.004  (0.04)  [-0.078; 0.069]  0.91 |
| 2. Perceptions of gender discrimination against women | Conservatives | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | 0.05  (0.02)  [0.001; 0.091]  0.047 | -1.60  (0.04)  [-1.679; -1.517]  < 0.001 | -0.07  (0.04)  [-0.148; -0.0004] | -0.01  (0.05)  [-0.097; 0.082]  0.87 | -0.03  (0.02)  [-0.063; -0.0003] |
| Liberals | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.066; 0.025]  0.37 | -1.60  (0.04)  [-1.679; -1.517]  < 0.001 | 0.03  (0.04)  [-0.041; 0.108] | 0.04  (0.05)  [-0.049; 0.129]  0.38 |
| 3. Perceptions of gender discrimination against men | Conservatives | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | 0.05  (0.02)  [0.001; 0.091]  0.047 | 0.54  (0.06)  [0.427; 0.650]  < 0.001 | 0.02  (0.01)  [0.001; 0.053] | 0.01  (0.06)  [-0.118; 0.131]  0.92 | 0.01  (0.01)  [0.0004; 0.022] |
|  | Liberals | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.066; 0.025]  0.37 | 0.54  (0.06)  [0.427; 0.650]  < 0.001 | -0.01  (0.01)  [-0.037; 0.013] | 0.11  (0.06)  [-0.013; 0.235]  0.079 |

Table S5. *Results of the moderated mediation analyses, IV = Survey time, W = Political ideology (mean-centered), M = Modern Sexism (mean-centered).*

*Note. N* = 2,290. Results for conservatives and liberals were computed at +1*SD* and -1 *SD* respectively. Confidence intervals (CIs) were computed with the bias-corrected bootstrap method with 10,000 resamples.

Table S5 Continued.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome variables** |  |  | **A path** | **B path** | **Indirect effect** | **Direct effect** | **Difference in indirect effects (index of moderated mediation**) |
| 4. Perceptions of progress towards gender equality | Conservatives | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | 0.05  (0.02)  [0.001; 0.091]  0.047 | 0.89  (0.02)  [0.845; 0.925]  < 0.001 | 0.04  (0.02)  [-0.0004; 0.081] | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.060; 0.029]  0.50 | 0.02  (0.01)  [0.000; 0.035] |
|  | Liberals | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.066; 0.025]  0.37 | 0.89  (0.02)  [0.845; 0.925]  < 0.001 | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.060; 0.023] | -0.01  (0.02)  [-0.054; 0.035]  0.67 |
| 5. Perceived female representation at top levels | Conservatives | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | 0.05  (0.02)  [0.001; 0.091]  0.047 | 6.38  (0.48)  [5.445; 7.318]  < 0.001 | 0.29  (0.15)  [0.007; 0.610] | 0.18  (0.53)  [-0.860; 1.219]  0.73 | 0.13  (0.07)  [0.005; 0.264] |
|  | Liberals | *b*  *(SE)*  95% CI  *p* | -0.02  (0.02)  [-0.066; 0.025]  0.37 | 6.38  (0.48)  [5.445; 7.318]  < 0.001 | -0.13  (0.15)  [-0.436; 0.154] | -0.25  (0.53)  [-1.287; 0.785]  0.63 |

*Note. N* = 2,290. Results for conservatives and liberals were computed at +1*SD* and -1 *SD* respectively. Confidence intervals (CIs) were computed with the bias-corrected bootstrap method with 10,000 resamples.

Second, we assessed whether there was an effect of candidate support on our dependent variables above and beyond political ideology, i.e., whether candidate support was more than a mere proxy for political ideology. To do so, we re-ran the analyses reported in the main text (testing for an interaction between survey time and candidate support on the dependent variables measured, as well as the relevant indirect effects), while controlling for political ideology.

*Different effects of survey time for Clinton versus Trump supporters, controlling for political ideology*. To assess whether survey time would still have different effects on Trump and Clinton supporters once political ideology was accounted for, we submitted each dependent variable to a 2 (Survey time: pre- vs. post-election) X 2 (Candidate support: Clinton vs. Trump) between-subjects ANOVA, controlling for political ideology. Results showed that Candidate support significantly moderated the effect of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism endorsement, *F*(1, 2005) = 7.28, *p* = 0.007,= 0.004, and there was also a significant main effect of political ideology on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2005) = 74.72, *p* < 0.001,= 0.06. Controlling for political ideology, Trump supporters endorsed modern sexism significantly more after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 2.77, *SD* = 0.80, *MPost =* 2.89, *SD* = 0.81, *F*(1, 2005) = 5.06, *p* = 0.025,= 0.003, 95% CI [0.016; 0.229], whereas Clinton supporters did not show a shift in their endorsement of modern sexism over time, *MPre* = 2.37, *SD* = 0.76, *MPost =* 2.30, *SD* = 0.77, *F*(1, 2005) = 2.27, *p* = 0.13,= 0.001, 95% CI [-0.150; 0.020].

Candidate support also significantly moderated the effect of survey time on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.79, *p* = 0.029, = 0.002, and there was also a significant main effect of political ideology on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2005) = 32.93, *p* < 0.001,= 0.016. Whereas Clinton supporters perceived significantly more discrimination against women after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 7.23, *SD* = 1.77, *MPost =* 7.46, *SD* = 1.74, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.72, *p* = 0.030, = 0.002, 95% CI [0.023; 0.448], Trump supporters did not, *MPre* = 5.98, *SD* = 2.08, *MPost =* 5.84, *SD* = 2.19, *F*(1, 2005) = 1.15, *p* = 0.28, = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.413; 0.122].

None of the other dependent variables (disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination against men, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, perceived female representation at top levels) showed a significant interaction of survey time by candidate supported: *F*s ≤ 2.58, *p*s ≥ 0.11, ≤ 0.001, controlling for political ideology.

*Potential consequences of shifts in modern sexism as a function of Survey time and Candidate support, controlling for political ideology.* As in the main text, we tested for evidence of indirect effects, by which the increase in Trump supporters’ modern sexism after (versus before) the election could shape their gender-biased attitudes, controlling for political ideology. Political ideology was included as a covariate, while candidate support was included as a potential moderator (W) of the link between survey time (X) and modern sexism (M), and of the link between survey time (X) and the relevant outcome variable (Y) (Model 8 in Hayes (2013)). There was no meaningful change compared to results reported in the main text. We found significant indirect effects of survey time through modern sexism among Trump supporters, such that Trump supporters’ post-election increase in modern sexism was associated with less disturbance with the gender pay gap, *b* = -0.06, *SE =* 0.03*,* 95% CI [-0.124; -0.007], lower perceived discrimination against women, *b* = -0.09, *SE =* 0.04*,* 95% CI [-0.176; -0.010], higher perceived discrimination against men, *b* = 0.03, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.004; 0.068], greater perceived progress towards equality for women, *b* = 0.05, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.005; 0.097], and a higher estimated proportion of women at top levels in the U.S., *b* = 0.44, *SE =* 0.21*,* 95% CI [0.052; 0.880]. We found no significant indirect effects of survey time on gender-biased attitudes through modern sexism for Clinton supporters, |*b*s| ≤ 0.24, which was expected given that, as noted, the survey time did not significantly affect Clinton supporters’ modern sexism, controlling for political ideology. The index of moderated mediation was significant for each variable, indicating that, controlling for political ideology, the indirect effects were still significantly larger for Trump supporters than for Clinton supporters.

**(2) Potential selection bias.** As can be seen in Table S6, two demographic characteristics differed between pre- and post-election: SES and Education level. Specifically, compared to pre-election participants, post-election participants were from a significantly lower socio-economic background (*M*Pre = 1.70, *SD* = 0.94, *M*Post = 1.62, *SD* = 0.95, *t*(2288) = 2.00, *p* = 0.046, *d* = 0.08, 95% CI [0.001; 0.156]), and marginally less educated (*M*Pre = 4.26, *SD* = 1.43, *M*Post = 4.15, *SD* = 1.47, *t*(2288) = 1.81, *p* = 0.071, *d* = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.009; 0.229]). To account for these differences, we conducted two different types of analysis: controlling for SES and Education, and using a propensity score matching analysis.

***(a)* *Controlling for SES*.** We re-ran the analyses reported in the main text (testing the effect of survey time on the dependent variables measured, and for an interaction between survey time and candidate support on these dependent variables, as well as the relevant indirect effects), while controlling for SES.

*No overall effect of survey time.* To assess whether the effects of survey time on the dependent variables would be altered once selection bias on SES across the pre- and post-election samples was accounted for, we conducted one-way ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables measured with survey time as an independent variable, controlling for SES. We found no significant main effects of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism, disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination towards women or men in society, of progress toward gender equality, or perceived female representation at top levels, *F*(1, 2287) ≤ 2.84, *p* ≥ 0.092,≤ 0.001, controlling for SES.

*Different effects of survey time for Clinton versus Trump supporters*. To assess whether survey time would still have different effects on Trump and Clinton supporters once selection bias on SES across the pre- and post-election samples was accounted for, we submitted each dependent variable to a 2 (Survey time: pre- vs. post-election) X 2 (Candidate support: Clinton vs. Trump) between-subjects ANOVA, controlling for SES.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Demographic variables** | **Categories** | **Pre-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Post-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Pearson**  **chi-square**  **χ2** | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** | |
| Gender | Men | 531 | 567 | 3.46 | / | 2 | 0.18 |
|  | Women | 564 | 625 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Other | 3 | 0 |  |  |  |  |
| Race | White | 747 | 807 | 0.93 | / | 4 | 0.92 |
|  | Black | 157 | 161 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Asian | 55 | 59 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Hispanic or Latino | 97 | 113 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Other | 42 | 52 |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | *M* = 33.87  *SD* = 16.63 | *M* = 33.39  *SD* = 17.13 | / | 0.69 | 2288 | 0.49 |
| Education | 1 - Less than high school | 4 | 11 | / | 1.81 | 2288 | 0.071 |
| 2 - High school | 147 | 191 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 - Incomplete college | 242 | 258 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 - Associate’s Degree (AA) | 132 | 36 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 - Bachelor’s Degree (BA, BS, BBA) | 356 | 391 |  |  |  |  |
| 6 - Master’s Degree (MA, MS, MBA) | 171 | 151 |  |  |  |  |
| 7 - Doctor’s Degree (Ph.D., JD, MD) | 46 | 54 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 4.26  *SD* = 1.43 | *M* = 4.15  *SD* = 1.47 |  |  |  |  |
| Socio-economic background | 1 - Working class / Lower class | 150 | 184 | / | 2.00 | 2288 | 0.046 |
| 2 - Lower-middle class | 229 | 277 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 - Middle class | 528 | 555 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 - Upper-middle class | 179 | 155 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 - Upper class | 12 | 21 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 2.70  *SD* = 0.94 | *M* = 2.62  *SD* = 0.95 |  |  |  |  |

Table S6. *Tests of potential significant differences in demographics across pre- and post-election samples*.

*Note.* *N* = 2,290.

Table S6 Continued.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Demographic variables** | **Categories** | **Pre-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Post-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Pearson**  **chi-square**  **χ2** | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** |
| English as a first language | Yes | 1054 | 1151 | 0.52 | / | 1 | 0.47 |
| No | 44 | 41 |  |  |  |  |
| Employment status | Full time | 463 | 473 | 5.26 | / | 4 | 0.26 |
| Part time | 133 | 148 |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | 71 | 91 |  |  |  |  |
| Retired | 336 | 350 |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently working (e.g., stay-at-home- parent, on leave, etc.) | 95 | 130 |  |  |  |  |
| Level of managerial responsibility | 1 - No managerial responsibilities | 709 | 793 | / | 0.75 | 2288 | 0.45 |
| 2 - Lower management | 62 | 76 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 - Middle management | 161 | 143 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 - Top management team | 67 | 68 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 - Executive | 99 | 112 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 1.89  *SD* = 1.36 | *M* = 1.85  *SD* = 1.36 |  |  |  |  |
| Political views | 1 – Extremely liberal | 100 | 109 | / | -1.25 | 2288 | 0.21 |
| 2 | 147 | 144 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 151 | 154 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 304 | 339 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 187 | 190 |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | 131 | 151 |  |  |  |  |
| 7 – Extremely conservative | 78 | 105 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 3.94  *SD* = 1.67 | *M* = 4.03  *SD* = 1.70 |  |  |  |  |

*Note.* *N* = 2,290.

Results showed that Candidate support significantly moderated the effect of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2005) = 5.74, *p* = 0.017,= 0.003, and there was also a significant main effect of SES on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2005) = 56.74, *p* < 0.001,= 0.03. Trump supporters expressed greater modern sexism after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 2.93, *SD* = 0.80, *MPost =* 3.05, *SD* = 0.81, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.82, *p* = 0.028,= 0.002, 95% CI [0.013; 0.230], while Clinton supporters did not show a shift in their modern sexism over time, *MPre* = 2.26, *SD* = 0.76, *MPost =* 2.21, *SD* = 0.77, *F*(1, 2005) = 1.18, *p* = 0.28,= 0.001, 95% CI [-0.134; 0.038].

Candidate support also significantly moderated the effect of survey time on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.21, *p* = 0.040, = 0.002, and there was also a significant main effect of SES on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2005) = 13.14, *p* < 0.001,= 0.007. Whereas Clinton supporters perceived significantly more discrimination against women after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 7.37, *SD* = 1.77, *MPost =* 7.58, *SD* = 1.74, *F*(1, 2005) = 3.88, *p* = 0.049, = 0.002, 95% CI [0.001; 0.429], Trump supporters did not, *MPre* = 5.78, *SD* = 2.08, *MPost =* 5.63, *SD* = 2.19, *F*(1, 2005) = 1.11, *p* = 0.29, = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.413; 0.124].

None of the other dependent variables (disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination against men, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, perceived female representation at top levels) showed a significant interaction of survey time by candidate supported: *F*s ≤ 2.03, *p*s ≥ 0.16, ≤ 0.001, controlling for SES.

*Potential consequences of shifts in modern sexism as a function of Survey time and Candidate support.* As in the main text, we tested for evidence of indirect effects, by which the increase in Trump supporters’ modern sexism after (versus before) the election could shape their gender-biased attitudes, controlling for SES. SES was included as a Covariate, while Candidate support was included as a potential moderator (W) of the link between survey time (X) and modern sexism (M), and of the link between survey time (X) and the relevant outcome variable (Y) (Model 8 in Hayes (2013)). There was no meaningful change compared to results reported in the main text. We found significant indirect effects of survey time through modern sexism among Trump supporters, such that Trump supporters’ post-election increase in modern sexism was associated with less disturbance with the gender pay gap, *b* = -0.06, *SE =* 0.03*,* 95% CI [-0.124; -0.006], lower perceived discrimination against women, *b* = -0.09, *SE =* 0.04*,* 95% CI [-0.176; -0.007], higher perceived discrimination against men, *b* = 0.04, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.003; 0.071], greater perceived progress towards equality for women, *b* = 0.05, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.003; 0.097], and a higher estimated proportion of women at top levels in the U.S., *b* = 0.45, *SE =* 0.22*,* 95% CI [0.028; 0.903]. We found no significant indirect effects of survey time on gender-biased attitudes through modern sexism for Clinton supporters, |*b*s| ≤ 0.18, which was expected given that, as noted, the survey time did not significantly affect Clinton supporters’ modern sexism, controlling for SES. The index of moderated mediation was significant for each variable, indicating that, controlling for SES, the indirect effects were still significantly larger for Trump supporters than for Clinton supporters.

***(b)* *Controlling for Education*.** We re-ran the analyses reported in the main text (testing the effect of survey time on the dependent variables measured, and for an interaction between survey time and candidate support on these dependent variables, as well as the relevant indirect effects), while controlling for Education, separately.

*No overall effect of survey time.* To assess whether the effects of survey time on the dependent variables would be altered once selection bias on Education across the pre- and post-election samples was accounted for, we conducted one-way ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables measured with survey time as an independent variable, controlling for Education. We found no significant main effects of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism, disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination towards women or men in society, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, or perceived female representation at top levels, *F*(1, 2287) ≤ 2.90, *p* ≥ 0.089,≤ 0.001, controlling for Education.

*Different effects of survey time for Clinton versus Trump supporters*. To assess whether survey time would still have different effects on Trump and Clinton supporters once selection bias on Education across the pre- and post-election samples was accounted for, we submitted each dependent variable to a 2 (Survey time: pre- vs. post-election) X 2 (Candidate support: Clinton vs. Trump) between-subjects ANOVA, controlling for Education.

Result showed that Candidate support significantly moderated the effect of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2005) = 5.96, *p* = 0.015,= 0.003, and there was also a significant main effect of Education on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2005) = 9.11, *p* = 0.003,= 0.005. Trump supporters expressed greater modern sexism after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 2.94, *SD* = 0.80, *MPost =* 3.06, *SD* = 0.81, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.34, *p* = 0.037,= 0.002, 95% CI [0.007; 0.226], while Clinton supporters did not show a shift in their modern sexism over time, *MPre* = 2.26, *SD* = 0.76, *MPost =* 2.20, *SD* = 0.77, *F*(1, 2005) = 1.69, *p* = 0.19,= 0.001, 95% CI [-0.145; 0.029].

Candidate support also significantly moderated the effect of survey time on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.29, *p* = 0.038, = 0.002, and there was also a significant main effect of Education on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.17, *p* = 0.041,= 0.002, 95% CI [0.016; 0.229]. Whereas Clinton supporters perceived significantly more discrimination against women after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 7.37, *SD* = 1.77, *MPost =* 7.59, *SD* = 1.74, *F*(1, 2005) = 4.22, *p* = 0.040, = 0.002, 95% CI [0.010; 0.438], Trump supporters did not, *MPre* = 5.76, *SD* = 2.08, *MPost =* 5.62, *SD* = 2.19, *F*(1, 2005) = 1.03, *p* = 0.31, = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.408; 0.130].

None of the other dependent variables (disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination against men, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, perceived female representation at top levels) showed a significant interaction of survey time by candidate supported: *F*s ≤ 2.19, *p*s ≥ 0.14, ≤ 0.001, controlling for Education.

*Potential consequences of shifts in modern sexism as a function of Survey time and Candidate support.* We tested for evidence of indirect effects, by which the increase in Trump supporters’ modern sexism after (versus before) the election could shape their gender-biased attitudes, controlling for Education. Education was included as a Covariate, while Candidate support was included as a potential moderator (W) of the link between survey time (X) and modern sexism (M), and of the link between survey time (X) and the relevant outcome variable (Y) (Model 8 in Hayes (2013), see Figure 1). We effect-coded survey time (pre-election = -1; post-election = 1) and candidate support (Clinton = -1; Trump = 1), and mean-centered the mediator, modern sexism. The coefficients reported below are indirect effects and their bias-corrected, bootstrapped 95% CIs, computed with 10,000 resamples using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2013). There was no meaningful change compared to results reported in the main text. We found significant indirect effects of survey time through modern sexism among Trump supporters, such that Trump supporters’ post-election increase in modern sexism was associated with less disturbance with the gender pay gap, *b* = -0.06, *SE =* 0.03*,* 95% CI [-0.122; -0.001], lower perceived discrimination against women, *b* = -0.09, *SE =* 0.04*,* 95% CI [-0.167; -0.002], higher perceived discrimination against men, *b* = 0.03, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.002; 0.071], greater perceived progress towards equality for women, *b* = 0.05, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.002; 0.095], and a higher estimated proportion of women at top levels in the U.S., *b* = 0.45, *SE =* 0.23*,* 95% CI [0.009; 0.900]. We found no significant indirect effects of survey time on gender-biased attitudes through modern sexism for Clinton supporters, |*b*s| ≤ 0.23, which was expected given that, as noted, the survey time did not significantly affect Clinton supporters’ modern sexism. The index of moderated mediation was significant for each variable, indicating that the indirect effects were significantly larger for Trump supporters than for Clinton supporters.

***(c) Controlling for SES and Education.*** We re-ran the analyses reported in the main text (testing the effect of survey time on the dependent variables measured, and for an interaction between survey time and candidate support on these dependent variables, as well as the relevant indirect effects), while controlling for SES and Education.

*No overall effect of survey time.* To assess whether the effects of survey time on the dependent variables would be altered once selection bias on SES and Education across the pre- and post-election samples was accounted for, we conducted one-way ANOVAs on each of the dependent variables measured with survey time as an independent variable, controlling for SES and Education. We found no significant main effects of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism, disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination towards women or men in society, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, or perceived female representation at top levels, *F*(1, 2286) ≤ 2.99, *p* ≥ 0.084,≤ 0.001, controlling for SES and Education.

*Different effects of survey time for Clinton versus Trump supporters*. To assess whether survey time would still have different effects on Trump and Clinton supporters once selection bias on SES and Education across the pre- and post-election samples was accounted for, we submitted each dependent variable to a 2 (Survey time: pre- vs. post-election) X 2 (Candidate support: Clinton vs. Trump) between-subjects ANOVA, controlling for SES and Education.

Result showed that Candidate support significantly moderated the effect of survey time (pre- versus post-election) on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2004) = 5.74, *p* = 0.017,= 0.003, and there was also a significant main effect of SES on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2004) = 47.41, *p* < 0.001,= 0.023, but no significant main effect of Education on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2004) = 0.01, *p* = 0.92,< 0.001. Trump supporters expressed greater modern sexism after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 2.93, *SD* = 0.80, *MPost =* 3.05, *SD* = 0.81, *F*(1, 2004) = 4.82, *p* = 0.028,= 0.002, 95% CI [0.013; 0.230], while Clinton supporters did not show a shift in their modern sexism over time, *MPre* = 2.26, *SD* = 0.76, *MPost =* 2.21, *SD* = 0.77, *F*(1, 2004) = 1.19, *p* = 0.28,= 0.001, 95% CI [-0.134; 0.038].

Candidate support also significantly moderated the effect of survey time on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2004) = 4.17, *p* = 0.041, = 0.002, and there was also a significant main effect of SES on perceptions of discrimination against women, *F*(1, 2004) = 9.29, *p* = 0.002,= 0.005, but no significant main effect of Education on modern sexism, *F*(1, 2004) = 0.34, *p* = 0.56,< 0.001. Whereas Clinton supporters perceived marginally significantly more discrimination against women after the election compared to before, *MPre* = 7.37, *SD* = 1.77, *MPost =* 7.58, *SD* = 1.74, *F*(1, 2004) = 3.83, *p* = 0.051, = 0.002, 95% CI [-0.001; 0.427], Trump supporters did not, *MPre* = 5.78, *SD* = 2.08, *MPost =* 5.63, *SD* = 2.19, *F*(1, 2004) = 1.11, *p* = 0.29, = 0.001, 95% CI [-0.413; 0.124].

None of the other dependent variables (disturbance with the gender pay gap, perceptions of discrimination against men, perceptions of progress toward gender equality, perceived female representation at top levels) showed a significant interaction of survey time by candidate supported, *F*s ≤ 2.06, *p*s ≥ 0.15, ≤ 0.001, controlling for SES and Education.

*Potential consequences of shifts in modern sexism as a function of Survey time and Candidate support.* We tested for evidence of indirect effects, by which the increase in Trump supporters’ modern sexism after (versus before) the election could shape their gender-biased attitudes, controlling for SES and Education. SES and Education were included as Covariates, while Candidate support was included as a potential moderator (W) of the link between survey time (X) and modern sexism (M), and of the link between survey time (X) and the relevant outcome variable (Y) (Model 8 in Hayes (2013), see Figure 1). We effect-coded survey time (pre-election = -1; post-election = 1) and candidate support (Clinton = -1; Trump = 1), and mean-centered the mediator, modern sexism. The coefficients reported below are indirect effects and their bias-corrected, bootstrapped 95% CIs, computed with 10,000 resamples using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2013). There was no meaningful change compared to results reported in the main text. We found significant indirect effects of survey time through modern sexism among Trump supporters, such that Trump supporters’ post-election increase in modern sexism was associated with less disturbance with the gender pay gap, *b* = -0.06, *SE =* 0.03*,* 95% CI [-0.121; -0.003], lower perceived discrimination against women, *b* = -0.09, *SE =* 0.04*,* 95% CI [-0.174; -0.005], higher perceived discrimination against men, *b* = 0.04, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.003; 0.072], greater perceived progress towards equality for women, *b* = 0.05, *SE =* 0.02*,* 95% CI [0.002; 0.097], and a higher estimated proportion of women at top levels in the U.S., *b* = 0.45, *SE =* 0.22*,* 95% CI [0.042; 0.908]. We found no significant indirect effects of survey time on gender-biased attitudes through modern sexism for Clinton supporters, |*b*s| ≤ 0.18, which was expected given that, as noted, the survey time did not significantly affect Clinton supporters’ modern sexism. The index of moderated mediation was significant for each variable, indicating that the indirect effects were significantly larger for Trump supporters than for Clinton supporters.

***(d)* *Propensity score matching analysis.*** To account and correct more fully for (marginally) significant differences in SES and education levels across samples, we conducted a propensity score matching analysis. In research contexts where participant random assignment is not feasible, a propensity score matching analysis can be conducted to statistically “mimic” a randomized design and thereby minimize selection bias across conditions (Austin, 2011; Cochran & Chambers, 1965). This ensures that the difference observed across conditions in the dependent variables is the result of the treatment (here, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election), and *not* the product of various confounding covariates (Beal & Kupzyk, 2014).

To do so, propensity score matching considers each participant’s observed covariates (e.g., one’s demographic profile) and, *based on this set of covariates*, computes a “propensity score”, that is, a given participant’s pot-hoc probability of being selected to take the survey in the pre- rather than post-election phase. For illustration purposes, let us consider a participant with a lower reported educational background. Because participants in the post-election phase were on average of a significantly lower educational level than participants in the pre-election phase, all else being equal, we can say that this particular participant had a higher probability of being selected to take the survey after the election rather than before, independent of when he or she actually took the survey. In this way, a participant’s covariates predict his or her propensity score, regardless of which group he or she actually ended up in (pre- or post-election survey group). It follows that participants with very similar sets of covariates also end up having very “close” propensity scores (different definitions of “closeness” exist in the propensity score literature, and are implemented by different matching algorithms to accordingly constrain the matching procedure).

Given these scores, a propensity score matching analysis matches each participant in one condition with one (or several) participant(s) in the other condition, provided that the propensity scores are sufficiently “close”. Participants with propensity scores that are significantly different from anyone in the opposite group and remain unmatched are excluded from the analysis. Eventually, two new samples (treatment and control groups) are thus created, in which covariates are more equally distributed across conditions than initially, thereby approaching the ideal of the randomized design. A propensity score analysis thereby ensures that the biasing influence of initial confounds is minimized when estimating the overall average effect of the election on participants’ gender-biased attitudes.

*No overall effect of survey time.* We detail below the different steps of the analysis, following Caliendo and Kopeinig's (2008) 4-step framework.

Step 1: Estimating of the propensity score. The fact that participants with lower socio-economic status (SES) and lower education were over-represented in the post-election sample compared to the pre-election sample can be interpreted as retrospective evidence that participants with lower SES and education level had a greater chance of taking the survey after the election rather than before. We thus sought to calculate each participant’s “propensity score”, i.e., his or her probability to participate in the post-election survey rather than the pre-election one, conditional on a number of covariates (gender, race, age, socio-economic status, education level, native English speaker status, registered voter status, political views, employment status, level of responsibility).


To do so, we conducted a probit regression on survey time with each covariate as an independent variable. Following Beal and Kupzyk's (2014) recommendation, all measured covariates where entered in the probit regression, and not only those for which imbalance across samples was observed (i.e., SES and education). However, in order not to match on variables that may have been influenced by the election (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008), we did not include the extent to which one followed the election or candidate support, because the time at which the survey was taken could have influenced how closely participants reported to have followed the election, and their willingness to report support for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Based on this model, a propensity score was generated for each participant in each survey wave, which is used in the next step to match participants across conditions.

Step 2: Selecting a matching algorithm. The next step consisted in building comparable pre- and post-election groups, i.e., to reduce the selection bias across samples to the greatest extent possible. The extent to which bias across samples can be reduced depends on the specific measure used to evaluate “closeness” between two (or more) participants’ propensity scores. As such, our goal in Step 2 was to identify which algorithm would use the measure of “closeness” that would maximally reduce initial selection bias across samples, and then carry out matching using this algorithm.

The effectiveness of an algorithm at reducing selection bias is assessed by looking at the reduction of the mean bias index, i.e. the difference between mean bias across samples before and after matching. After testing several matching algorithms, we found that a nearest-neighbor matching algorithm with radius caliper 0.01 maximally reduced the selection bias across samples (mean bias index before matching: 4.6; mean bias index after matching: 0.4). This means that, of all algorithms tested, a nearest-neighbor matching algorithm with radius caliper 0.01 allowed us to build new pre- and post-election groups that best approximated the randomized trial ideal.

We thus chose this algorithm to carry out the matching procedure. Because fewer participants took the survey in the pre-election wave than in the post-election phase, we matched each participant in the pre-election survey wave to one or more participant(s) in the post-election survey wave, conditional on their propensity score, i.e., on their demographic characteristics (gender, race, age, socio-economic status, education level, native English speaker status, registered voter status, political views, employment status, level of responsibility). Only 6 participants in the pre-election phase, and 2 in the post-election phase were unmatched, and thus excluded. This low number of exclusions ensured that power to detect effects of the election in Step 4 was virtually unchanged.

Step 3: Checking for balance in the demographic characteristics across groups. To assess the extent to which bias in covariates had been reduced after matching (and in particular bias in SES and education across groups), we used the two new pre- and post-election groups and conducted t-tests on each of the covariates with survey time as the independent variable. Results showed that the minimum p-value acrosscovariates was: *p* = 0.72 (native English speaker status), indicating that the new pre- and post-election groups were no longer significantly different along any of the covariates measured in the study (see Figure S1 for covariate balance obtained after matching).

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*Figure S1*. Covariate balance before and after matching participants across time surveys.

Step 4: Estimating the effects of the treatment and interpreting the results. With balance achieved on all covariates across the new pre- and post-election groups, it was possible to more reliably estimate the average effect of the election on each of our dependent variables. To do so, we used the new pre- and post- samples built in Step 2 to conduct t-tests on each of the dependent variables with survey time, as an independent variable.

Results showed that compared to participants in the pre-election phase, participants in the post-election phase did not report significantly greater modern sexism (DifferencePost-Pre = 0.039, *SE* = 0.036, *t* = 1.08; ATE = 0.037) or significantly greater disturbance with the gender pay gap(DifferencePost-Pre = 0.016, *SE* = 0.068, *t* = 0.23; ATE = 0.013). There was also no significant differences across conditions in perceptions of gender discrimination against women(DifferencePost-Pre = -0.041, *SE* = 0.088, *t* = -0.47; ATE = -0.034), of gender discrimination against men (DifferencePost-Pre = 0.124, *SE* = 0.092, *t* = 1.34; ATE = 0.124), of progress toward gender equality(DifferencePost-Pre = 0.015, *SE* = 0.046, *t* = 0.32; ATE = 0.011), or of female representation at top levels(DifferencePost-Pre = 0.131%, *SE* = 0.791%, *t* = 0.17; ATE = 0.105%).Consistent with primary analyses, this propensity score matching analysis corroborated the finding that there was therefore no significant main effect of the election on reported gender-biased attitudes among Americans overall.

*Different effects of survey time for Clinton versus Trump supporters.* A series of t-tests, chi-square and tau tests on the covariates measured revealed that there were no significant differences on any of the covariates across pre- and post-election sub-samples of Trump supporters, *p*s ≥ 0.15 (see Table S7). This suggested that the two sub-samples of Trump supporters already approximated a randomized design. As a result, no propensity score matching analysis was necessary, and the estimate of the election’s effects on Trump supporters’ gender biased attitudes above can be considered reliable.

However, similar t-tests, chi-square and tau tests conducted among the pre- and post-election subsamples of Clinton supporters on the various covariates measured revealed that there were several significant differences across the two sub-samples of Clinton supporters (see Table S8). Accordingly, we ran a propensity score matching analysis to assess the effects of the election among Clinton supporters.

First, we used the propensity scores generated in the first overall propensity score analysis (see above) as a basis for the matching procedure. Second, we tested the effectiveness of several matching algorithms at reducing the bias across the two sub-samples of Clinton supporters, and found that a normal local linear regression matching was best able to reduce the initial mean bias across pre- and post-election sub-samples (mean bias index before matching: 7.1; mean bias index after matching: 2.3). This means that, of all algorithms tested, a normal local linear regression matching

Table S7. *Tests of potential significant differences in demographics across pre- and post-election sub-samples of Trump supporters.*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Demographic variables** | **Categories** | **Pre-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Post-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Pearson**  **chi-square**  **χ2** | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** | |
| Gender | Men | 193 | 240 | 0.03 | / | 1 | 0.87 |
|  | Women | 158 | 192 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Other | 0 | 0 |  |  |  |  |
| Race | White | 296 | 368 | 1.14 | / | 4 | 0.89 |
|  | Black | 7 | 8 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Asian | 13 | 11 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Hispanic or Latino | 24 | 33 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Other | 11 | 12 |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | *M* = 39.28  *SD* = 15.35 | *M* = 37.67  *SD* = 15.77 | / | 1.45 | 781 | 0.15 |
| Education | 1 – Less than high school | 2 | 2 | / | 0.20 | 781 | 0.84 |
|  | 2 – High school | 54 | 79 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 3 – Incomplete college | 87 | 97 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 4 – Associate’s Degree (AA) | 44 | 47 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5 – Bachelor’s Degree (BA, BS, BBA) | 105 | 142 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 6 – Master’s Degree (MA, MS, MBA) | 50 | 47 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 7 – Doctor’s Degree (Ph.D., JD, MD) | 9 | 18 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 4.09  *SD* = 1.42 | *M* = 4.07  *SD* = 1.46 |  |  |  |  |
| Socio-economic background | 1 – Working class / Lower class | 39 | 56 | / | 0.62 | 781 | 0.54 |
| 2 – Lower-middle class | 71 | 94 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 – Middle class | 183 | 214 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 – Upper-middle class | 56 | 57 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 – Upper class | 2 | 11 |  |  |  |  |
|  | *M* = 2.75  *SD* = 0.88 | *M* = 2.71  *SD* = 0.94 |  |  |  |  |

*Note.* *N* = 783.

Table S7 Continued.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Demographic variables** | **Categories** | **Pre-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Post-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Pearson**  **chi-square**  **χ2** | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** |
| English as a first language | Yes | 341 | 426 | 2.06 | / | 1 | 0.15 |
| No | 10 | 6 |  |  |  |  |
| Employment status | Full time | 128 | 167 | 0.58 | / | 4 | 0.97 |
| Part time | 35 | 43 |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | 19 | 25 |  |  |  |  |
| Retired | 139 | 161 |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently working (e.g., stay-at-home- parent, on leave, etc.) | 30 | 36 |  |  |  |  |
| Level of managerial responsibility | 1 – No managerial responsibilities | 234 | 272 | / | -0.92 | 781 | 0.36 |
| 2 – Lower management | 15 | 26 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 – Middle management | 46 | 53 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 – Top management team | 20 | 33 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 – Executive | 36 | 48 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 1.89  *SD* = 1.39 | *M* = 1.98  *SD* = 1.44 |  |  |  |  |
| Political views | 1 – Extremely liberal | 6 | 5 | / | 0.51 | 781 | 0.61 |
|  | 2 | 3 | 11 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 3 | 14 | 13 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 4 | 70 | 109 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5 | 110 | 108 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 6 | 89 | 111 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 7 – Extremely conservative | 59 | 75 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 5.22  *SD* = 1.26 | *M* = 5.17  *SD* = 1.31 |  |  |  |  |

*Note.* *N* = 783.

Table S8. *Tests of potential significant differences in demographics across pre- and post-election sub-samples of Clinton supporters.*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Demographic variables** | **Categories** | **Pre-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Post-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Pearson**  **chi-square**  **χ2** | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** | |
| Gender | Men | 288 | 270 | 1.35 | / | 2 | 0.51 |
|  | Women | 333 | 335 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Other | 1 | 0 |  |  |  |  |
| Race | White | 373 | 342 | 5.40 | / | 4 | 0.25 |
|  | Black | 138 | 130 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Asian | 33 | 39 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Hispanic or Latino | 63 | 67 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Other | 15 | 27 |  |  |  |  |
| Age |  | *M* = 31.77  *SD* = 16.57 | *M* = 31.22  *SD* = 17.64 | / | 0.56 | 1215.04 | 0.58 |
| Education | 1 – Less than high school | 2 | 6 | / | 1.79 | 1225 | 0.073 |
|  | 2 – High school | 72 | 87 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 3 – Incomplete college | 120 | 122 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 4 – Associate’s Degree (AA) | 77 | 67 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5 – Bachelor’s Degree (BA, BS, BBA) | 209 | 203 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 6 – Master’s Degree (MA, MS, MBA) | 108 | 89 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 7 – Doctor’s Degree (Ph.D., JD, MD) | 34 | 31 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 4.41  *SD* = 1.43 | *M* = 4.26  *SD* = 1.48 |  |  |  |  |
| Socio-economic background | 1 – Working class / Lower class | 79 | 89 | / | 2.07 | 1225 | 0.039 |
| 2 – Lower-middle class | 129 | 140 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 – Middle class | 292 | 286 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 – Upper-middle class | 113 | 81 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 – Upper class | 9 | 9 |  |  |  |  |
|  | *M* = 2.75  *SD* = 0.95 | *M* = 2.64  *SD* = 0.94 |  |  |  |  |

*Note.* *N* = 1,227.


Table S8 Continued.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Demographic variables** | **Categories** | **Pre-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Post-election**  **sample**  **frequencies** | **Pearson**  **chi-square**  **χ2** | ***t*** | ***df*** | ***p*** |
| English as a first language | Yes | 595 | 578 | 0.01 | / | 1 | 0.92 |
| No | 27 | 27 |  |  |  |  |
| Employment status | Full time | 290 | 252 | 10.18 | / | 4 | 0.037 |
| Part time | 81 | 81 |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployed | 36 | 50 |  |  |  |  |
| Retired | 170 | 154 |  |  |  |  |
| Not currently working (e.g., stay-at-home- parent, on leave, etc.) | 45 | 68 |  |  |  |  |
| Level of managerial responsibility | 1 – No managerial responsibilities | 379 | 406 | / | 2.04 | 1224.98 | 0.041 |
| 2 – Lower management | 39 | 44 |  |  |  |  |
| 3 – Middle management | 106 | 73 |  |  |  |  |
| 4 – Top management team | 43 | 29 |  |  |  |  |
| 5 – Executive | 55 | 53 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 1.96  *SD* = 1.36 | *M* = 1.81  *SD* = 1.32 |  |  |  |  |
| Political views | 1 – Extremely liberal | 85 | 90 | / | -0.15 | 1225 | 0.88 |
|  | 2 | 134 | 122 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 3 | 125 | 123 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 4 | 176 | 166 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5 | 58 | 57 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 6 | 29 | 27 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 7 – Extremely conservative | 15 | 20 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | *M* = 3.22  *SD* = 1.48 | *M* = 3.23  *SD* = 1.53 |  |  |  |  |

*Note.* *N* = 1,227.

algorithm allowed us to build new pre- and post-election sub-samples of Clinton supporters that best approximated the randomized trial ideal.

We thus chose this algorithm to carry out the matching procedure. Because fewer Clinton supporters took the survey in the pre-election wave than in the post-election phase, we matched each Clinton supporters in the pre-election survey wave to one or more Clinton supporter(s) in the post-election survey wave, conditional on their propensity score, i.e., on their demographic characteristics (gender, race, age, socio-economic status, education level, native English speaker status, registered voter status, political views, employment status, level of responsibility). No Clinton supporter in the pre-election phase or in the post-election phaseremained unmatched (i.e., excluded). This low number of exclusions ensured that power to detect effects of the election would be virtually unchanged. Third, we assessed the extent to which bias in covariates had been reduced after matching (and in particular bias in employment status, level of managerial responsibility, SES and education across sub-groups of Clinton supporters). To do, we used the two new pre- and post-election groups of Clinton supporters, and conducted t-tests on each of the covariates with survey time as the independent variable. Results showed that the minimum p-value acrosscovariates was:0.26 (Level of managerial responsibility)**,** indicating that the new pre- and post-election groups of Clinton supporters were no longer significantly different along any of the covariates measured in the study (see Figure S2 for covariate balance obtained after matching).



*Figure S2*. Covariate balance before and after matching Clinton supporters across time surveys.

Finally, we estimated the average effect of the election on each of our dependent variables among Clinton supporters. To do so, we used the new pre- and post- samples of Clinton supporters built in Step 2 to conduct t-tests on each of the dependent variables with survey time, as an independent variable.

Consistent with results reported in the main text, results of the propensity score matching analysis conducted on the sub-sample of Clinton supporters revealed that, compared to Clinton supporters in the pre-election phase, Clinton supporters in the post-election phase report marginally greater perceptions of discrimination against women (DifferencePost-Pre = 0.192, *SE* = 0.102, *t* = 1.89; ATE = 0.199).

Also consistent with results reported in the main text, compared to Clinton supporters in the pre-election phase, Clinton supporters in the post-election phase did not report significantly greater modern sexism (DifferencePost-Pre = -0.051, *SE* = 0.044, *t* = -1.14; ATE = -0.051) or disturbance with the gender pay gap (DifferencePost-Pre = 0.056, *SE* = 0.073, *t* = 0.76; ATE = 0.041). There was not either any significant pre- versus post-election differences in reported perceptions of gender discrimination against men (DifferencePost-Pre = 0.098, *SE* = 0.123, *t* = 0.80; ATE = 0.131), of progress toward gender equality(DifferencePost-Pre = -0.090, *SE* = 0.052, *t* = -1.75; ATE = -0.089), or of female representation at top levels(DifferencePost-Pre = -1.069%, *SE* = 1.192%, *t* = -0.90; ATE = -1.038%).

**(3) Multiple hypothesis testing.** We used two common methods for multiple testing adjustment (see formulas below):

Bonferroni: *p*adj = α \* k

TCH (Tukey, Ciminera, & Heyse, 1985): *p*adj = 1 – (1 – *p*)√k

Where: *p*adj is the adjusted value

*p* is the nominal/raw value

k is the number of variables (in our case, 6)

In sum, as noted in the main text, the results for Trump supporters appear robust across the four robustness checks applied, whereas the four robustness checks applied to the results for Clinton supporters yielded mixed results, and we thus conclude are less robust.

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**APPENDIX**

**Full Scale For the Measure of Disturbance With the Gender Pay Gap**

1. Recent statistics confirm that across all jobs, women who work full-time earn 78 cents for every dollar a man earns for the same work.
2. Recent statistics show that women earn less than men do in 99% of jobs.
3. Recent statistics show that the more education a woman has, the more underpaid she is relative to a man with the same education.
4. Recent statistics reveal that female financial managers receive 67 cents for every dollar their male peers make.
5. Recent statistics show that the gender pay gap has been essentially unchanged for the past 10 years.
6. Recent statistics show that the gender gap in pay will take over 100 years to close.

Scale: 1 “Not at all disturbed” to 7 “Extremely disturbed”