

Supplemental Materials for Exposure to the 2014 Gaza War and support for militancy:

The role of emotion dysregulation

Full details on measures employed in Study 1 (translated to English)-S1

Exposure to 2014 Gaza war

The following questions address the consequences the last war, operation “Protective Edge,” may have had on your life (the rocket sirens and attacks, the tunnel threat, and mortar shells). Some of the questions might be difficult and we appreciate your willingness to respond. We hope that this information could assist people who are facing similar difficulties.

1) Have you experienced difficult events such as being witnessed of terror or rocket attack, serious injury, or a death or injury of a close other as a result of rockets or terror attacks?

- a. No
- b. Yes

2) If the answer is yes, can you tell us how many such events you experienced?

3) Have you experienced or been exposed to the death of a family member or a close friend as a result of terror or rocket attack?

- a. No
- b. Yes

4) If the answer is yes, can you tell us how many such events you experienced? _____

5) Have you, anyone in your immediate family or one of your friends been injured as a result of terror or rocket attacks?

- a. No
- b. Yes

6) If the answer is yes, can you tell us how many such events you experienced? _____

7) Have you witnessed a rocket attack or terrorism or were present at a site where there were people injured or killed in such an attack?

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- a. No
- b. Yes

8) If the answer is yes, can you tell us how many such events you experienced? _____

9) Have you suffered damage to property as a result of rockets or terror attacks in the last year (since the operation)?

- 1. No
- 2. Some damage
- 3. Severe damage

10) Have you suffered financial loss as a result of rockets or terror attacks?

- 1. No
- 2. Some damage
- 3. Severe damage

11) Have you or someone in your immediate family had to leave your home as a result of rockets or terror attacks?

- 1. No
- 2. Yes

12) Have you experienced other difficult events during the past year (which were not related to rockets or terror attacks), such as death, disease or injury of a close person, divorce or a loss of work place ?

- 1. No
- 2. Yes

Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS)

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Try to think about those security events, specifically those who took place during Operation 'protective edge' until today. Please indicate how often you experience each of the following conditions on a scale from 1 to 6:

1. I pay attention to how I feel. (r)
2. I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control.
3. I have no idea how I am feeling.
4. I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings.
5. I know exactly how I am feeling. (r)
6. I am confused about how I feel.
7. When I'm upset, I acknowledge my emotions. (r)
8. When I'm upset, I acknowledge my emotions. (r)
9. When I'm upset, I have difficulty getting work done.
10. When I'm upset, I become out of control.
11. When I'm upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time.
12. When I'm upset, I believe that I'll end up feeling very depressed.
13. When I'm upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important. (r)
14. When I'm upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things.
15. When I'm upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way.-
16. When I'm upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way.
17. When I'm upset, I have difficulty concentrating
18. When I'm upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.
19. When I'm upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better.
20. When I'm upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way.
21. When I'm upset, I lose control over my behaviors.

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22. 3When I'm upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else.

23. When I'm upset, I take time to figure out what I'm really feeling. (r)

24. When I'm upset, my emotions feel overwhelming.

Items Excluded from the analysis:

1. I am clear about my feelings. (r)
2. I am attentive to my feelings. (r)
3. I care about what I am feeling. (r)
4. When I'm upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way.
5. When I'm upset, I feel out of control.
6. When I'm upset, I can still get things done. (r)
7. When I'm upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better. (r)
8. When I'm upset, I feel like I am weak
9. When I'm upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviors. (r)
10. When I'm upset, I start to feel very bad about myself.
11. When I'm upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do
12. When I'm upset, it takes me a long time to feel better

Post-traumatic stress symptoms (PSS)

In the next section, we present a list of events that people may experience after exposure to difficult events. Please Indicate to what extent you have experienced each of these feelings in the past month on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (To very great extent).

1. Repeated images or thoughts of terror attacks.
2. Repeated dreams or nightmares of terror attacks.
3. Sometimes, when things remind you of terror attacks, you act or feel as if you were there
4. Trying to avoid thoughts or feelings related to terror attacks
5. Avoiding activities, people or situations that remind you of terror attacks
6. Feeling distant or cut off from other people
7. Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have loving feelings toward other people.
8. Trouble falling or staying asleep
9. Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts
10. Being super alert or watchful or on guard
11. Feeling very emotionally upset when reminded of the trauma
12. Having physical reactions when reminded of the trauma (for example, sweating, heart racing)
13. Not being able to remember important parts of the trauma
14. Losing interest or not participating in activities you used to do
15. Feeling as if your future hopes or plans will not come true
16. Unwanted upsetting memories about the trauma
17. Being jumpy or easily startled

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18. These difficulties interfere with your everyday life (for example relationships, work,
or other important activities)

Humiliation-inducing contrived article**original text (in Hebrew).**

לפנייך כתבה שהתפרסמה לאחרונה באתר וואלה חדשות בנושא חפירת המנהרות על ידי חמאס. חשוב

לנו להבין את עמדתך בנושא ולכן נבקש ממך לקרוא את הקטע ולענות על השאלות שמופיעות אחריו:



חמאס משתמש במכונות חפירה כדי להאיץ את חפירת המנהרות בעזה

מקורות בעזה מסרו לוואלה חדשות כי חמאס פועל לקדם את חפירת המנהרות ההתקפיות מהרצוה באמצעות כלים הנדסיים המסוגלים לפעול במקומות קטנים. גורמי ביטחון בישראל אישרו את הדברים וצינו כי במקביל הארגון מתאמץ להאיץ את ייצור הרקטות לטווח קצר

תגיות: חמאס, רצועת עזה, מנהרות

חמאס עבר להשתמש בכלים הנדסיים מתחת לפני הקרקע על מנת לחפור את המנהרות ההתקפיות לכיוון

ישראל – כך מסרו מקורות בעזה לוואלה חדשות. מעל פני הקרקע נראים היטב מהצד הישראלי גם הדחפורים

הגדולים יותר שמכשירים את הפתחים של המנהרות.

גורמי ביטחון בישראל אישרו את הדברים ואמרו כי ניכר מאמץ עילאי של חמאס לחפור מנהרות

במהירות גדולה, ובמקביל לייצר כמה שיותר רקטות לטווח קצר. זאת לאחר שבארגון הבינו שדווקא הרקטות

והמרגמות לטווח קצר יוצרות נזק גדול ומקשות על הפעילות של מערכת ההגנה "כיפת ברזל". על פי הערכות

צה"ל, חלק מהמנהרות ההתקפיות נמצאות כבר מתחת לבתי הילדים בקיבוצים בעוטף עזה ורק מחכות לפקודה.

בתוך כך, אלוף פיקוד הדרום אמר בשיחה עם תא הכתבים המדיניים כי הוא לא מאמין שניתן לפרוץ את

עזה וכן השווה את חמאס לדאעש ואמר כי הארגון בעזה מסוכן לא פחות ממקבילו הקיצוני הפועל בסוריה

ובעירק.



אנשי חמאס במנהרה במהלך צוק איתן (צילום: רויטרס).

כזכור, פחות משבועיים לאחר כניסתה לתוקף של הפסקת האש אחרי צוק איתן הגיעו דיווחים כי חמאס חידש את ייצור הרקטות ואת פעילות ההברחות לרצועת עזה וכן פתח במבצע שיקום של המנהרות ההתקפיות שצה"ל הרס במהלך צוק איתן. זאת, על אף המאמצים בקהיר להגיע להסדרה ארוכת טווח בנושא. דיווחים אלה מקבלים משנה תוקף על ידי דבריו של בכיר חמאס בעזה מחמוד א-זהאר "לניצחונות אבות רבים ולהפסד יש רק אב אחד ושמו נתניהו", אמר א-זהאר. הוא לגלג על ישראל כשאמר שהיא סבורה שהרסה את כל המנהרות. "מי מונע מאיתנו היום לבנות מנהרות חדשות?", תהה.

Translated article.

The following is an article recently published on the *Walla News* website regarding Hamas's digging of tunnels. It is important for us to understand your stance on this subject and thus we would like to ask you to read the text carefully and answer the subsequent questions.

Hamas is using digging machines

Hamas is using digging machine in order to accelerate the construction of tunnels in the Gaza Strip.

Sources from Gaza have communicated to *Walla News* that Hamas is advancing the digging of tunnels by using engineering machinery capable of working in small spaces. Security

officials in Israel have confirmed the news and have further stated that the organization is accelerating the production of short-range rockets as well.

According to sources in the Gaza Strip, Hamas has started to implement underground engineering machinery in the digging of military tunnels crossing into Israeli territory. Above ground level, the bulldozers that are used to construct the tunnels' entrances are easily seen from the Israeli side.

Security officials have confirmed the news and added that they have noticed the strenuous efforts Hamas makes to dig tunnels as fast as possible and to produce as many short-range rockets as possible. This new goal stems from Hamas's understanding that short-range rockets inflict significant damage and hinder the effectiveness of the defense system "Iron Dome." The IDF (Israel Defense forces) estimates that some of the military tunnels have already reached children's education buildings of a few kibbutzim in the Gaza envelope and only await commands.

The Southern Command said in a conversation with political reporters that he does not believe the Gaza Strip could be disarmed completely. In addition, he compared Hamas to ISIS and stated that the Gaza organization is no less dangerous than its extreme counterpart acting in Syria and Iraq.

As a reminder, two weeks after the beginning of the ceasefire the followed Operation Protective Edge, Hamas renewed the production of rockets and the smuggling activity into the Gaza Strip. Moreover, it started a mission of rehabilitating the tunnels destroyed by the IDF during Operation Protective Edge, despite the great efforts made by the government in Cairo to reach a long-term agreement. These reports are supported by Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior Hamas official in Gaza, who stated that "Victory has many fathers but failure has only one and his name is Netanyahu." He mocked Israel for its belief in having destroyed the tunnels. "Who prevents us from building new tunnels?", he wondered.

Reading comprehension.

The following are questions about the text you just read. Try to answer correctly as you understand best.

1. What is the subject of the article?
 - a. The digging of tunnels advanced by Hamas since Operation Protective Edge.
 - b. The number of Palestinian civilians killed during Operation Protective Edge.
 - c. A critique of the government's actions during Operation Protective Edge.
 - d. The cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas after Operation Protective Edge.
2. What is the Israeli security officials' stance according to the article?
 - a. There is no concern about the military tunnels' construction.
 - b. Hamas after Operation Protective Edge is "weak and thus there is no real reason to launch military action."
 - c. Some of the military tunnels have already reached children's education buildings of a few kibbutzim in the Gaza Envelop.
 - d. It is not right to criticize the government's actions during Operation Protective Edge.
3. Which one is Mahmoud al-Zahar's response cited in the article?
 - a. "During Operation Protective Edge we witnessed the Israeli government's weakness."
 - b. "Hamas has proven its strength during Operation Protective Edge."
 - c. "Operation Protective Edge is only the beginning."

- d. "Victory has many fathers but failure has only one and his name is Netanyahu."

Group-based humiliation

Try to rate your emotions towards the Palestinians while reading the article. State your response from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much).

1. Anger towards Palestinians
2. Hostility towards Palestinians
3. Hope regarding future relations with Palestinians
4. Fear of the Palestinians
5. Optimism regarding future relations with Palestinians
6. Hatred towards Palestinians
7. Empathy towards Palestinians
8. Frustration
9. Humiliation in light of the Palestinians' successes in fighting Israel
10. Concern because of Palestinians

Support for militancy

Indicate to what extent you support or oppose the following statements on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much).

1. As long as there is no peace agreement with the Palestinians, they should not be allowed to work within the State of Israel.
2. A military strike in Gaza will restore Israel's deterrence capability.
3. Regardless of the state of war and violence, Israel must deliver food and medicine to civilians in the Gaza Strip.
4. Israel should allow Palestinian women and children to receive medical treatment in hospitals.

Demographic questionnaire

Birth year: _____

Gender:

1. Male
2. Female

How do you define yourself in terms of your religiosity?

1. Secular
2. Traditional
3. Religious
4. Ultra-Orthodox

What is your political stance regarding the conflict?

1. Extreme right 2. Moderate right
2. Centre
3. Moderate left
4. 7. Extreme left

What is your education level ?

1. Elementary or less (up to 8 years of schooling)
2. Complete high-school (12 years of schooling)
3. Post-secondary education (teachers' college, nursing school etc.)
4. Complete academic degree (B.A. or more)
5. Complete academic degree (M.A. or more)

Marital status:

1. Single
2. Married

3. Divorced\Separated
4. Widow\er
5. Living with a partner without being married to him/her

Please indicate your place of residence for the past two years? _____

Income: The average monthly income per household in Israel is currently 12,345 NIS. Is
your total household income (of both spouses):

1. Much below the average
2. A little below the average
3. Approximately average
4. A little above the average
5. Much above the average

Distribution of yes responses to the exposure items Study 1- S2

Table S3

Distribution of yes responses to the exposure items.

Exposure item	F	% of yes response
1. Have you experienced difficult events such as being witnessed of terror or rocket attack, serious injury, or a death or injury of a close other as a result of rockets or terror attacks?	26	21.7
2. Have you experienced or been exposed to the death of a family member or a close friend as a result of terror or rocket attack?	8	6.7
3. Have you, anyone in your immediate family or one of your friends been injured as a result of terror or rocket attacks?	13	10.8
4. Have you witnessed a rocket attack or terrorism or were present at a site where there were people injured or killed in such an attack?	21	17.5
5. Have you suffered damage to property as a result of rockets or terror attacks in the last year (since the operation)?	10	8.3
6. Have you suffered financial loss as a result of rockets or terror attacks?	17	14.2
7. Have you or someone in your immediate family had to leave your home as a result of rockets or terror attacks?	31	25.8

Full details on measures employed in Study 2 (translated to English)- S3

Study 2- T1 Measures

The following measures were identical to those employed in Study 1.

1. Exposure to political violence- 2014 Israel-Gaza war
2. Emotion dysregulation
3. Post-traumatic stress symptoms (PSS)
4. Demographic questionnaire

Humiliation-inducing contrived article

Original text (in Hebrew).

לפנייך כתבה שהתפרסמה לאחרונה באתר וואלה חדשות בנושא חפירת המנהרות על ידי חמאס. חשוב לנו להבין את עמדתך בנושא ולכן נבקש ממך לקרוא את הטקסט בעיון ולענות על השאלות שמופיעות אחריו:



חמאס בנה מחדש את מערך המנהרות; לפי הערכות, חלקן כבר בשטח ישראל

הארגון משקיע מאמצים והון עתק בפרויקט המנהרות, ולפי הערכות מספרן מתקרב עתה לזה שהיה ערב "צוק איתן". גורם ביטחוני: הקמת מכשול אפקטיבי בגבול הרצועה תעלה כ-2.8 מיליארד שקלים, סכום שאינו מופיע בתקציב הביטחון לשנה הנוכחית

רועי קייס | פורסם: 22.01.16, 21:49

בשבועות האחרונים חשף שב"כ לפחות שלוש חוליות טרור של חמאס בגדה המערבית ובמזרח ירושלים, שתכננו פיגועים בנשק חם נגד ישראלים. המעצרים וכתבי האישום שהוגשו בעקבותיהם העלו חשדות בדבר כוונות מרחיקות לכת: פיגועי התאבדות, חטיפה וירי. לנוכח הצהרות חוזרות ונשנות של בכירי הארגון ברצועת עזה — הכיוון נראה ברור. ישנם בכירים בחמאס שמבקשים להפוך את העימות האלים המתנהל בשטחים כבר יותר משלושה חודשים לאינתיפאדה חמושה. תוך כדי המערכה האחרונה בעזה, מבצע צוק איתן בקיץ 2014, חשפה ישראל 32 מנהרות התקפיות שחפרו הפלסטינים לכיוון ישראל. כשליש מהן כבר נחפרו ממזרח לגדר — בתוך שטח ישראל. צה"ל הודיע שהרס את כל המנהרות הללו, אבל מאז הסתיימה המלחמה חודשו החפירות. חמאס משקיע מאמצים והון עתק בפרויקט המנהרות. ההערכה הסבירה היא כי מספר המנהרות החוצות את הגבול מתקרב למספרן ערב צוק איתן.

האם חמאס מחפש עימות צבאי נוסף עם ישראל? החוכמה המקובלת גורסת שלא. אולם, ייתכן כי המאמץ הישראלי לאיתור מנהרות לצד החשש של חמאס שישראל תכה ראשונה יביאו את מנהיגי הזרוע הצבאית, מוחמד דף, מרוואן עיסא ויחיא סנוואר, לפתוח במתקפה חד-צדדית מכיוונם, למרות המחיר הכבד שעלולה הרצועה לשלם. באחרונה, פרסם חמאס כמה קטעי וידאו מתקופת החטיפה של שליט. הפרסומים נועדו לשמר את הדימוי של חמאס בתודעת תושבי הרצועה כארגון "התנגדות", הנלחם נגד ישראל, אבל נדמה שהם מלמדים גם על החשיבות העצומה שחמאס מוסיף לייחס למבצעי חטיפה, כדרך להכתיב לישראל ויתורים. התפיסה המבצעית של הארגון קיבלה תוקף במלחמה האחרונה. טפטוף הרקטות למרכז הארץ נתפס בחמאס כהישג ולקראת סוף המלחמה כיוון הארגון אש מרגמות מסיבית לכיוון יישובי עוטף עזה, לאחר שזיהה שאוכלוסיית העוטף היא נקודת תורפה ישראלית.

מה עושה ישראל באשר לאתגר המנהרות? לפי דבריו של גורם ביטחוני בכיר "העלות המשוערת של הקמת גדר חדשה סביב הרצועה, שתכלול מענה טכנולוגי מספק לסוגיית המנהרות, עומדת על לא פחות מ-2.8 מיליארד שקלים". הסעיף התקציבי עצום הממדים הזה כלל אינו מופיע בתקציב הביטחון לשנה הנוכחית. לכך מגיב אלוף משנה רומן גופמן, כיום מפקד החטיבה המרחבית עציון (בית לחם): "היוזמה ואיתה התחבולה, ההעזה והתעוזה הן שיחרצו את גורל המערכה הבאה. צה"ל לא הצטיין בתחומים האלה בצוק איתן. חובה עלינו לחולל שינוי עמוק". עצם הודאת הצבא בפערים הללו, מאוחרת ככל שתהיה, מרשימה. אבל המרכיבים הבסיסיים בתמונת המצב בדרום — המשך חפירת המנהרות, היעדרו של מכשול אפקטיבי בגבול הרצועה והמצור ההדוק על עזה — מותירים את הסיכון לסיבוב נוסף בעינו.

Translated article.

Hamas has rebuilt its tunnel network; it is estimated that some of the tunnels have already reached Israeli territory.

The Hamas organization invests strenuous efforts and great sums of money in its tunnel project. It is estimated that the number of tunnels is likely nearly equivalent to that

which existed prior to Operation Protective Edge. According to a security official, building an effective barrier on the Gaza Strip's border will cost 2.8 billion shekels, a sum which is not included in this year's Israeli security budget.

In the past several weeks, the General Security Service (Shin Bet) has uncovered at least three terrorist cells in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which were planning armed attacks against Israelis. Their arrests and following indictments revealed suspicions of far-reaching intentions: suicide attacks, kidnappings, and shooting. In fact, repeated declarations by the organization's officials in the Gaza Strip reveal clear intentions. Some senior Hamas officials aim at transforming the violent confrontations, taking place in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, to an armed intifada. During the last war in Gaza, Operation Protective Edge, in the summer of 2014, Israel discovered 32 military tunnels built by the Palestinians to enter Israeli territory. The IDF declared that it had destroyed the tunnels. Nonetheless, since the end of the war, tunnel construction has been renewed. In fact, Hamas invests great efforts and great sums of money in the tunnel project. Thus, it is estimated that there are as many tunnels as there were just before Operation Protective Edge.

Does Hamas seek another military conflict with Israel? According to the common understanding, it is not. Nevertheless, it is possible that Israel's efforts to locate the tunnels added to Hamas's concern about Israel attacking first, which may urge the leaders of the military arm, Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Yihye Sanwar, to launch a unilateral attack from their side, despite the great costs it may inflict on the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Hamas has recently released several videos from the period of Shalit's abduction. Releasing these is aimed to preserve the Gaza Strip inhabitants' perception of Hamas as a "Resistance" organization, which fights against Israel. In addition, it appears that these videos emphasize the great importance Hamas still ascribes to abduction missions as a way to impose concessions on Israel. The military tactic of the organization has been reinforced during the

last war. Rockets occasionally reaching Israel's center has been regarded by Hamas as a success, and towards the end of the war, the organization, who recognized that the Gaza Envelop communities are Israel's pressure point, directed massive mortar shelling towards these communities.

What is Israel doing in response to the challenge posed by the tunnel network?

According to a senior security official, "the estimated cost of building a new fence around the Strip, which will include an adequate technological solution to the tunnel issue, is at least 2.8 billion shekels." This great expense is not included in the security budget designated for the current year. In this regard, Colonel Roman Gofman, who is currently head of the Etzion (Bethlehem) territorial division, said: "Initiative and strategy, courage and daring will seal the fate of the next war. The IDF did not excel in these fields in Operation Protective Edge. We must undertake a deep transformation." The IDF's admission of its own flaws, even if late, is impressive. But the current situation in the south, with continued digging of tunnels, the absence of a true barrier on the Gaza Strip border, and the tight siege on Gaza, could still easily lead to a new war.

Reading comprehension

The following are questions about the text you just read. Try to answer to the best of your understanding.

1. What is the subject of the article?
 - a. The national security situation in the Gaza Strip since Operation Protective Edge.
 - b. The number of Palestinian civilians killed during Operation Protective Edge.
 - c. A critique on the foreign press during Operation Protective Edge.
 - d. Israeli international propaganda.
2. What did the article say about the tunnel threat?
 - a. There is no concern about the military tunnels' construction.
 - b. Hamas does not have the economic faculty to build military tunnels.
 - c. The number of tunnels crossing into Israeli territory is likely nearly equivalent to those that existed prior to the war.
 - d. Hamas has not recovered since Operation Protective Edge and therefore was not concerned with restarting digging tunnels.
3. What is Hamas's stance towards Israel, according to what can be assumed from the article?
 - a. Hamas is not interested in another war.
 - b. Hamas has declared that it is interested in a third Lebanon war.
 - c. Hamas leadership is focused on efforts with Cairo to have the Rafah Border Crossing regularly open.
 - d. Hamas continues to build tunnels and plan soldiers' abductions as a strategy to impose concessions on Israel's government.

Group-based humiliation

Try to rate your emotions towards the Palestinians while reading the article. State your response from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much).

1. Anger towards Palestinians
2. Insult in light of Palestinians' success in fighting Israel
3. Hope regarding future relations with Palestinians
4. Fear of the Palestinians
5. Shame in light of Palestinians' success in fighting Israel
6. Hatred towards Palestinians
7. Optimism regarding future relations with the Palestinians
8. Frustration
9. Humiliation in light of Palestinians' success in fighting Israel
10. Helplessness in light of Palestinians' success in fighting Israel

Tolerance for collateral damage

Now, please think about the following scenario: As part of Israel's efforts to control Palestinian terror, military units are sent to East Jerusalem to act against the rioters. During an intense demonstration in a crowded residential neighborhood, an army commander instructs some of his soldiers to respond with live fire. As a result of the combination of weapons to diffuse demonstrations ("rubber bullets") and live ammunition, dozens of Palestinians are wounded and five are killed, including innocent citizens who did not take part in the demonstration, including two women and an 11-year-old child. Regarding this scenario, please indicate your agreement with the following statements:

1. If such an event occurs, I think that Israel should avoid from firing live ammunition at demonstrators
2. If such an event occurs, I think that fire demonstrators is legitimate and justified
3. If such an event occurs, Israel must do everything in its power to stop the demonstrators without using firearms
4. If such an event occurs, Israel must stop the demonstrators in any way possible, regardless of the damage to the Palestinians

Correlations between group-based emotions -S4

Study 1

Table S1

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between group-based emotions in Study 1.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Anger	4.17	1.42	1	--	--	--	--	--				
2. Fear	4.02	1.28	.37**	1	--	--	--	--				
3. Hostility	2.81	1.41	.80**	.47**	1	--	--	--				
4. Hope	2.38	1.15	-.06	-.19*	-.16	1	--	--				
5. Concern	4.42	1.21	.46**	.77**	.62**	-.22**	1	--				
6. Optimism	2.31	1.22	-.01	-.15	-.12	.16	-.25**	1				
7. Hatred	3.34	1.53	.73**	.09	.69**	.50**	.32**	.23*	1			
8. Frustration	4.54	1.26	.22*	-.38**	.36**	.34**	.51**	.38**	.16	1		
9. Humiliation	2.20	1.39	.33**	.30**	.35**	.05	.18	.03	.40**	.09	1	
10. Empathy	2.31	1.54	-.38**	-.13	.28**	.39**	-.21**	.33**	.35**	-.08	-.07	1

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Study 2

Table S2

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between group-based emotions in Study 2.

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Anger	4.47	1.38	1	--	--	--	--	--				
2. Fear	3.65	1.49	.38**	1	--	--	--	--				
3. Insult	2.88	1.57	.34**	.40**	1	--	--	--				
4. Hope	2.90	1.54	-.20**	.05	-.08	1	--	--				
5. Shame	2.88	1.59	.33**	.40**	.92**	-.09**	1	--				
6. Optimism	2.32	1.24	-.20**	.06	-.01	.66**	-.04	1				
7. Hatred	3.83	1.63	.73**	.36**	.39**	.27**	.38**	.16**	1			
8. Frustration	4.53	1.28	.21*	.49**	.22**	.09*	.25**	-.04	.07	1		
9. Humiliation	2.80	1.52	.34**	.39**	.85**	-.07	.85**	.03	.40**	.28**	1	
10. Helplessness	2.33	1.26	.30**	.52**	.72**	.05	.76**	-.08	.29**	.44**	.70**	1

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Analyses without adjusting for other group-based emotions- S5**Study 1**

Moderated mediation. To further test our hypothesized model, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis, with other group-based emotions entered as controls. We used the PROCESS command with 5,000 iterations (Model 7) to test the conditional indirect effect of exposure to political violence (high vs. low) on humiliation through PSS, at different levels of emotion dysregulation. The analysis revealed a significant conditional indirect effect (index of moderated mediation = .19, $SE = .13$; $CI = [.02, .50]$). More specifically, we found that the indirect effect of exposure on humiliation through PSS was significant at high levels of emotion dysregulation ($B = .31$, $SE = .17$, $CI = [.06, .72]$), and the direct effect was not significant ($B = -.21$, $SE = .26$, $CI = [-.72, .30]$). Conversely, the indirect effect was nonsignificant at low levels of dysregulation ($B = .04$, $SE = .07$, $CI = [-.10, .17]$).

Path analysis. To examine the full model, in which support for militancy is the ultimate outcome, we ran a path analysis. To this end, we used AMOS 21 with maximum likelihood estimation. This procedure facilitates the validation of important aspects of the suggested model by comparing them to possible alternatives (i.e., inverse causality or a direct relationship rather than mediation). The model showed excellent fit to the data ($\chi^2_{(8)} = 8.33$, $p = .139$; $RMSEA = .075$; $NFI = .98$; $CFI = .99$; $TLI = .97$; $SRMR = .037$). All paths of the latent factors were found to be statistically significant and in the expected direction except the path between humiliation and support for militancy ($\beta = .07$, $B = .06$, $p = .284$).

Study 2

Moderated mediation. We used the PROCESS command with 5,000 iterations (Model 7) to test the conditional indirect effect of exposure to political violence (high vs. low) on humiliation through PSS, at different levels of emotion dysregulation. The analysis indicated a significant conditional indirect effect (index of moderated mediation = .13, $SE = .07$; $CI = [.01, .29]$). More specifically, the analysis revealed that the indirect effect of exposure (high vs. low) on humiliation through PSS was significant only at high levels of emotion dysregulation (effect = .27, $SE = .08$, $CI = [.13, .45]$), with the direct effect turning non-significant in this model ($B = -.03$, $SE = .14$, $CI = [-.32, .25]$). The indirect effect at low levels of dysregulation was nonsignificant ($B = .06$, $SE = .05$, $CI = [-.04, .18]$).

Path analysis. To test our full hypothesized model, we employed a path analysis. The model in which exposure predicts humiliation and consequent support for militancy, through PSS only for those high in emotion dysregulation yielded good fit ($\chi^2_{(9)} = 13.842$, $p = .017^1$; $RMSEA = .063$; $NFI = .99$; $TLI = .96$, $CFI = .99$, $SRMR = .0226$). All paths of the latent factors were statistically significant. High-exposure participants showed higher level of PSS, but only among those high in emotion dysregulation. For them, PSS predicted higher group-based humiliation (T2), which in turn was associated with greater support for militancy (T2).

Path analysis- tolerance for collateral damage. To test our full hypothesized model, with tolerance for collateral damage as the ultimate variable, we employed a path analysis. The model in which exposure predicts humiliation and consequent tolerance for collateral damage, through PSS only for those high in emotion dysregulation yielded good fit ($\chi^2_{(9)} = 12.98$, $p < .05$; $RMSEA = .06$; $NFI = .980$; $TLI = .907$, $CFI = .987$, $SRMR = .0214$). All paths of the latent factors were statistically significant, with a significant path between group-based humiliation and support for collateral damage ($\beta = .09$, $B = .08$, $SE = .04$, $p < .05$).

¹ The χ^2 test for goodness of fit was significant, which can imply poor fit of the model to the data. However, a more plausible reason in this case is the large sample ($N > 200$) we used in Study 2, which brought the χ^2 value to significance, regardless of the goodness of fit to the data.

Shame and humiliation as competing factors.

In order to distinguish shame from humiliation, we employed another path analysis, introducing the two discrete emotions as competing factors. The model yielded good fit ($\chi^2_{(9)} = 25.604, p = .007$; $RMSEA = .055$; $NFI = .99$; $TLI = .98$, $CFI = .99$, $SRMR = .0345$). In this analysis, the path between shame and militancy emerged as non-significant ($\beta = .13$, $SE = .08$, $p = .135$), whereas the path between humiliation and militancy ($\beta = .18$, $SE = .08$, $p = .041$) remain significant.

Elaboration on sampling of study 2- S6

To ensure that the samples did not differ on key demographic variables, we made use of the socio-economic index. This is an established national ranking from 1 to 10 pointing to the socio-economic status of all cities and localities in Israel. The Index takes into consideration many demographic variables like household income, education, employment, occupation, religion, age, etc. Guided by this data, for the high-exposure sample we recruited participants from the cities of Ashkelon and Sderot, as well as from two nearby regional councils and 31 towns. Conversely, for the low-exposure sample we recruited participants from the cities of Hadera and Or Aqiva, as well as from four nearby regional councils and 51 towns. Consequently, in Study 2, the mean socio-economic status of the areas within the high-exposure sample was 5.25 out of 10 and 5.86 out of 10 in the low-exposure sample. Comparing other areas as low-exposure alternatives, yielded no better results.