**Appendix**

1. **Descriptive Statistics**

**Table A1. Cross-Sectional Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Obs.** | **Mean** | **St. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** |
| Vote Share*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 20.8319.6921.4820.95 | 6.423.915.267.40 | 15.96.41 | 53.22737.253.2 |
| Immigrants*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 1.642.851.301.37 | 1.331.64.651.16 | .1.6.5.1 | 9.383.89.3 |
| Unemployment*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 9.609.988.929.74 | 3.132.902.873.27 | 3.33.73.53.3 | 20.715.417.120.7 |
| Social Assistance*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 5.696.605.755.36 | 1.912.001.681.86 | 1.42.41.61.4 | 1211.610.512 |
| Farm. Subsidies*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2955766172 | 9.191.516.7912.66 | 7.261.494.326.99 | 00.831.58 | 33.897.4217.5533.89 |
| Income Inequality *Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 25.3126.5924.8625.06 | 2.213.111.551.91 | 20.923.62220.9 | 43.543.530.934.1 |
| Risk of Poverty*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 15.9913.3014.3917.47 | 4.483.924.024.21 | 4.84.86.16 | 27.621.623.527.6 |
| Higher Education*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 20.8128.4622.4217.69 | 6.336.404.774.09 | 9.719.715.79.7 | 56.556.534.833.4 |
| Swedish Population*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 5.3685.204.405.79 | 17.4711.7814.8219.85 | 0000 | 92.256.169.692.2 |
| Manufacturing*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2955766172 | 16.2017.3318.9514.76 | 6.576.405.896.50 | 1.35.64.81.3 | 36.632.932.936.6 |
| Crime*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2965766173 | 6.117.696.295.52 | 2.732.422.512.71 | .72.41.9.7 | 18.413.417.318.4 |
| Population Size*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2955766172 | 18.2165.7813.154.40 | 45.9490.025.592.59 | .8021.405.70.802 | 595.39595.3928.9612.39 |
| Img.\*Unemp.*Urban**Semi-Urban**Rural* | 2975766174 | 14.9028.1811.4511.85 | 11.9117.437.447.16 | .975.44.38.97 | 85.6885.6849.9141.16 |

Note: Following the official definition provided by *Statistics Finland*, urban denotes municipalities where 90 % of its inhabitants live in an urban area, and where the largest urban area has a population of at least 15 000 people. Semi-urban denotes municipalities where between 60-90% of its inhabitants live in urban area, and where the largest urban area has a population between 4 000-15 000 people. Rural denotes municipalities where < 60% of its inhabitants live in an urban area and where the largest urban area has a population of < 15 000, also including municipalities where between 60-90% of its inhabitants live in an urban area that has < 4000 inhabitants. For further details, see: <https://www.sotkanet.fi/sotkanet/en/metadata/indicators/2332>

**Table A2. Time-Series Cross-Sectional Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** | **Obs.** |
| Δ Vote Share *Overall**Between**Within* | 4.77 | 7.811.837.66 | -34.2  - .08 -30.55  | 40.919.844.55  | N = 1141n = 291T = 3.92 |
| Δ Immigrants *Overall**Between**Within* | .247 | . 40. 25. 31 | -1.2-. 2 -1.65  | 3.61.91.95  | N = 1188n = 297T = 4 |
| Δ Unemployment *Overall**Between**Within* | -2.40  | 2.43.7332.31 | - 11.6 - 5.15 - 8.9 | 10.51.23 6.87 | N = 1188n = 297T = 4 |
| Δ Social Assistance *Overall**Between**Within*Δ Farming Subsidies *Overall* *Between* *Within*  | -.94 1. 12 | 1.51. 631.383.021.092.82 | -7.1-3 - 5.67-38.25-.68-41.17 | 3.5. 453.7451.175.2348.25 | N = 1186n = 297T = 3.99N = 1180n = 295T = 4. |
| Δ Income Inequality *Overall**Between* *Within* | 1.13 |  2.27 . 462.23 | -12.3 -1.16 -12.282  | 13.43.38 12.398  | N = 1188n = 297T = 4 |
| Δ Risk of Poverty *Overall**Between* *Within* Population Size *Overall* *Between* *Within* | 1.6717.67 | 2.49. 772.3742.8542.782.45 | -7.3 -.03 -8.10 . 80. 91- 17.18 | 10.13.79. 35595.38559.8853. 18 | N = 1188n = 297T = 4N = 1476n = 297T = 4.99 |
| Δ Im.\*Δ Unemp. *Overall**Between* *Within* | - .29 | 1.28. 521.17 | -6.7-2.24 -9.79  | 23.14.3418.46 | N = 1188n = 297T = 4 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

1. **Robustness of Results to Different Model Specifications**

The analyses presented in the paper suggest that rapid increases in immigration, unemployment and economic dependency on state support have a strong positive effect on support for the radical populist right. To test whether this claim holds and whether increasing ethnic diversity and economic hardship do indeed have such a strong effect on these parties’ performance, I investigate the sensitivity and robustness of these results by estimating various model specifications, both with lags (tables A3. And A4.) and with changes in immigrant populations (table A5.) and changes in economic hardship (table A6.) as the key explanatory variables. Tables A7. and A8. control for the rural/urban dynamics that may be underlying these relationships. Tables A9. and A10. include interactive terms for the key independent variables and the population size.

* 1. ***Models with Lags***

**Table A3. Structural Conditions and PRR support with Lagged DV**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Vote Share | 2Vote Share | 3Vote Share | 4Vote Share | 5Vote Share |
| Immigrants | -1.07\*\*\*(0.22) | -1.08\*\*\*(0.23) | -1.25\*\*\*(0.26) | -0.20(0.37) | -0.30(0.27) |
| Unemployment | 0.26\*\*\*(0.09) | 0.26\*\*\*(0.09) | 0.36\*\*\*(0.12) | 0.10(0.12) | 0.09(0.12) |
| Social Assistance | 0.37\*\*(0.15) | 0.35\*\*(0.15) | 0.42\*\*\*(0.16) | 0.08(0.17) | 0.13(0.17) |
| Farming Subsidies |  | -0.01(0.04) | 0.02(0.05) | -0.02(0.04) | -0.01(0.05) |
| Income Inequality |  |  | 0.26(0.22) | 0.20(0.23) | 0.17(0.27) |
| Risk of Poverty |  |  | -0.11(0.10) | -0.15(0.15) | -0.23(0.18) |
| Higher Education |  |  |  | -0.08(0.10) | -0.13(0.10) |
| Swedish Pop. |  |  |  | -0.18\*\*\*(0.01) | -0.19\*\*\*(0.02) |
| Manufacturing |  |  |  | 0.03(0.03) | -0.01(0.04) |
| Crime |  |  |  | 0.06(0.08) | 0.11(0.09) |
| Population |  |  |  | -0.01\*\*\*(0.01) | -0.01\*\*(0.00) |
| Img.\*Unemp. |  |  |  | 0.03(0.04) |  |
| Lagged Vote Share | 0.91\*\*\*(0.10) | 0.92\*\*\*(0.10) | 0.92\*\*\*(0.10) | 0.82\*\*\*(0.08) | 0.85\*\*\*(0.09) |
| Region FE |  |  |  |  | Yes |
| Constant | 13.88\*\*\*(1.30) | 14.10\*\*\*(1.59) | 7.83(5.57) | 14.92\*\*\*(5.23) | 19.25\*\*\*(5.24) |
| N | 291 | 289 | 289 | 288 | 288 |
| R2 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.66 | 0.71 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A4. Changes over Time and PRR Support with Lagged DV and IVs**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Δ Vote | 2Δ Vote | 3Δ Vote | 4Δ Vote |
| Vote t-1 | -0.18(0.26) | -0.22(0.23) | -0.38\*(0.20) | -0.38\*(0.20) |
| Δ Immigrants |  3.72\*\*\*(0.98) | 1.55\*(0.88) | 1.57\*(0.86) | 1.64\*(0.94) |
| Immigrants t-1 |  | 2.88\*\*\*(0.97) | 2.25\*\*(0.94) | 2.65\*\*(1.14) |
| Δ Unemployment |  2.04\*\*\*(0.14) | 0.63\*\*\*(0.14) | 0.76\*\*\*(0.13) | 0.80\*\*\*(0.14) |
| Unemployment t-1 |  | -0.89\*\*\*(0.11) | -0.43\*\*\*(0.11) | -0.38\*\*(0.15) |
| Δ Social Assistance | 0.33\*(0.19) | 0.63\*\*\*(0.20) | 0.55\*\*\*(0.19) | 0.59\*\*\*(0.19) |
| Social Assistance t-1 |  | -0.18(0.20) | -0.23(0.19) | -0.25(0.19) |
| Δ Farming Subsidies |  |  | -0.22\*(0.12) | -0.24\*\*(0.12) |
| Farming Subsidies t-1 |  |  | 0.15(0.10) | 0.10(0.10) |
| Δ Income Inequality |  |  | -0.11(0.09) | -0.20(0.17) |
| Income Inequality t-1 |  |  |  | -0.14(0.24) |
| Δ Risk of Poverty |  |  | -0.86\*\*\*(0.11) | -0.69\*\*\*(0.16) |
| Risk of Poverty t-1 |  |  |  | 0.20(0.16) |
| Population Size |  |  |  | -0.24\*\*\*(0.08) |
| Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 9.50\*\*\*(0.98) | 18.33\*\*\*(1.95) | 14.28\*\*\*(2.05) | 18.68\*\*\*(6.93) |
| N | 1139 | 1139 | 1131 | 1131 |
| R2 | 0.47 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.65 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Tables A3. and A4. shed light on the robustness of the results to the inclusion of lagged values for the dependent and key independent variables. While it could be plausible that the values the demographic and economic indicators at time point t partly depend on their values at t-1, the interpretation of the results does not change when lagged values are included in the models.

* 1. ***Alternative Models with Changes***

**Table A5. Changes in Immigration and PRR Support**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Δ Vote | 2Vote | 3Δ Vote | 4Vote | 5Δ Vote | 6Vote | 7Δ Vote | 8Vote |
| Δ Immigrants | 6.06\*\*\*(1.01) | 7.47\*\*\*(1.21) | 5.85\*\*\*(1.01) | 7.20\*\*\*(1.21) | 6.22\*\*\*(1.05) | 7.78\*\*\*(1.26) | 3.62(2.34) | 5.08\*(2.89) |
| Unemp. | -0.87\*\*\*(0.13) | -0.85\*\*\*(0.14) | -0.76\*\*\*(0.14) | -0.70\*\*\*(0.15) | -0.96\*\*\*(0.15) | -1.03\*\*\*(0.16) | -1.02\*\*\*(0.14) | -1.09\*\*\*(0.16) |
| Social Ass. | -0.85\*\*\*(0.22) | -0.92\*\*\*(0.25) | -0.85\*\*\*(0.22) | -0.92\*\*\*(0.25) | -0.94\*\*\*(0.23) | -1.09\*\*\*(0.26) | -0.91\*\*\*(0.23) | -1.05\*\*\*(0.26) |
| Farming Sub. |  |  | 0.20\*(0.11) | 0.27\*\*(0.12) | 0.25\*\*(0.12) | 0.34\*\*(0.14) | 0.26\*\*(0.13) | 0.37\*\*(0.15) |
| Income Inequality |  |  |  |  | -0.56\*\*(0.23) | -0.77\*\*\*(0.27) | -0.55\*\*(0.23) | -0.76\*\*\*(0.26) |
| Risk of Poverty |  |  |  |  | -0.24(0.18) | -0.49\*\*(0.20) | -0.29(0.18) | -0.56\*\*\*(0.20) |
| Population |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.25\*\*(0.11) | 0.38\*\*\*(0.14) |
| Δ Immig.\*Δ Unemp. |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.26(0.20) | 0.26(0.25) |
| Constant | 18.98\*\*\*(0.93) | 21.40\*\*\*(1.00) | 16.26\*\*\*(1.62) | 17.77\*\*\*(1.72) | 36.46\*\*\*(5.89) | 48.64\*\*\*(6.60) | 32.99\*\*\*(6.24) | 42.81\*\*\*(7.08) |
| Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1140 | 1158 | 1132 | 1150 | 1132 | 1150 | 1132 | 1150 |
| R2 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.34 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A6. Changes in Immigration, Economic Hardship, EU funding and PRR Support**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Δ Vote | 2Vote | 3Δ Vote | 4Vote | 5Δ Vote | 6Vote | 7Δ Vote | 8Vote |
| Δ Immig. | 3.66\*\*\*(0.95) | 4.02\*\*\*(1.05) | 3.53\*\*\*(0.96) | 3.86\*\*\*(1.96) | 2.20\*\*(0.87) | 2.84\*\*\*(1.01) | 2.26\*\*(0.98) | 3.04\*\*(1.19) |
| Δ Unemp. | 1.98\*\*\*(0.11) | 2.30\*\*\*(0.12) | 1.97\*\*\*(0.11) | 2.29\*\*\*(0.12) | 1.76\*\*\*(0.11) | 2.12\*\*\*(0.13) | 1.80\*\*\*(0.13) | 2.11\*\*\*(0.15) |
| Δ Soc. Assistance | 0.29\*(0.17) | 0.50\*\*\*(0.18) | 0.26(0.17) | 0.46\*\*\*(0.18) | 0.59\*\*\*(0.18) | 0.73\*\*\*(0.18) | 0.65\*\*\*(0.18) | 0.79\*\*\*(0.18) |
| Δ Farming Sub. |  |  | -0.23\*\*(0.12) | -0.26\*(0.13) | -0.27\*(0.14) | -0.29\*(0.15) | -0.27\*(0.14) | -0.29\*(0.15) |
| Income Inequality |  |  |  |  | 0.28(0.18) | 0.17(0.18) | 0.26(0.18) | 0.18(0.19) |
| Risk of Poverty |  |  |  |  | 0.74\*\*\*(0.12) | 0.61\*\*\*(0.13) | 0.77\*\*\*(0.12) | 0.64\*\*\*(0.13) |
| Pop. Size |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.28\*\*\*(0.06) | -0.27\*\*\*(0.08) |
| Δ Immig.\*Δ Unemp. |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.06(0.33) | 0.11(0.44) |
| Constant | 8.85\*\*\*(0.39) | 12.30\*\*\*(0.43) | 9.09\*\*\*(0.41) | 12.58\*\*\*(0.45) | -9.13\*\*(3.85) | -1.08(3.77) | -3.99(3.79) | 3.34(3.77) |
| Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1139 | 1157 | 1131 | 1149 | 1131 | 1149 | 1131 | 1149 |
| R2 | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.54 | 0.51 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 0.56 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Tables A5. and A6. shed light on the robustness of the association between changes in immigration, changes in economic hardship and PRR support. As shown in Table A5., change in immigration continues to exert a strong effect on support for the *Finns*, whether the dependent variable is measured as the level of support over time, or as the change in the party’s electoral performance. Table A5. further investigates the robustness of the results on changes in the two key indicators for economic hardship and EU transfers. In both cases, and across different model specifications, the substantive effects of the key IVs hold.[[1]](#footnote-1) In fact, when the other independent and control variables are included in the models as levels and not as changes, changes in unemployment, social assistance and EU funding have a similar, and changes in immigrant populations an even stronger effect (and statistically significant across all models), giving confidence to the fact that these substantive effects of immigration do not depend on the choice of a given model. Furthermore, apart from social assistance recipient rates, using levels of the independent variables over time behave similarly to the cross-sectional examination of the 2011 election results. However, caution is advised when interpreting the results in Tables A5-A6. The regression diagnostics suggest that the first-difference model (Table 2.) most effectively addresses issues related to the structure and characteristics of the data. Tables A5. to A6. merely provide an illustration of the sensitivity of the key results to different model specifications.

* 1. ***Models with Additional Controls for the Rural/Urban Divide***

**Table A7. Changes over Time and PRR Support with a Dummy for Rural Municipalities**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Δ Vote | 2Δ Vote | 3Δ Vote | 4Δ Vote |
| Δ Immigrants | 3.44\*\*\*(0.94) | 3.29\*\*\*(0.95) | 2.51\*\*\*(0.83) | 2.27\*\*\*(0.84) |
| Δ Unemployment | 1.93\*\*\*(0.11) | 1.92\*\*\*(0.11) | 1.21\*\*\*(0.11) | 1.27\*\*\*(0.12) |
| Δ Social Assist. | 0.26(0.17) | 0.22(0.17) | 0.38\*\*(0.15) | 0.38\*\*(0.15) |
| Δ Farming Sub. |  | -0.24\*\*(0.12) | -0.30\*\*(0.14) | -0.30\*\*(0.15) |
| Δ Income Ineq. |  |  | -0.21\*\*(0.10) | -0.22\*\*(0.10) |
| Δ Risk of Poverty |  |  | -1.21\*\*\*(0.11) | -1.21\*\*\*(0.11) |
| Population Size |  |  | -0.12\*\*\*(0.05) | -0.10\*\*(0.05) |
| Δ Immigrants\*ΔUnemployment |  |  |  | -0.24(0.16) |
| Rural Dummy | -4.25\*\*\*(1.18) | -4.35\*\*\*(1.16) | -3.92\*\*\*(0.80) | -4.10\*\*\*(0.79) |
| Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 11.55\*\*\*(0.83) | 11.85\*\*\*(0.84) | 14.71\*\*\*(1.03) | 14.56\*\*\*(1.01) |
| N | 1139 | 1131 | 1131 | 1131 |
| R2 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.60 | 0.61 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A8. Changes over Time and PRR Support with Urban Municipalities Excluded from the Analysis**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Δ Vote | 2Δ Vote | 3Δ Vote | 4Δ Vote |
| Δ Immigrants | 3.81\*\*\*(1.14) | 3.64\*\*\*(1.15) | 2.53\*\*\*(0.96) | 2.36\*(1.22) |
| Δ Unemployment | 2.00\*\*\*(0.12) | 1.99\*\*\*(0.12) | 1.21\*\*\*(0.12) | 1.22\*\*\*(0.14) |
| Δ Social Assistance | 0.25(0.19) | 0.22(0.19) | 0.39\*\*(0.16) | 0.39\*\*(0.16) |
| Δ Farming Subsidies |  | -0.22\*\*(0.14) | -0.29\*\*(0.14) | -0.29\*\*(0.14) |
| Δ Income Inequality |  |  | -0.31\*\*\*(0.10) | -0.32\*\*\*(0.10) |
| Δ Risk of Poverty |  |  | -1.13\*\*\*(0.12) | -1.14\*\*\*(0.12) |
| Population Size |  |  | -0.47(0.29) | -0.46(0.30) |
| Δ Immigrants\*ΔUnemployment |  |  |  | -0.11(0.34) |
| Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 8.95\*\*\*(0.42) | 9.22\*\*\*(0.44) | 14.82\*\*\*(3.01) | 14.77\*\*\*(3.03) |
| N | 972 | 964 | 964 | 964 |
| R2 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.56 | 0.56 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Tables A7. and A8. control for the urban/rural dynamics that may affecting the results, notably for farming subsidies, which arguably more rural municipalities benefit from relative to cities and larger urban areas. However, the inclusion of a dummy variable for rural municipalities, or the exclusion of urban municipalities from the sample (based on the official Statistics Finland categorization elaborated above) does not affect the substantive interpretation of the results.

* 1. ***Models with Interactive Terms for Key Independent Variables and the Population Size***

**Table A9. Structural Model with Interactive Terms for Key Independent Variables and Population Size**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1Vote | 2Vote | 3Vote | 4Vote |
| Immigrants | 0.16(0.35) | 0.14(0.35) | 0.14(0.35) | 0.13(0.35) |
| Unemployment | -0.25(0.16) | -0.25(0.16) | -0.26(0.16) | -0.25(0.16) |
| Social Assistance | 0.26(0.26) | 0.27(0.26) | 0.27(0.26) | 0.30(0.27) |
| Farming Subs. | -0.01(0.07) | -0.01(0.08) | -0.02(0.07) | -0.01(0.07) |
| Income Ineq. | 0.27(0.32) | 0.25(0.32) | 0.26(0.32) | 0.26(0.32) |
| Risk of Poverty | -0.11(0.22) | -0.09(0.21) | -0.11(0.22) | -0.10(0.21) |
| Higher Education | -0.23(0.15) | -0.19(0.14) | -0.21(0.14) | -0.21(0.14) |
| Swedish Pop. | -0.24\*\*\*(0.02) | -0.24\*\*\*(0.01) | -0.24\*\*\*(0.02) | -0.24\*\*\*(0.02) |
| Manufacturing | 0.07(0.05) | 0.07(0.05) | 0.07(0.05) | 0.07(0.05) |
| Crime | -0.11(0.14) | -0.10(0.14) | -0.10(0.14) | -0.10(0.14) |
| Population Size | 0.00(0.02) | -0.01\*(0.01) | -0.02\*(0.01) | 0.02(0.03) |
| Img.\*Pop. | -0.00(0.00) |  |  |  |
| Farming Sub.\*Pop |  | -0.00(0.01) |  |  |
| Unemp.\*Pop. |  |  | 0.00(0.00) |  |
| Social As.\*Pop. |  |  |  | -0.00(0.00) |
| Constant | 22.34\*\*\*(6.13) | 21.74\*\*\*(6.16) | 22.26\*\*\*(6.26) | 21.73\*\*\*(6.06) |
| N | 294 | 294 | 294 | 294 |
| R2 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A10. Dynamic Model with Interactive Terms for Changes in Key Independent Variables and Population Size**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Δ Vote | Δ Vote | Δ Vote | Δ Vote |
| Δ Immigrants | 2.77\*\*\*(0.91) | 2.71\*\*\*(0.84) | 2.69\*\*\*(0.83) | 2.65\*\*\*(0.83) |
| Δ Unemp. | 1.24\*\*\*(0.11) | 1.24\*\*\*(0.11) | 1.23\*\*\*(0.11) | 1.24\*\*\*(0.11) |
| Δ Social Assistance | 0.41\*\*\*(0.15) | 0.41\*\*\*(0.15) | 0.41\*\*\*(0.15) | 0.41\*\*\*(0.15) |
| Δ Farming Subsidies | -0.29\*\*(0.14) | -0.29\*\*(0.14) | -0.29\*\*(0.14) | -0.18(0.18) |
| Δ Income Inequality | -0.22\*\*(0.10) | -0.22\*\*(0.10) | -0.22\*\*(0.10) | -0.23\*\*(0.10) |
| Δ Risk of Poverty | -1.22\*\*\*(0.11) | -1.22\*\*\*(0.11) | -1.22\*\*\*(0.11) | -1.22\*\*\*(0.11) |
| Population Size | -0.06(0.07) | -0.07(0.07) | -0.15\*\*(0.07) | -0.11\*\*(0.05) |
| Δ Img.\*Pop. | -0.00(0.01) |  |  |  |
| Δ Social Ass.\*Pop. |  | -0.00(0.00) |  |  |
| Δ Unemp.\* Pop. |  |  | 0.00(0.00) |  |
| Δ Farm Subs.\*Pop. |  |  |  | -0.02(0.01) |
| Constant | 11.12\*\*\*(1.44) | 11.21\*\*\*(1.37) | 12.77\*\*\*(1.28) | 11.99\*\*\*(0.87) |
| Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 1131 | 1131 | 1131 | 1131 |
| R2 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Tables A9. and A10. include additional interactive terms for the key independent variables and the population size. Indeed, the boundaries of “local” continue to be debated and it is well plausible that the effects of (changes in) immigration and economic hardship may be only indirectly or superficially felt in (certain neighbourhoods of) larger cities relative to small municipalities. Structural and cyclical analyses with interactive terms for the key independent variables and the population size, however, suggest that the results are not driven by the municipal population size. This could be explained by the fact that, when considered in relative terms, the magnitude of a percent increase in immigrant populations or the unemployed as a share of the total *municipal* population in a large city like Helsinki with over 600 000 inhabitants is considerable and likely to be noted and provoke a reaction by local residents. Moreover, despite its size, Helsinki (or other large cities) enjoys no special status and has the same rights and responsibilities as other municipalities. This could make it more likely to be perceived as “local” or one’s living environment like other, smaller municipalities.

1. **Local Elections**

**Table A11. Structural Conditions and Support for the *Finns* in the 2012 Municipal Elections**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|  | Vote Share in Mun. Elections | Vote Share in Mun. Elections | Vote Share in Mun. Elections | Vote Share in Mun. Elections |
| Immigrants | -0.68\*\*(0.30) | -0.57\*(0.33) | -0.44(0.38) | -0.14(0.54) |
| Unemployment | -0.01(0.13) | 0.01(0.13) | -0.14(0.18) | -0.27(0.18) |
| Social Assistance | 0.77\*\*\*(0.25) | 0.84\*\*\*(0.25) | 0.73\*\*\*(0.26) | 0.21(0.25) |
| Farming Subsidies |  | 0.10\*(0.06) | 0.05(0.06) | 0.05(0.08) |
| Income Inequality |  |  | -0.16(0.19) | -0.34(0.21) |
| Risk of Poverty |  |  | 0.19(0.14) | 0.24 (0.17) |
| Higher Education |  |  |  | 0.04(0.10) |
| Swedish Pop. |  |  |  | -0.14\*\*\*(0.02) |
| Manufacturing |  |  |  | 0.01(0.05) |
| Crime |  |  |  | 0.03(0.18) |
| Pop. Size |  |  |  | -0.01(0.01) |
| Immigrants\*Unemployment |  |  |  | 0.07(0.05) |
| Constant | 10.01\*\*\*(1.24) | 8.32\*\*\*(1.47) | 11.57\*\*(4.62) | 17.32\*\*\*(4.65) |
| N | 285 | 285 | 285 | 283 |
| R2 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.18 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A12. Changes over Time in Local Conditions and Support for the *Finns* in Municipal Elections (1996-2012)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|  | Δ Vote Mun. Elections | Δ VoteMun. Elections | Δ VoteMun. Elections | Δ VoteMun. Elections |
| Δ Immigrants | 2.62\*\*\*(0.78) | 2.56\*\*\*(0.77) | 1.43\*(0.74) | 1.68\*\*(0.85) |
| Δ Unemployment | 0.56\*\*\*(0.11) | 0.57\*\*\*(0.11) | 0.18(0.12) | 0.13(0.14) |
| Δ Social Assistance | 0.25(0.18) | 0.25(0.18) | 0.16(0.17) | 0.14(0.17) |
| Δ Farming Subsidies |  | -0.26\*\*\*(0.08) | -0.29\*\*\*(0.08) | -0.28\*\*\*(0.08) |
| Δ Income Inequality |  |  | -0.34\*\*(0.16) | -0.36\*\*(0.17) |
| Δ Risk of Poverty |  |  | -0.53\*\*\*(0.11) | -0.53\*\*\*(0.11) |
| Population Size |  |  | -0.04(0.07) | -0.07(0.08) |
| Δ Immigrants\*ΔUnemployment |  |  |  | 0.19(0.18) |
| Fixed Effects  | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 4.10\*\*\*(0.36) | 4.34\*\*\*(0.37) | 5.37\*\*\*(1.70) | 5.94\*\*\*(1.94) |
| N | 469 | 469 | 469 | 469 |
| R2 | 0.29 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.41 |

Table reports non-standardized OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Tables A11. and A12. examine the structural and cyclical effects of local-level conditions on support for the *Finns* in *municipal* elections.[[2]](#footnote-2)The *Finns’* policy program and priorities differ considerably at the local level and the key issues the party capitalizes on are national-level competencies. For example, during the 2012 municipal elections, the *Finns’* core campaign issues included opposing forced municipal mergers; ensuring the provision of universal public services across the country; investing in the prevention of disadvantage and social exclusion; protecting the livelihood of traditional “family farms” and prioritizing the consumption of alimentation produced in Finland (Perussuomalaiset, 2018). Thus, individuals’ electoral behavior and motives for voting for the *Finns* might well differ depending on the level of the election. Moreover, *Finns* being a centralized, leader-oriented party with relatively weak organizational capacities and resources at the municipal level prior to the 2011 landslide elections, its presence has traditionally been weaker in certain regions and municipalities. In the 2008 municipal elections, for example, the *Finns* had no candidates in as many as 101 (i.e. approximately one third) of all municipalities (Statistics Finland, 2018).

It is nonetheless likely that the local contextual influences this paper investigates also have an effect on citizens’ electoral choice and behavior in *municipal* elections. For example, a local resident concerned with local ethnic change may well be prone to support a *Finns* candidate in local elections, even if immigration does not form part of the core local election campaign and remains primarily a national-level competency. Structural (the 2012 municipal elections – the year after the 2011 landslide elections) and cyclical analyses (from 1996 – the first year *Finns* competed in municipal elections – to 2012) suggest that similar structural and cyclical local-level dynamics are at play with regard to the *Finns’* performance in local elections. However, given the *Finns’* weaker presence in local elections prior to 2011, the number of observations in the cyclical analysis is significantly reduced. While this calls for caution when making direct comparisons, the results are largely in line with the analyses of parliamentary election results.

**References:**

Perussuomalaiset (2018) “Election Program – 2012 Municipal Elections” <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/tietoa-meista/puolueohjelma/> (note: only 2017 municipal election program is available in English)

Statistics Finland (2018) “Municipal Elections 2008 – Number of Candidates by Municipality and Party” available at:

<http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi__vaa__kvaa__2008_10/110_kvaa_2008_2008-10-31_tau_103_fi.px/table/tableViewLayout2/?rxid=16b3a1d8-0b91-495e-886e-0c4a8f730fd1>

1. The results for changes in unemployment, social assistance and EU funding also hold when the other key variables are measured as levels as opposed to changes. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Data for IVs and control variables correspond to the election year, except for farming subsidies, for which the data is only available for the years preceding the municipal elections (e.g. 2011 for 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)