Appendix B: Additional Tests

In the empirical part of the article, we are interested in the effects of incentives related to a party's participation in issue competition on its propensity to issue RCV requests. We argue in the article that requesting RCVs is a means of participation, at least for parties in German state parliaments. However, just as RCV request need not be the only means of participation, participation in issue competition need not be the only incentive for parties to issue an RCV request. With a view to the literature, Carrubba et al. (2008) and Hug (2010) identify two further incentives for issuing RCV requests: exposing government/coalition disunity from the point of view opposition parties, and enforcing party unity from the point of view of party leaders. These incentives are identified from an individual-level perspective, of opposition MPs trying to cajole government-party MPs into embarrassing the recent cabinet and/or government party leaders trying to discipline "their" MPs. In the article, we control for possible effects of these incentives with a variable on ideological diversity of coalition parties, as measured with the RILE score, as a proxy for MPs of government parties being prone to dissident voting behavior. We do not find inclusion of this variable to substantially affect the relationships that we hypothesize. In this appendix, we first conduct a series of tests on two further measures of these "intraparliamentary" incentives for issuing RCV requests: number of cabinet parties, and government popularity.

One alternative measure to the ideological range within the cabinet is the number of cabinet parties. So we set up model B.1a that mimics model 1 in the article, but with this number rather than cabinet-specific RILE range. Results are summarized in table B.1 at the end of this appendix. They do not point towards a clear tendency of, as one might expect, an increasing number of coalition parties driving rates of request. They rather point to the converse. With a view to our argument, this is not very interesting though as inclusion of the number of coalition parties instead of RILE range does not affect results with a view to the other variables as compared to model 1 in the article. We still calculated predicted durations between RCV requests just as we did with a view to figure 1 in the article. Predicted durations are depicted in figure B.1, for the cases of two to seven parties in parliament. They are in line with our findings in the article with a view to both an increase in rates towards election times, and an increase in rates as the number of PPGs increases. Again, this is particularly pronounced for opposition parties, but 95% confidence intervals for government and opposition parties are now overlapping. We address this issue below and now first turn to government popularity as a further confounding variable for our hypothesized temporal relationship





Another alternative indicator of strategic parliamentary behavior that varies over time could be government popularity. An unpopular government might be especially vulnerable to intragovernment dissent, and opposition parties might be especially tempted then to tie government MP names to Yeas for unpopular policies. Unfortunately, state government popularity has never been documented for all states for the period under study on a regular basis, much less so for the 60 years covered by our RCV data. Still, we were able to retrieve data on the popularity of state governments for all legislative periods post-1980, and also for several cabinets of the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, assessed during the final years of each term, from the state election studies conducted by the German Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. For these studies, respondents were inter alia requested to rate the performance of the incumbent government, typically on a scale ranging from -5 to 5. These studies are available from the German Social Sciences Archives (Gesis.org). So we retrieved them from the archives, adapted data on the respective item to a 0-10 scale, and employed the ensuing variable as "government popularity" in two further models, models B.1b, and B.1c. Results are summarized in table B.2, at the end of this appendix. Model B.1b includes all spells ending during the final 18 months of each term. For those spells that started earlier but extended into these 18 months, we re-calculated their duration, taking the 548th day before the

respective election as their starting date. Model B.1c includes all spells of legislative terms where data on government popularity was available. We doubt that this latter model adequately captures government popularity in all instances because popularity was most likely not constant over these periods. So we include this model in this appendix only for reference.





Again, we calculated predicted durations, now with government popularity instead of the number of coalition parties, for popularity values at five and seven (tapping the lowest and highest deciles, see figure B.2 on predictions from model B.1b, and B.3 on predictions from model B.1c). Government popularity turns out as having a considerable effect on request rates. The more popular a government is the higher are rates. This is also somewhat counterintuitive – parties appear to be especially prone to requesting RCVs in instance where the government is comparatively popular. Still, this finding is not related to our argument. Also, it does not affect the relationships that we expect with a view to the curvilinear relationship over time in the respective predictions in the article. This relationship still holds: We do observe an increase in rates towards elections, in particular for opposition parties.

To the extent that our popularity measure is valid for a legislative period as a whole, we also still observe an increase in rates (as evidence by ever shorter durations of spells) over time, both for very popular and for unpopular governments.





In the article, we also hypothesize an increase in RCV request rates in increasing numbers of PPGs for all parties and for opposition parties in particular, and in increasing numbers of opposition parties for opposition parties. With a view to the role inclusion of these two measures (number of coalition parties, government popularity) plays there, we calculated a further series of models, models B.2a - B.5a, in line with models 2-5 in the article but with the variable on the number of coalition parties instead of the variable on RILE range. Results are summarized in table B.1 at the end of this appendix. Likewise, we calculated a series of models, B.2c-B.5c, replacing the number of coalition parties with government popularity for the legislative term as a whole. Results are summarized in table B.2. Predicted durations over the various constellations of numbers of parties in these ten models, calculated just like the predictions depicted in figure 2 in the article, are shown in figure B.4 (models B.1a - B.5a, on RILE range), and in figure B.5 (models B.1c - B.5c, on government popularity for whole legislative terms). Again, we doubt that our measure of government popularity taps popularity well for whole legislative periods in models B.2c - B.5c, and only include the related models and predictions for reference.

Comparing the predictions in figure B.4 with the predictions in figure 2 does not reveal any notable differences. Differences are even hardly noticeable.



Figure B.4: Predicted durations calculated from models B.1a - B.5a

This also holds for findings on government popularity (figure B.5). However, for the final half years of legislative periods, we do find the relationship between popularity and request rates not to be significant at conventional levels (see table B.4). Also, figures on the two models on opposition parties in final half years (figures B.5f and A5h on models B.3c and B.5c) show that the seemingly negative relationships between the number of opposition PPGs and RCV requests rates for final half years (see table B.4) are not stable to calculating predictions along values of interest for those variables that are of empirical interest along our argument (also note the difference in scales for these two figures as compared to the other scales in figure B.5). However, this does not concern empirical validity of hypotheses H2, and H4 because these hypotheses do not address election times.

We conclude from these additional models that our results at least do not hinge on one specific way of assessing strategic intra-parliamentary drivers.





Beyond these intra-parliamentary drivers, RCV requests could however also reflect parties seizing opportunities provided by real-world problems that are high on the party system agenda. Seizing these opportunities would imply a temporal pattern along the contents of bills subject to RCVs. Bills tapping policy fields that are high on the party system agenda at some time would then be more likely to also be subject to RCV requests at this time. Our argument is mute on this since it does not address the issues-part of issue competition. As concerns the empirical part of the article, we thus expect these opportunities to have a random effect on the temporal pattern that we hypothesize. So accounting for these opportunities could blur the empirical picture that our argument envisages. Still, controlling for this effect directly might also uncover that the effects that we hypothesize are spurious, and that it is these opportunities that drive requests rather than the logic under our argument. In order to address these two possibilities, we ran a final series of models, with the following modifications from the models in the article.

Using the Comparative Agendas Project's coding scheme (CAP, cf. Dowding, et al. 2016) we first coded the bill subject to each RCV request as a bill on an issue concerning the economy if its contents tapped one of the CAP policy fields listed at the end of this appendix in table B.3. We then assessed state-level unemployment rates of the year of each RCV request as an indicator for

the state of the economy. This data is available for most states from the German Federal Agency of Labor (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) for the period 1958-2015.¹ We conceive of high levels of unemployment as a measure of the related year providing a "window of opportunity" for competing on economic issues especially for the opposition.²

In models B.1d – B.5d we then included only observations on votes related to bills on economic issues, and also controlled for the state-specific unemployment rate in the year of each RCV request.³ Results for these models are summarized in table B.4 at the end of this appendix. We again calculated predicated durations for the eight constellations of numbers of (opposition) PPGs and intermittent requests, just like we did in figure 2 in the article. Predictions for zero, two, and four intermittent requests are depicted in figure B.6.





Unemployment does not turn out to affect request rates at conventional levels of significance (see table B.4). This does NOT speak against the logic of parties riding the wave of public

¹ Data are available at: https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Statistik-nach-Themen/Arbeitsloseund-gemeldetes-Stellenangebot/Arbeislose-und-gemeldetes-Stellenangebot-Nav.html (30 November 2016).

² Note that this could also apply to the government in states where the unemployment rate is particularly low. Still, this would only concern model 1.

³ We also ran a series of models on the change in state-level rates, on the federal-level rate, on the change in the federal-level rates, and on both state-level and federal-level rates. Since results were very similar to the results reported here, we abstained from including them in this appendix.

attention with a view to seizing opportunities to pointing to, say, the government handling economic issues badly in times of high unemployment. They only lend empirical credence to our argument of such behavior being embedded in a complementary temporal logic. Focusing on economic policies, however, reveals that the logic under our argument also extents to government parties outside of election times with a view to increasing request rates as the number of PPGs increases (figure B.6a, though note the lower rates for government parties as indicated by the scale of this figure diverging from the scales of the other figures – government parties are still predicted to request RCVs less often than opposition parties). At the same time, this relationship is less pronounced for opposition parties if these parties are studied in isolation (figures B.6e and B.6g). These two findings also concern the final half-years of terms (figures B.6b and B.6d), to the extent that we now observe significant effects of the number of PPGs on rates for government and opposition parties with a view to model B.1d. At the same time, the effects of the number of intermittent requests are less sharp for these models. It now often takes an increase by two intermittent requests to separate the 95% confidence intervals of predicted durations from each other when all other variables are held at identical values.

Table B	3.1:	Summary	of	results	for	models	B.1a -	- B.5a

Table D.1. Summary 0	D 4	D 2	D A	D 4	D 5
	B.1a	B.2a	B.3a	B.4a	B.5a
Remaining months	0.96*** (0.004)	0.98* (0.007)	0.15*** (0.182)	0.99 (0.007)	0.15*** (0.183)
Remaining months,	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00 (0.000)	1.20*** (0.021)	1.00 (0.000)	1.20*** (0.021)
squared					
Intermittent requests	0.82*** (0.007)	0.80*** (0.010)	0.84*** (0.037)		
Inter. opp. requests				0.77*** (0.014)	0.81*** (0.052)
Number of PPGs	1.14*** (0.024)				
Num. opp. PPGs		1.15*** (0.032)	0.98 (0.090)	1.18*** (0.033)	0.99 (0.090)
Seat-share	1.00 (0.001)	1.00 (0.002)	1.00 (0.005)	1.00* (0.002)	0.99 (0.005)
New PPG	1.13* (0.053)	1.09 (0.065)	1.12 (0.180)	1.10 (0.065)	1.09 (0.182)
Government	0.87** (0.054)				
Num. coal. PPG	0.89** (0.039)	1.03 (0.044)	0.94 (0.145)	1.01 (0.044)	0.96 (0.146)
Avg duration prev year	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00* (0.001)	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00* (0.001)
(state)		· · · ·	× ,	~ /	· · · ·
Avg. duration prev.	1.00 (0.000)	1.00 (0.000)	1.00 (0.001)	1.00 (0.000)	1.00 (0.001)
vear (all)		()			
Decade dummies					
1950s	0.31 (0.777)	0.18 (1.099)		0.11* (1.102)	
1960s	0.22 (0.776)	0.15 (1.093)	0.61 (0.378)	0.12 (1.095)	0.69 (0.379)
1970s	0.29 (0.785)	0.20 (1.109)	0.80(0.355)	0.14(1.111)	0.90(0.356)
1980s	0.43 (0.786)	0.32(1.109)	0.65 (0.376)	0.24(1.112)	0.81 (0.375)
1990s	0.45(0.788)	0.32(1.10)	1.01 (0.333)	0.23(1.112)	1 20 (0 336)
2000s	0.13(0.700) 0.43(0.791)	0.28 (1.112)	0.81 (0.353)	0.22(1.119)	0.94 (0.376)
20003 2010s	0.19(0.791)	0.20(1.110) 0.30(1.130)	1.19 (0.428)	0.22(1.113) 0.23(1.133)	1.45 (0.432)
State dummies	0.50 (0.000)	0.50 (1.150)	1.17 (0.420)	0.25 (1.155)	1.45 (0.452)
RR	1 08*** (0 103)	2 17*** (0 110)	1 42 (0 391)	2 25*** (0 110)	1 46 (0 391)
BW	2.48***(0.081)	2.17 (0.112) 2 37*** (0.102)	2.76***(0.278)	2.23 (0.11)	2.41 * (0.275)
BV	2.70 (0.001) 3.37*** (0.082)	2.57 (0.102) 3.54*** (0.105)	2.70 (0.270) 2.66*** (0.283)	2.21 (0.101) 2.01***(0.104)	2.41 (0.275) 2.54** (0.285)
UR	0.40***(0.123)	0.45*** (0.103)	1.26(0.203)	0.42***(0.154)	1.15 (0.423)
HE	$0.49^{***}(0.123)$ $0.62^{***}(0.114)$	$0.45^{***}(0.135)$	1.20(0.422) 1.30(0.476)	$0.42^{++}(0.134)$	1.13(0.423) 1.18(0.477)
нц	$0.02^{++}(0.114)$	$0.07^{44} (0.133)$ $0.76^{*} (0.132)$	1.30(0.470) 1.77(0.381)	$0.05^{++}(0.133)$ 0.76*(0.132)	1.10(0.477) 1.60(0.380)
	$1.00^{+++}(0.113)$	$0.70^{\circ} (0.132)$ 2 1 4*** (0 1 27)	1.77(0.301) 1.07*(0.315)	$0.70^{\circ} (0.132)$ 2 1 4*** (0 127)	1.00(0.360) 1.07*(0.316)
NI V	$1.94^{+++}(0.107)$	$2.14^{\circ}(0.127)$	2.00(0.313)	$2.14^{+++}(0.127)$	$1.97^{\circ} (0.310)$
	$0.04^{\text{opt}} (0.113)$	0.06^{mm} (0.130)	2.00(0.411)	$0.04^{\text{max}}(0.137)$	1.00(0.414)
	$0.70^{\text{res}} (0.114)$	0.77 (0.150)	1.10(0.440)	0.77(0.130)	0.96(0.441)
KP CU	$0.54^{\text{max}} (0.128)$	$0.51^{+++} (0.101)$	1.81 (0.442)	$0.52^{\text{max}} (0.162)$	1.90(0.442)
SH	$0.05^{***} (0.110)$	$0.75^{+}(0.156)$	0.82(0.431)	$0.61^{++++} (0.157)$	0.85(0.451)
SL	$0.5/^{***} (0.125)$	$0.54^{+++} (0.157)$	1.55 (0.550)	$0.51^{+++} (0.157)$	1.40 (0.549)
SN	1.36** (0.115)	1.40* (0.134)	1.13 (0.418)	1.34* (0.135)	1.08 (0.420)
51	1.8/***(0.106)	1.96^{***} (0.128)	1.8/* (0.320)	1.88^{***} (0.128)	1.89* (0.320)
IH	2.91*** (0.095)	3.30*** (0.120)	2.15* (0.325)	2.68*** (0.120)	$1.90^{*}(0.326)$
Constant	0.03*** (0.816)	0.03** (1.152)	0.65 (0.708)	0.05** (1.153)	0.55 (0.716)
Ν	3919	2568	338	2566	338
N (failure)	3660	2478	333	2476	333
Time at risk	974894	511051	18220	509138	18220
LR (chi2)	3956	2154	260.2	1899	256.5
Log likelihood	-6128	-4047	-466.3	-4170	-468.2
Ln (p)	-0.01 (0.013)	0.01 (0.016)	0.25*** (0.046)	-0.05** (0.016)	0.24*** (0.046)

Count previous year: count of RCV requests in previous year; Inter. opp. requests: number of intermittent requests by opposition parties; Num. Opp. PPGs: number of opposition PPGs; Num. coal. PPG: Number of PPGs in support of cabinet. Reference category for dummies is state of Berlin in 1940s.

Table B.2: Summary of	results	for models	B.1b -	B.5 b
-----------------------	---------	------------	--------	--------------

	B.1b	B.1c	B.2c	B.3c	B.4c	B.5c
Remaining	0.97***(0.004)	0.97***(0.005)	0.99 (0.007)	0.12***(0.208)	1.00(0.007)	0.13***(0.208)
months						
Remaining		1.00***(0.000)	1.00 (0.000)	1.23*** (0.024)	1.00(0.000)	1.22***(0.024)
months, squared						
Intermittent	0.88***(0.012)	0.83*** (0.008)	0.80***(0.011)	0.82***(0.046)		
requests						
Inter. opp.					0.75***(0.016)	0.78***(0.063)
requests						
Number of PPGs	1.06 (0.056)	1.13***(0.033)				
Num. opp. PPGs			1.22***(0.044)	0.77 (0.138)	1.24***(0.045)	0.79 (0.141)
Seat-share	1.00(0.003)	1.00(0.002)	1.00(0.002)	1.00 (0.006)	1.00(0.002)	1.00 (0.006)
New PPG	1.22(0.110)	1.05 (0.070)	1.03 (0.075)	1.37 (0.228)	1.07 (0.075)	1.39 (0.229)
Government	0.84(0.108)	0.83** (0.070)				
Num. coal. PPG	1.35***(0.074)	1.37*** (0.043)	1.29***(0.051)	1.18 (0.172)	1.26***(0.051)	1.09(0.171)
Avg duration prev	1.00(0.000)	1.00***(0.000)	1.00***(0.000)	1.00(0.001)	1.00***(0.000)	1.00(0.001)
year (state)						
Avg. duration	1.00*(0.001)	1.00(0.000)	1.00(0.001)	0.99*(0.002)	1.00*(0.001)	1.00(0.002)
prev. year (all)	. ,	. ,			. ,	. ,
Decade dummies						
1960s	1.39 (0.433)	0.88(0.253)	0.68(0.310)	0.38(1.300)	0.68(0.310)	0.39(1.300)
1970s	1.31 (0.394)	1.63*(0.222)	1.45 (0.262)	0.90 (0.658)	1.20(0.260)	0.89 (0.660)
1980s	1.81 (0.386)	2.90***(0.216)	2.63***(0.255)	0.72(0.669)	2.42***(0.255)	0.75(0.668)
1990s	2.02(0.380)	2.70***(0.211)	2.31**(0.255)	1.05 (0.662)	2.16**(0.255)	1.11 (0.662)
2000s	1.88 (0.388)	2.67***(0.214)	2.21**(0.259)	0.82(0.683)	2.05**(0.259)	0.84(0.684)
2010s	1.43 (0.459)	2.35*(0.332)	1.98 (0.414)	0.70 (0.826)	1.78(0.414)	0.76(0.827)
State dummies						
BB	1.22(0.187)	1.72***(0.118)	1.98***(0.132)	1.02(0.443)	2.09***(0.131)	1.10(0.443)
BW	1.80***(0.147)	1.98***(0.101)	1.89***(0.118)	2.88** (0.370)	1.87***(0.118)	2.70**(0.367)
BY	2.33*** (0.174)	2.87***(0.114)	2.85***(0.127)	2.57*(0.410)	2.49***(0.126)	2.48*(0.411)
HB	0.41***(0.239)	0.31*** (0.166)	0.31***(0.192)	1.24 (0.617)	0.30***(0.193)	1.34 (0.615)
HE	0.48***(0.222)	0.68** (0.132)	0.72*(0.151)	1.15 (0.540)	0.67**(0.151)	1.06 (0.542)
HH	0.66*(0.205)	0.73*(0.134)	0.79 (0.150)	1.40 (0.454)	0.80(0.149)	1.28 (0.455)
MV	0.78(0.251)	1.30(0.138)	1.59**(0.156)	0.65 (0.529)	1.62**(0.155)	0.72(0.528)
NI	0.64*(0.225)	0.64**(0.137)	0.67**(0.154)	1.30 (0.586)	0.66**(0.154)	1.31 (0.586)
NW	0.82(0.225)	0.71*(0.139)	0.73*(0.156)	1.12 (0.479)	0.75(0.156)	1.06 (0.480)
RP	0.60*(0.264)	0.41***(0.158)	0.41***(0.190)	3.64 (0.666)	0.43***(0.190)	3.63 (0.668)
SH	0.46***(0.220)	0.47***(0.153)	0.46***(0.180)	0.60 (0.603)	0.37***(0.180)	0.65 (0.603)
SL	0.52(0.341)	0.29***(0.188)	0.25***(0.223)	1.28 (1.099)	0.27***(0.223)	1.38(1.100)
SN	0.84 (0.227)	0.99 (0.136)	0.96 (0.155)	1.02 (0.526)	0.97 (0.155)	1.02(0.530)
ST	1.63**(0.183)	2.04***(0.124)	1.93***(0.146)	2.16* (0.357)	1.87***(0.145)	2.03*(0.357)
TH	1.84***(0.170)	2.63***(0.114)	2.86***(0.132)	1.85 (0.398)	2.41***(0.131)	1.60 (0.396)
Constant	0.00***(0.712)	0.00***(0.416)	0.00***(0.462)	0.84(1.431)	0.00***(0.460)	1.10(1.443)
	. ,	. ,			. ,	. ,
Ν	1282	3047	2102	270	2102	270
N (failure)	1130	2895	2052	265	2052	265
Time at risk	201275	642201	352948	14040	352948	14040
Ln (chi2)	1262	2963	1665	225.0	1493	221.2
Log Likelihood	-1902	-4785	-3319	-364.1	-3405	-366.0
Ln(p)	0.03 (0.025)	0.00(0.015)	0.01 (0.018)	0.28*** (0.052)	-0.03 (0.018)	0.27***(0.052)

Table B.3: Bills subject to RCV requests under studies in models B.1d – B.5d, by CAP policy field counted as tapping economic policies

CAP main category	CAP sub-category	Frequency	Percent
Domestic	General Domestic Macroeconomic Issues	1	0.1
Macroeconomic issues	National Budget and Debt	51	4.1
	Taxation, Tax policy, VAT, and Tax Reform	38	3.0
	Industrial Policy	47	3.7
	Market Regulation and Organization	33	2.6
	Other - Domestic Macroeconomic Issues	19	1.5

Health	Comprehensive Health Care Reform	1	0.1
	Insurance Reform, Availability, and Costs	22	1.8
	Facilities Construction, Regulation, and Payments	44	3.5
	Provider and Insurer Payments and Regulation	10	0.8
	Long-Term Care, Home Health, Terminally Ill, Rehab, Services	1	0.1
	Health Research and Development	2	0.2
	Other - Health	2	0.2
Agriculture	Government Subsidies to Farmers and Ranchers	20	1.6
	Fisheries and Fishing	2	0.2
	Agricultural Research and Development	14	11
	Other - Aoriculture	15	1.1
Labor and Employment	Worker Safety and Protection	1	0.1
Labor and Employment	Employment Training and Workforce Development	12	1.0
	Employee Benefits	25	2.0
	Employee Belations and Labor Unions	13	2.0
	Employee Relations and Labour Law	10	0.9
	Vouth Employment and Child Labor	10	0.0
	Equality and Description of Western in Labor	1	0.1
	Equality and Promotion of Women in Labor	12	1.0
Г	Other - Labor and Employment	2	0.2
Energy	Nuclear Energy	/3	5.8
	Coal	9	0.7
	Alternative and Renewable Energy	11	0.9
	Energy Conservation	1	0.1
	Other - Energy	3	0.2
Transportation	Mass Transportation and Safety	18	1.4
	Highway Construction, Transportation, Maintenance and Safety	47	3.7
	Airports, Airlines, Air Traffic Control	33	2.6
	Railroad Transportation and Safety	21	1.7
	Maritime Issues	2	0.2
	Public Works (Infrastructure Development)	32	2.6
Social Welfare	Poverty Assistance for Low-Income Families	6	0.5
	Elderly Issues and Elderly Assistance Programs	8	0.6
	Assistance to the Disabled and Handicapped	30	2.4
	Social Services and Volunteer Associations	17	1.4
	Displaced own Nationals	10	0.8
	Public Employment/Training Programmes	13	1.0
	Social Benefits and Assistance	33	2.6
Community Development	Housing and Community Development	1	0.1
and Housing Issues	Urban Economic Development and General	28	2.2
	Low and Middle Income Housing Programs	20	1.6
Banking, Finance, and	Banking System and Financial Institutions	13	1.0
Domestic Commerce	Small Business Issues	12	1.0
	Tourism	1	0.1
	Consumer Safety and Consumer Fraud	6	0.5
	Sports and Gambling Regulation	13	1.0
Space, Science, Technol.,	Telephone and Telecommunication Regulation	4	0.3
and Communications	Newspaper, Publishing, and Broadcast Industry Regulation	13	1.0
Foreign Trade	General Foreign Trade	1	0.1
Government Operations	Government Employee Benefits and Civil Service Issues	127	10.1
1	Government Procurement, Procurement Fraud	8	0.6
	Government Property Management	73	5.8
	Public Services: Breadth, Cost, Level of Tolls and Fees	25	2.0
	Offices Held by Public Employees/Parliamentarians	11	0.9
	Distribution of Public Funds among Administrative Units	76	6.1
Public Lands. Water	Natural Resources, Public Lands, and Forest Management	32	2.6
Mgmt., Territorial Issues	······································	~-	
Cultural Policy Issues	Public Broadcasting	28	2.2
Total		1257	100.0

1 able B.4: Summary of results for models B.1d – B.5d						
	B.1d	B.2d	B.3d	B.4d	B.5d	
Remaining months	0.97*** (0.007)	0.99 (0.011)	0.09*** (0.375)	1.00 (0.011)	0.09*** (0.378)	
Remaining months,	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00 (0.000)	1.28*** (0.045)	1.00 (0.000)	1.28*** (0.046)	
squared						
Intermittent requests	0.83*** (0.011)	0.79*** (0.015)	0.77*** (0.070)			
Inter. opp. requests				0.76*** (0.024)	0.75** (0.090)	
Number of PPGs	1.27*** (0.048)					
Num. opp. PPGs		1.26*** (0.065)	1.16 (0.230)	1.23** (0.065)	1.21 (0.233)	
Seat-share	1.01** (0.002)	1.00 (0.003)	1.00 (0.011)	1.01** (0.003)	1.00 (0.011)	
New PPG	0.94 (0.104)	0.93 (0.112)	2.45* (0.385)	1.07 (0.112)	2.60* (0.378)	
Government	0.66*** (0.093)			~ /		
Num. coal. PPG	1.00 (0.003)	1.00 (0.003)	1.00 (0.013)	1.01 (0.003)	1.01 (0.012)	
Avg duration prev year	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00*** (0.000)	1.00 (0.001)	1.00** (0.000)	1.00 (0.001)	
(state)						
Avg. duration prev.	1.00 (0.001)	1.00 (0.001)	0.99 (0.004)	1.00* (0.001)	0.99 (0.004)	
vear (all)						
Unemployment rate	0.99 (0.013)	0.99 (0.016)	0.89 (0.059)	0.98 (0.016)	0.90 (0.058)	
Decade dummies						
1960s	0.98 (0.374)	1.52 (0.514)		1.29 (0.514)		
1970s	2.06 (0.371)	2.72^{*} (0.502)	3.32 (0.866)	1.78 (0.499)	3.00 (0.863)	
1980s	3.82*** (0.369)	5.68*** (0.498)	1.08 (0.852)	4.26** (0.499)	1.07 (0.855)	
1990s	3.82*** (0.361)	5.62*** (0.491)	1.70 (0.903)	4.26** (0.492)	1.48 (0.892)	
2000s	3.13** (0.365)	4.54** (0.495)	1.30 (0.919)	3.59** (0.496)	1.13 (0.918)	
2010s	3.39** (0.433)	4.51* (0.633)	1.29 (0.951)	3.60* (0.634)	1.24 (0.956)	
State dummies	(01100)	(0.000)	(0.701)			
BB	2.20*** (0.171)	2.18*** (0.191)	6.51 (1.257)	2.28*** (0.191)	6.75 (1.264)	
BW	2.30*** (0.163)	2.22*** (0.203)	1.66 (0.592)	2.27*** (0.201)	1.68(0.587)	
BY	4.39*** (0.162)	3.86*** (0.198)	4.61* (0.620)	3.42*** (0.196)	4.31* (0.621)	
HB	0.29*** (0.210)	0.26^{***} (0.242)	2.97 (1.083)	0.29^{***} (0.243)	2.38(1.076)	
HE	0.57** (0.184)	0.56** (0.219)	2.16 (0.851)	0.56** (0.219)	2.41 (0.858)	
НН	0.71* (0.175)	0.74 (0.206)	2.81 (0.646)	0.77 (0.206)	2.62 (0.652)	
MV	3.20*** (0.177)	3.10*** (0.205)	10.9^{***} (0.702)	3.17*** (0.207)	10.2*** (0.698)	
NI	0.47^{***} (0.201)	0.48** (0.228)	(0.7.02)	$0.53^{**}(0.227)$	(0.070)	
NW	0.78 (0.172)	0.78 (0.205)	1.00 (0.747)	0.81 (0.205)	0.87(0.749)	
RP	0.39^{***} (0.215)	0.32*** (0.263)	10.34 (1.394)	0.39*** (0.263)	9.30 (1.394)	
SH	0.39^{***} (0.198)	0.41^{***} (0.228)	0.09 (1.222)	0.36*** (0.229)	0.12 (1.198)	
SL	0.41*** (0.216)	0.35*** (0.260)	(1.222)	0.38^{***} (0.261)	0.112 (11170)	
SN	1.54* (0.206)	1.41 (0.236)	7.07 (1.049)	1.36 (0.237)	7.02 (1.023)	
ST	2.28*** (0.202)	2.42*** (0.238)	4.54 (0.856)	2.40*** (0.239)	4.70 (0.837)	
ТН	4 15*** (0 159)	3.94 * * (0.187)	4 10* (0.656)	347***(0188)	3 65* (0 644)	
Constant	$0.00^{***} (0.527)$	$0.00^{***} (0.684)$	0.92(1.565)	0.00*** (0.681)	0.88 (1.569)	
Somotant	(0.527)	(0.004)	0.72 (1.505)	(0.001)	0.00 (1.507)	
Ν	1577	1062	118	1062	118	
N (failure)	1414	1013	113	1013	113	
Time at risk	484703	231309	5899	231309	5899	
LR (chi2)	1912	1055	129.7	918.4	124.3	
Log likelihood	-2310	-1571	-144.5	-1640	-147.2	
Ln(p)	0.06** (0.021)	0.10*** (0.025)	0.40*** (0.081)	0.03 (0.025)	0.38*** (0.081)	
AT 1	\ /	· · · /	\ /	- /	\	

Table B.5: Summary of results for models 1-5, including dummies

Tuble 2101 Summary of feet		-,			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Remaining months	$0.96^{***}(0.004)$	0.98*(0.007)	0.15***(0.182)	0.99(0.007)	0.15***(0.183)
Remaining months, squared	$1.00^{***}(0.000)$	1.00(0.000)	$1.20^{***}(0.021)$	1.00(0.000)	$1.20^{***}(0.021)$
Intermittent requests	$0.82^{***}(0.007)$	$0.80^{***}(0.010)$	$0.85^{***}(0.037)$		
Intermittent opp. requests				0.77***(0.014)	0.81***(0.052)
Number of PPGs	1.11***(0.022)				
Number of opposition PPGs		$1.16^{***}(0.033)$	0.98(0.090)	1.19***(0.033)	1.00(0.091)
Seat-share	1.00(0.001)	1.00(0.002)	1.00(0.005)	1.00*(0.002)	1.00(0.005)
New PPG	1.14*(0.054)	1.10(0.063)	1.14(0.181)	1.10(0.064)	1.12(0.182)
Government	0.85**(0.054)				
Ideological diversity (Gov't)	1.00(0.001)	1.00(0.002)	1.01(0.005)	1.00(0.002)	1.01(0.005)
Avg duration prev year (state)	1.00***(0.000)	1.00***(0.000)	1.00*(0.001)	1.00***(0.000)	1.00*(0.001)
Avg. duration prev. year (all)	1.00*(0.000)	1.00(0.000)	1.00(0.001)	1.00(0.000)	1.00(0.001)
Decade dummies					
1950s	0.30(0.776)	0.18(1.099)		0.11*(1.102)	
1960s	0.22(0.776)	0.16(1.094)	0.67(0.378)	0.13(1.096)	0.77(0.377)
1970s	0.31(0.785)	0.20(1.110)	1.00(0.335)	0.15(1.111)	1.14(0.333)
1980s	0.47(0.786)	0.32(1.110)	0.84(0.341)	0.26(1.113)	1.03(0.339)
1990s	0.48(0.787)	0.30(1.113)	1.18(0.318)	0.24(1.116)	1.40(0.321)
2000s	0.47(0.790)	0.28(1.117)	0.97(0.350)	0.23(1.120)	1.12(0.354)
2010s	0.55(0.799)	0.31(1.131)	1.35(0.423)	0.24(1.133)	1.62(0.427)
State dummies	· · · ·	· · · · ·			· · · ·
BB	1.92***(0.103)	2.19***(0.120)	1.28(0.381)	2.29***(0.120)	1.33(0.381)
BW	2.48***(0.082)	2.40***(0.103)	3.02***(0.285)	2.27***(0.103)	2.74***(0.285)
BY	3.43***(0.085)	3.59***(0.107)	3.20***(0.289)	3.06***(0.108)	3.15***(0.291)
HB	0.51***(0.123)	0.45***(0.154)	1.34(0.423)	0.43***(0.154)	1.25(0.424)
HE	0.63***(0.115)	0.68**(0.138)	1.40(0.480)	0.68**(0.138)	1.33(0.481)
HH	0.66***(0.114)	0.77(0.133)	1.95(0.384)	0.78(0.133)	1.83(0.384)
MV	1.90***(0.106)	2.13***(0.127)	1.92*(0.316)	2.14***(0.127)	1.92*(0.317)
NI	0.66***(0.117)	0.69**(0.139)	2.16(0.415)	0.67**(0.140)	2.09(0.418)
NW	0.70**(0.116)	0.78(0.138)	1.31(0.448)	0.81(0.139)	1.21(0.448)
RP	0.55***(0.129)	0.52***(0.162)	2.00(0.440)	0.54***(0.163)	2.12(0.441)
SH	0.67***(0.117)	0.74*(0.137)	0.96(0.436)	0.63***(0.138)	1.00(0.437)
SL	0.59***(0.125)	0.54***(0.156)	1.59(0.534)	0.52***(0.156)	1.64(0.537)
SN	1.43**(0.115)	1.40*(0.134)	1.30(0.417)	1.38*(0.135)	1.26(0.419)
ST	1.86***(0.107)	1.98***(0.130)	1.97*(0.322)	1.95***(0.130)	2.01*(0.323)
TH	2.92***(0.096)	3.32***(0.120)	2.25*(0.325)	2.78***(0.121)	2.03*(0.326)
Constant	0.03***(0.815)	$0.03^{**}(1.151)$	0.41(0.617)	0.04 ** (1.152)	0.34(0.623)
Ν	3919	2568	338	2566	338
N (failure)	3660	2478	333	2476	333
Time at risk	974894	511051	18220	509138	18220
LR (chi2)	3948	2154	262.1	1901	259.8
Log likelihood	-6132	-4047	-465.4	-4169	-466.5
Ln(p)	-0.12(0.013)	0.00(0.016)	0.25***(0.046)	-0.05**(0.016)	0.25***(0.046)

Bibliography

Carrubba, Clifford, Matthew Gabel und Simon Hug 2008: Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll-Call Vote Selection; in: *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33: 4. S. 543-572.

Dowding, Keith, Andrew Hindmoor und Aaron Martin 2016: The Comparative Policy Agendas Project: Theory, Measurement and Findings; in: *Journal of Public Policy* 36: 1. S. 3-25.

Hug, Simon 2010: Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes; in: *British Journal of Political Science* 40: 1. S. 225-235.