

# Transborder Identities, Bias, and Third-Party Conflict Management

Supplemental Materials: Summary Statistics, Operationalization and Data  
Sources, Robustness Tests, and Additional Figures

## Summary Statistics

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	mean	sd	min	max
Conflict Management	.028951	.16767	0	1
Economic CM	.0243292	.1540701	0	1
Diplomatic CM	.0028963	.05374	0	1
Verbal CM	.0017255	.0415033	0	1
Strength of Identity Bias	.4919211	.6727262	0	3
Strength of Identity Ties with Both Sides	.1088653	.3557323	0	3
Alliance with One Side	.1376314	.3445148	0	1
Alliance with Both Sides	.0055955	.0745938	0	1
Trade Ties with One Side	.0502114	.2183822	0	1
Trade Ties with Both Sides	.0127809	.1123283	0	1
Joint Democracy (One Side)	.0434943	.2039684	0	1
Joint Democracy (Both Sides)	.1063263	.3082567	0	1
Shared Border with One Side	.1116137	.3148925	0	1
Shared Border with Both Sides	.062869	.2427286	0	1
Colonial Tie	.0070991	.0839571	0	1
Previous MID between Third Party and Disputants	.0198307	.1394189	0	1
# of Previous Management Attempts	1.35339	5.274381	0	53
Management in Previous Year	.0010846	.0329154	0	1
Successful Management Before	.0011092	.0332869	0	1
Previous Conflict with Same Disputants	.8113684	.3912181	0	1
Contiguous Disputants	.2767788	.4474089	0	1
CINC Score	.0129894	.0361191	3.59e-07	.3639884
Observations	81137			

## Operationalization of Variables

### Independent Variable

Relative identity bias is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Absolute Bias towards Side A} = \text{Ethnic}_{TA} + \text{Language}_{TA} + \text{Religious}_{TA}^1 \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Absolute Bias towards Side B} = \text{Ethnic}_{TB} + \text{Language}_{TB} + \text{Religious}_{TB}^2 \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Relative Bias} = |(\text{Absolute Bias towards Side A}) - (\text{Absolute Bias towards Side B})| \quad (3)$$

### Control Variables

The data sources and operationalization of the control variables related to the effects of other bias types are as follows:

- *Alliance with One Side* variable is coded as “1” when the third party has an alliance with one of the disputants and “0” otherwise. *Alliance with Both Sides* variable is coded as “1” when the third party has an alliance with both of the disputants and “0” otherwise (Leeds et al., 2002).
- *Trade Ties with One Side* variable is coded as “1” if trade volume between a third party and a disputant is above the average in original data and “0” otherwise. *Trade Ties with Both Sides* variable is coded as “1” if trade volume between a third party and both disputants are above the average in original data and “0” otherwise (Barbieri, 1996).
- *Joint Democracy with One Side* variable is coded as “1” if the third party and one of the disputants are democracies with at least 6 *polity2* scores and “0” otherwise. *Joint Democracy with Both Sides* variable is coded as “1” if the third party and both of the disputants are democracies with at least 6 *polity2* scores (Marshall Monty et al., 2002).
- *Shared Border with One Side* variable is coded as “1” if the the distance between the third party’s capital and a disputant’s capital is less than 1,000 miles and “0” otherwise. *Shared Border with Both Sides* variable is coded as “1” if the the distance between the third party’s capital and both of the disputants’ capitals is less than 1,000 miles and “0” otherwise (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001).
- *Colonial Tie* variable is coded as “1” if the third party has colonial ties with at least one of the disputants, and coded as “0” otherwise (Correlates of War 2 Project, 2007).

The variables related to probability of success listed by Melin (2011) are as follows:

- As the *Number of Previous Management Attempts* goes up, probability of success should go down (Frazier and Dixon, 2006; Bercovitch, 1999).

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<sup>1</sup>  $\text{Ethnic}_{TA}$ =Ethnic ties between the third party and side A,  $\text{Language}_{TA}$ =Language ties between the third party and side A +  $\text{Religious}_{TA}$ =Religious ties between the third party and side A

<sup>2</sup>  $\text{Ethnic}_{TB}$ =Ethnic ties between the third party and side B,  $\text{Language}_{TB}$ =Language ties between the third party and side B +  $\text{Religious}_{TB}$ =Religious ties between the third party and side B

- If the third party managed the dispute in the previous year according to Third-Party Intermediary data (Frazier and Dixon, 2006) and International Conflict Management data (Bercovitch, 1999), it is more likely to attempt to manage the conflict again. *Management in Previous Year* variable is coded as “1” if this is the case and as “0” otherwise.
- Another third party’s successful conflict management attempts in the past also indicate that the dispute is resolvable by third parties. Therefore, *Successful Management Before* variable, which is coded as “1” if another third party achieved agreement before, should positively affect probability of success (Frazier and Dixon, 2006; Bercovitch, 1999).

The variables affecting the cost of conflict management which affect both the likelihood and type of conflict management are as follows:

- *Previous Conflict Same Disputants* variable is coded as “1” if the same disputants had a dispute before according to Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Maoz, 2005) and “0” otherwise. Melin (2011) argues that recurrent conflict should have less cost to third parties as the disputants will be more willing to ask for third parties’ help.
- Any previous militarized interstate dispute between the third party and one of the disputants should decrease third party’s motivation for conflict management. *Previous MID between Third Party and Disputants* variable is coded as “1” if there was a dispute between a third party and a disputant and as “0” otherwise (Maoz, 2005).
- Contiguity between the disputants should increase their willingness to work with third parties as these disputes can easily escalate to international conflict. Thus, *Contiguous Disputants* variable is coded as “1” if the disputants are contiguous and as “0” otherwise (Stinnett et al., 2002).
- Third parties with greater capabilities should be more capable of absorbing the costs of conflict management. I use *CINC score* to measure third parties’ capabilities (Singer et al., 1972).

## Robustness Test

Table 2: Effect of Specific Identity Ties on Verbal Conflict Management

	(1) Verbal CM	(2) Verbal CM	(3) Verbal CM
Ethnic Bias	0.537* (1.67)		
Ethnic Ties with Both Sides	1.002* (1.91)		
Language Bias		0.949** (2.96)	
Language Ties with Both Sides		0.918* (1.65)	
Religious Bias			0.362* (1.68)
Religious Ties with Both Sides			0.112 (0.31)
Alliance with One Side	-0.356 (-1.56)	-0.407 (-1.60)	-0.380 (-1.59)
Alliance with Both Sides	0.472 (0.68)	0.611 (0.92)	0.463 (0.66)
Trade Ties with One Side	0.378 (0.79)	0.438 (0.89)	0.337 (0.71)
Trade Ties with Both Sides	-0.00482 (-0.01)	0.105 (0.15)	0.0978 (0.15)
Joint Democracy with One Side	0.961** (3.02)	0.838** (2.76)	0.921** (3.17)
Joint Democracy with Both Sides	-0.0596 (-0.17)	-0.0539 (-0.16)	-0.105 (-0.30)
Shared Border with One Side	0.655** (2.90)	0.481* (1.82)	0.597** (2.54)
Shared Border with Both Sides	0.375 (1.05)	0.108 (0.24)	0.451 (1.26)
Colonial Tie	1.058* (1.86)	1.118** (1.98)	1.069* (1.86)
Previous MID between Third Party and Disputants	-0.329 (-0.65)	-0.412 (-0.80)	-0.342 (-0.68)
# of Previous Management Attempts	0.0593*** (10.86)	0.0603*** (11.45)	0.0593*** (11.31)
Management in Previous Year	1.331 (1.33)	1.294 (1.28)	1.391 (1.40)
Successful Management Before	4.026*** (8.75)	3.904*** (7.49)	4.105*** (9.14)
Previous Conflict with Same Disputants	0.141 (0.39)	0.139 (0.39)	0.144 (0.39)
Contiguous Disputants	0.574** (2.01)	0.549* (1.88)	0.613** (2.07)
Third Party's CINC Score	9.779*** (7.10)	10.25*** (7.83)	10.10*** (7.70)
Constant	-7.444*** (-19.74)	-7.486*** (-19.43)	-7.597*** (-17.38)
Observations	81137	81137	81137

t statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Effect of Specific Identity Ties on Diplomatic Intervention

	(1) Diplomatic CM	(2) Diplomatic CM	(3) Diplomatic CM
Ethnic Bias	0.289 (0.74)		
Ethnic Ties with Both Sides	0.733 (1.41)		
Language Bias		0.294 (0.86)	
Language Ties with Both Sides		1.722*** (3.61)	
Religious Bias			0.381* (1.70)
Religious Ties with Both Sides			0.613** (2.18)
Alliance with One Side	-0.0781 (-0.29)	-0.0953 (-0.36)	-0.198 (-0.75)
Alliance with Both Sides	-0.371 (-0.62)	-0.256 (-0.43)	-0.790 (-1.25)
Trade Ties with One Side	0.244 (0.79)	0.310 (1.00)	0.235 (0.77)
Trade Ties with Both Sides	-1.010 (-1.42)	-0.875 (-1.24)	-0.817 (-1.15)
Joint Democracy with One Side	1.316*** (4.78)	1.288*** (4.77)	1.259*** (4.69)
Joint Democracy with Both Sides	-0.733** (-2.13)	-0.735** (-2.11)	-0.764** (-2.25)
Shared Border with One Side	0.965*** (4.96)	0.827*** (3.83)	0.828*** (3.94)
Shared Border with Both Sides	0.830*** (3.30)	0.555* (1.91)	0.635** (2.48)
Colonial Tie	1.669*** (4.80)	1.759*** (4.99)	1.672*** (4.82)
Previous MID between Third Party and Disputants	0.0321 (0.09)	0.0821 (0.22)	0.0393 (0.11)
# of Previous Management Attempts	0.0399*** (3.68)	0.0422*** (3.83)	0.0431*** (3.98)
Management in Previous Year	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Successful Management Before	4.803*** (13.90)	4.691*** (12.16)	4.785*** (13.35)
Previous Conflict with Same Disputants	-0.0874 (-0.30)	-0.0724 (-0.25)	-0.0217 (-0.07)
Contiguous Disputants	1.389*** (5.56)	1.279*** (5.11)	1.419*** (5.52)
Third Party's CINC Score	9.747*** (8.12)	10.21*** (8.71)	10.31*** (8.78)
Constant	-7.272*** (-22.41)	-7.284*** (-22.38)	-7.583*** (-21.97)
Observations	81049	81049	81049

t statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Effect of Specific Identity Ties on Economic Intervention

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Economic CM	Economic CM	Economic CM
Ethnic Bias	0.378** (2.37)		
Ethnic Ties with Both Sides	-1.633*** (-4.08)		
Language Bias		0.857*** (5.44)	
Language Ties with Both Sides		-3.521*** (-3.42)	
Religious Bias			0.238* (1.92)
Religious Ties with Both Sides			-0.123 (-0.66)
Alliance with One Side	1.436*** (7.33)	1.362*** (6.92)	1.420*** (7.57)
Alliance with Both Sides	-0.982** (-3.23)	-0.962** (-3.18)	-0.930** (-2.94)
Trade Ties with One Side	-0.439** (-2.32)	-0.395** (-2.08)	-0.456** (-2.42)
Trade Ties with Both Sides	-0.154 (-0.64)	-0.0507 (-0.21)	-0.169 (-0.71)
Joint Democracy with One Side	0.668*** (3.55)	0.511** (2.50)	0.623*** (3.31)
Joint Democracy with Both Sides	-0.193 (-0.93)	-0.140 (-0.66)	-0.201 (-0.98)
Shared Border with One Side	1.233*** (8.11)	1.082*** (6.94)	1.207*** (8.09)
Shared Border with Both Sides	2.280*** (15.42)	2.090*** (13.96)	2.279*** (15.09)
Colonial Tie	0.728** (2.51)	0.652** (2.24)	0.743** (2.53)
Previous MID between Third Party and Disputants	2.344*** (22.76)	2.238*** (20.80)	2.358*** (23.46)
# of Previous Management Attempts	0.0614** (2.75)	0.0620** (2.84)	0.0611** (2.71)
Management in Previous Year	1.319*** (3.82)	1.264*** (3.48)	1.317*** (3.89)
Successful Management Before	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Previous Conflict with Same Disputants	-0.121 (-0.61)	-0.156 (-0.79)	-0.102 (-0.52)
Contiguous Disputants	0.676*** (4.80)	0.748*** (5.17)	0.679*** (4.89)
Third Party's CINC Score	11.01*** (13.06)	11.26*** (13.22)	11.28*** (12.85)
Constant	-5.428*** (-20.34)	-5.425*** (-20.51)	-5.526*** (-19.09)
Observations	81047	81047	81047

t statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## Figures




Figure 1: Strength of Identity Bias and the Likelihood of CM In the Worst Case Scenario




Figure 2: Strength of Identity Bias and the Likelihood of CM In the Best Case Scenario






Figure 3: Strength of Identity Ties with Both Sides and the Likelihood of CM In Worst Case Scenario




Figure 4: Strength of Identity Ties with Both Sides and the Likelihood of CM In Best Case Scenario

## References

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