Online Supplemental File

Table S1. Comparison of Model 3 With and Without Scalar Invariant Scales (N=713)

Variable	Manuscript Model 3		Scalar Invariant Model 3	
	OR	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**
Offender	0.87	0.14	0.80	0.13
Male	0.96	0.15	0.95	0.15
White	1.04	0.15	1.00	0.14
Age	1.01*	0.01	1.01*	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.90	0.08	0.92	0.09
Future Orientation	1.20*	0.10	1.09	0.10

*$p<.05$; **$p<.01$; All hypotheses tests are one-tailed, with the exception of race/ethnicity

Table S2. Comparison of Model 6 With and Without Scalar Invariant Scales (N=692)

Ultimatum Group	Manuscript Model 6 OR	Manuscript Model 6 s.e.	Scalar Invariant Model 6 OR	Scalar Invariant Model 6 s.e.
Group 1: [0]				
Offender	0.70*	0.12	0.63**	0.11
Male	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.28
White	1.45	1.03	1.77	1.23
Age	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.92	0.09	0.95	0.09
Future Orientation	1.07	0.09	1.02	0.10
Risk-taking	0.74**	0.07	0.94**	0.02
Constant	5.12e8*	1.82e10	358.98**	388.19
Group 2: (0, 0.25]				
Offender	0.70*	0.12	0.63**	0.11
Male	0.33**	0.11	0.39**	0.12
White	1.69*	0.40	1.71*	0.40
Age	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.92	0.09	0.95	0.09
Future Orientation	1.07	0.09	1.02	0.10
Risk-taking	0.74**	0.07	0.94**	0.02
Constant	26.95**	11.40	22.37**	9.00
Group 3: (0.25,0.50)				
Offender	0.70*	0.12	0.63**	0.11
Male	0.89	0.16	0.89	0.16
White	1.80**	0.29	1.77**	0.29
Age	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.92	0.09	0.95	0.09
Future Orientation	1.07	0.09	1.02	0.10
Risk-taking	0.74**	0.07	0.94**	0.02
Constant	2.21**	0.72	2.08*	0.65
Group 4: [0.50]				
Offender	0.70*	0.12	0.63**	0.11
Male	1.45	0.52	1.47	0.52
White	0.59	0.21	0.58	0.21
Age	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.92	0.09	0.95	0.09
Future Orientation	1.07	0.09	1.02	0.10
Risk-taking	0.74**	0.07	0.94**	0.02
Constant	0.12**	0.05	0.11**	0.05

*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$; All hypothesis tests are one-tailed, with the exception of race/ethnicity

Table S3: Model 3 Ordered Logit for Group-Based Proportion Offered in Dictator Game: By Stake

Stake	$10		$50		$100		$500		$5,000		$10,000	
Variable	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**
Offender	0.86	0.16	0.90	0.15	1.03	0.17	1.02	0.17	0.97	0.16	0.99	0.17
Male	0.74*	0.13	0.70**	0.11	0.70*	0.11	0.89	0.14	1.10	0.17	0.99	0.16
White	1.11	0.18	1.00	0.15	0.97	0.14	1.04	0.15	1.21	0.18	1.13	0.16
Age	1.02**	0.01	1.02**	0.01	1.01*	0.01	1.02*	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.00	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.89	0.09	0.92	0.09	0.93	0.09	0.85*	0.08	0.88	0.08	0.82*	0.08
Future Orientation	1.11	0.10	1.20*	0.10	1.15*	0.10	1.11	0.09	1.23**	0.10	1.25**	0.10
N	723		723		723		724		722		722	

*$p<.05$; **$p<.01$; All hypotheses tests are one-tailed, with the exception of race/ethnicity

Table S4: Model 6 Generalized OLogit for Group-Based Proportion Offered in the Ultimatum Game: By Stake ($10-$100)

Stake	$10		$50		$100	
Ultimatum Group	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**
Group 1: [0]						
Offender	0.65*	.15	0.60**	.12	0.74	0.14
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
White	1.69**	.32	1.45*	.24	1.38*	0.23
Age	1.00	.01	1.00	.01	1.00	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.91	.11	0.99	.10	0.94	0.10
Future Orientation	1.11	.12	1.20	.37	1.06	0.10
Risk-taking	0.72**	.08	0.74**	.08	0.77**	0.08
Group 2: (0, 0.25]	---	---	---	---	---	---
[parallel variables omitted][1]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	0.34*	.12	0.36**	.11	.41**	.11
Group 3: (0.25,0.50)	---	---	---	---	---	---
[parallel variables omitted]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	.57*	.14	0.56**	.11	0.64*	0.13
Group 4: [0.50]	---	---	---	---	---	---
[parallel variables omitted]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	3.07**	1.35	1.86	.86	1.94	.88
N	714		715		714	

*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$; All hypothesis tests are one-tailed, with the exception of race/ethnicity; 1: Group 2, 3 and 4 variables which did not violate the proportional odds assumption are not displayed because their output was the same across groups.

Table S5: Model 6 Generalized OLogit for Group-Based Proportion Offered in the Ultimatum Game: By Stake ($500-$10,000)

Stake	500^2		$5,000		$10,000^2$	
Ultimatum Group	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**	**OR**	**s.e.**
Group 1: [0]						
Offender	0.69*	0.13	0.68*	0.12	0.62**	0.11
Male	0.73*	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.85	0.15
White	1.55**	0.24	1.71**	0.27	1.85**	0.30
Age	0.99	0.01	0.99	0.01	0.99	0.01
Sensation Seeking	0.89	0.09	0.93	0.09	0.92	0.09
Future Orientation	1.10	0.10	1.16*	0.10	1.20*	0.11
Risk-taking	0.74**	0.07	0.81*	0.08	0.83*	0.08
Group 2: (0, 0.25]						
[parallel variables omitted][1]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	---	---	0.70*	.14	---	---
Group 3: (0.25,0.50)						
[parallel variables omitted]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	---	---	0.96	.17	---	---
Group 4: [0.50]	---	---	---	---	---	---
[parallel variables omitted]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	---	---	2.28*	1.09	---	---
N	714		714		714	

*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$; All hypothesis tests are one-tailed, with the exception of race/ethnicity; 1: Group 2, 3 and 4 variables which did not violate the proportional odds assumption are not displayed because their output was the same across groups; 2: Parallel line assumption imposed to facilitate convergence.

Table S6. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests: Dictator Stake Comparison

	$50	$100	$500	$5,000	$10,000
Aggregate Sample					
$10	7.88**				
$50		4.27**			
$100			11.83**		
$500				11.45**	
$5,000					-3.64**
Offenders					
$10	6.78**				
$50		2.72**			
$100			9.86**		
$500				9.69**	
$5,000					-3.33**
Non-Offenders					
$10	3.96**				
$50		3.61**			
$100			6.47**		
$500				6.09**	
$5,000					-1.51

Note: Cells contain z statistics; $*p<.05$, $**p<.01$

Table S7. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests: Ultimatum Stake Comparison

	$50	$100	$500	$5,000	$10,000
Aggregate Sample					
$10	6.68**				
$50		2.66**			
$100			8.49**		
$500				7.31**	
$5,000					-1.31
Offenders					
$10	5.72**				
$50		1.13			
$100			8.05**		
$500				5.74**	
$5,000					-0.66
Non-Offenders					
$10	3.33**				
$50		3.16**			
$100			3.01**		
$500				4.78**	
$5,000					-1.36

Note: Cells contain z statistics; $*p<.05$, $**p<.01$

Table S8: Logit Models of Within-Individual Change Between Games

Variable	OR	s.e.
Offender	0.36**	0.09
Male	0.64*	0.15
White	1.76**	0.37
Age	0.99	0.01
Sensation Seeking	1.19	0.16
Future Orientation	1.20	0.15
Risk	0.71**	0.10
Group 1 [0]	25.13**	15.40
Group 2 (0,.25]	68.80**	24.72
Group 3 (.25, .50)	34.19**	11.03
Group 5 (.50,1]	1.09	1.18
Constant	0.27**	0.13
N	683	

*$p<.05$; **$p<.01$; All hypotheses tests are one-tailed, with the exception of race/ethnicity
Reference group is Group 4, which offered half of their stake in the dictator game

Here we examined change in behavior as an individual transitioned from the ultimatum to the dictator game. We conducted this analysis using a logit model (0=no change, 1=increased offer in the ultimatum game), while controlling for demographics, theoretically relevant confounders and an individual's initial dictator-game offer. Dummy variables for group-based dictator game offer (which we used for analysis of Models 1-3 within our manuscript) were included, with the modal offer (half of the stake) as our reference group.

As expected, neither sensation seeking nor future orientation were significantly associated with a change in offer between the games. The only theoretically-based predictor which we found to be significant was risk-taking (OR=0.67, $p<.01$). This was expected given that our manuscript substantively concluded the transition between games is reflective of strategic decision-making. Notably, the relationship between offender status and offer change also remained significant ($p<.05$). We believe this result supports our substantive conclusions that there are important individual differences between offender and non-offenders that can be found in the "strategic" element of decision-making, captured in the transition to the ultimatum game, which was not included in our risk-taking construct.