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\title{Promoting Political Participation in War-Torn Countries: Micro-Level Evidence from Postwar Liberia}

\date{\centering\today\endgraf\bigskip\textit{Supporting Information -- Not for Publication}}
  
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\begin{abstract}
	
\noindent \normalsize{This appendix is divided into three sections. The first of these offers more definitional and descriptive detail important for the paper. It first clarifies the differences between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the links between these two concepts. It then describes the United Nations Mission in Liberia in more detail.
In the second section, I conduct a series of robustness checks and additional analyses in an effort to shed more light on the main findings of the paper. These include: (i) testing for the effects of UNMIL separately for the civilian sample and the ex-combatant sample; (ii) altering the mean effects index of national political participation to assess the effects of UNMIL when the voting measure is excluded; (iii) using an alternative proxy for UNMIL operation--deployments before the October 2005 elections--to better capture UNMIL effects on voting in 2005; (iv) testing other potential mechanisms not investigated in the paper (e.g., exposure to violence; shifting of social norms); and (v) controlling for district-level fixed effects; and (vi) testing for potential heterogeneity of UNMIL effects. The final section provides detailed information about all the variables used in the analysis, including: sample demographics, survey questions used for coding and/or transforming the variables employed in the analysis,  summary statistics and deployment status of UNMIL bases and their strength from 2004 to 2009.}\

	
\end{abstract}

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\setlength{\baselineskip}{1.15\baselineskip}


\section{Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and UNMIL}

\subsection{Peacekeeping vs. Peacebuilding}

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are often used interchangeably, but they do not mean the same thing. Peacekeeping, the deployment of international personnel for peace and security purposes in the aftermath of warfare (Fortna 2008, Heldt 2011), has been concretely conceptualized -- and practiced -- in post-conflict intervention. It involves an indispensable military component and sometimes a non-military component as well (Fortna 2008). The United Nations defines two categories of peacekeeping operations: Chapter VI peacekeeping, which comprises the monitoring of cease-fire agreements, interposition of lightly armed troops and Chapter VII peacekeeping, which typically concerns heavier military involvement to ensure security and compliance with a cease-fire.\\

Peacebuilding generally refers to efforts to address the broader issues of democracy, governance and human rights, among other. These are issues often cited as root causes of conflict and considered to be under the purview of domestic governments during the Cold War (Cousens and Kumar 2001; Boutros-Boutros Ghalis, 1995). To use the UN lingo, it involves a ``range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacity at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development."\footnote{http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/faq.shtml}. These include ``disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, and advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation" (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 17, citing Boutros Ghali 1992).\footnote{Unlike peacekeeping, peacebuilding does not originate from the U.N. or other international institutions. Rather, the term was first coined by Galtung (1976) as an academic ``approach'' to achieving peace, ``perhaps over and above peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking.'' As Tschrigi (2004) acknowledges, ``[t]oday, peacebuilding is no longer an exact term.'' It has taken on a variety usages in existing literature, ranging from the very next step after peacekeeping (e.g., Fisher 1993) to an umbrella conception encompassing peacekeeping and other necessary measures (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000/06). In the latter case, peacebuilding involves both a military (``lower order'') mission to end conflict and a civilian (``higher order'') mission to bring in democratic transition.}\\

Nevertheless, these different usages of peacebuilding all emphasize preserving peace through building institutions and promoting participatory processes (Doyle and Sambanis 2000/06), instead of simply achieving an equilibrium of military power, as is peacekeeping's traditional focus (Fortna 2008). In other words, while both peacekeeping and peacebuilding can have multiple dimensions, the former tends to rely more heavily on military strength to ensure the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, whereas the latter focuses much more on the civilians and seeks to bring about good governance and democracy. Among the peacebuilding objectives defined by the U.N. include ``strengthening the rule of law,'' ``respect for human rights,'' ``supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes,'' and ``social and economic development'' (United Nations 2008). However, Doyle and Sambanis (2000/06) find that ``higher order peacebuilding,'' with a specific democracy promotion agenda, is more successful in terms of self-defense and self-sustainability than military-focused ``lower order peacebuilding.'' In particular, ``a creative, multidimensional implementation'' of political transition focused on enhancing local capacities is essential to sustainable peace.\\

In practice, peacebuilding is ``now widely accepted part of most UN [peacekeeping] missions" (Dawson 2004). Many empirical studies (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Paris 2004) use ``peacebuilding operations'' to refer to peacekeeping operations that have both the military/security component and non-military functions. Hence these operations are often called {\emph{peacebuilding operations}} or {\emph{multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations}}. As Fotna (2008a) puts it, ``\emph{ missions} involve both military and civilian components helping to implement a comprehensive peace settlement. In addition to the roles played by observer or interposition missions, they perform tasks such as the organizing of elections, human rights training and monitoring, police reform, institution building, economic development, and so on" (7). This paper follows the same protocol and uses peacebuilding operations/interventions interchangeably with multidimensional peacekeeping operations.\\


\subsection{The United Nations Mission in Liberia}

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was initiated in September 2013, after a cease-fire was reached following the conclusion of the Second Liberian Civil War. As President Charles Taylor's forced removal led to a power vacuum and a delicate security situation, based on Resolution 1509 of 2003, the U.N. sent in over 15,000 military personnel, 250 military observers, 160 staff officers, 1,115 police officers, and a substantial civilian component to restore social stable and democratic institutions in Liberia (Un.Org 2016 a). Over the past 14 years, UNMIL's annual budget reached a peak of \$821,986,000 in 2004-05. The U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has recommended \$205,068,000 for UNMIL in 2016-17 (United Nations 2016).\\

Like other U.N. peacebuilding missions in Africa, such as the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Operation in C\^{o}te d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UNMIL has been given the dual mandate of enhancing both security and non-security measures ever since its inception (Un.Org 2016 a, b, c). Its initial security tasks include supporting the cease-fire's implementation, protecting U.N. staff, facilities, and civilians, providing humanitarian assistance, and assisting in the country's security reforms. Its non-security tasks, on the other hand, focused on supporting the transitional government in re-establishing governance structures nationally and locally, consolidating executive and judicial institutions, restoring proper administration of natural resources, and preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than the end of 2005 (Un.Org 2016 a).\\

Due to damages from the convoluted and long-lasting civil wars in Liberia, UNMIL has faced some structural differences from other U.N. peace operations in adjacent regions. Unlike UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone or UNOCI in C\^{o}te d'Ivoire, UNMIL, as an external actor, is the most important security provider in Liberia. In particular, state actors and traditional ``secret societies'' have only played a very small role in security provision in Liberia. In contrast, secret societies in Sierra Leone are much more crucial and more deeply integrated into the country's security landscape (Smith-H\"{o}hn 2010).\\

Nevertheless, despite such differences, UNMIL's non-security functions remain substantial and systematic. In fact, as domestic security gradually stabilized, UNMIL has been increasingly shifting its focus to non-security measures of institution building and civil rights protection. According to Resolution 2215, which was passed in 2015, the current mandate of UNMIL largely emphasizes accelerating judicial reforms, monitoring human rights activities, and combating sexual-and-gender based violence. At the same time, the mission's military presence has seen a draw down over the last few years, from over 15,000 troop personnel to 7,950 in 2010, then a decrease to 3,750 in 2012, and finally a cut to 1,240 in 2015 (Un.Org 2016 a).\\

Therefore, UNMIL constitutes a fairly representative case of UN peacebuilding activities after the Cold War. Liberia's state security apparatus was characterized with its history of oppression and violence as well as inadequate training and resources, a trait shared by the sites of many other U.N. peace missions. Following the peacebuilding mission, however, the public began to think more highly of their security actors and offered positive ratings, as observed in UNAMSIL and UNOCI as well. But most importantly, UNMIL epitomizes the multilateral nature of post-conflict intervention missions by taking into consideration multiple objectives -- both military- and civilian-focused.\\

\section{Robustness checks and additional analyses}

\subsection{Separate Analyses for Civilian and Ex-Combatant Samples}

In order to check the sensitivity of our results to ex-combatant status or to the proportion of ex-combatants in a particular community I run the mean effects analyses for these populations separately. Table 1 displays estimates for the impacts of UNMIL proximity for ex-combatants (column 2), civilians (column 3), individuals living in communities with a greater concentration of ex-combatants (column 4) and individuals living in communities with fewer ex-combatants (column 5).\

\begin{table}[htb]
\small 
\begin{center}
\caption{Separating the Ex-Combatant and Civilian Samples}
\vskip 15pt
\makebox[\textwidth][c]{
		\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
			\hline
			\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{Any ex-combs} & \textbf{Any civilian} & \textbf{High \% ex-combs} & \textbf{Lower \% ex-combs}\\
			\hline
			\hline
			
			\textbf{National Participation} & 0.33** & 0.28*** & 0.30** & 0.30*** \\
													& (0.15) & (0.07) & (0.12) & (0.09) \\
													& N = 448 & N=1044 & N=882 & N=617 \\
			\hline
			
			\textbf{Local Participation} & -0.07 & -0.09 & -0.07 & -0.09 \\
													& (0.12) & (0.07) & (0.10) & (0.08) \\
													& N = 448 & N=1044 & N=882 & N=617 \\
			
			\hline
		\end{tabular}}	
\end{center}
\end{table}



As seen in the table, the results are not sensitive to dividing the population into civilians and ex-combatants.\


\subsection{Removing Voting from the Mean Effects Index}

Since some individuals may have chosen whether or not to vote in the 2005 Liberian general elections before they came into contact with peacekeepers, I check for the sensitivity of the analysis to the removal of this variable. Table 2 below displays the results of the analysis for a mean effects index of national participation that does not contain this variable.\

\begin{table}
	\begin{center}
		\caption{UNMIL effects on Alternative Index for National-Level Participation}
		\vskip 15pt
		\makebox[\textwidth][c]{
		\begin{tabular}{l c}
			\hline
			\textbf{Variable} & \\
			\hline
			\textbf{National Participation Index} & 0.29*** \\
			& (0.10) \\
			& N = 1499 \\
	
	\hline
	\hline		
			
		\end{tabular}}	
	\end{center}
\end{table}

As can be seen in the table, the coefficient on national political participation retains significance and is of the same magnitude after the removal of voting in 2005 from the mean effects index.\


\subsection{Alternative proxy for UNMIL operation: deployments before the October 2005 elections}

This proxy, {\it early exposure to UNMIL}, is constructed based on the year respondents reported to have seen UNMIL peacekeepers on patrol for the first time. I use 2005 as the cutoff for early versus late exposure, with 76 percent of respondents reporting having seen UNMIL peacekeepers in or before the 2005 general elections. 24 percent of respondents reporting to have seen peacekeepers for the first time after 2005. The goal here is to see whether UNMIL effect on voting in 2005 might be sensitive to the timing of UNMIL deployment. But this also provides an opportunity to probe whether UNMIL had differential effects on political participation depending on the timing of exposure. Table 3 below presents regression estimates from multivariate analyses.\

\begin{table}[htb]
\begin{center}
\caption{Early exposure to UNMIL and political participation}
\vskip 15pt
\makebox[\textwidth][c]{
\begin{tabular}{l c c }
 \hline
         
 \hline
& \textbf{National politics} &   \textbf{Local politics}\\

\hline 

\hline 

Early exposure to UNMIL (before 2005)  & .17 &  .27\\
					& (.07)**  & (.07)*** \\

\hline
\hline
Controls:  & Not displayed. & Not displayed.\\
F:  			& .0000 & .0000\\
Observations: & 1499 & 1499\\
 \hline 
 \hline \\[-1ex]
 
 
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textbf{Note: }{The effects on each index measure were estimated in separate regressions,}}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{with same set of predictors as in the specifications on individual outcome indicators.}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sampling locations: *** p $<$ 0.01, ** p $<$ 0.05, * p $<$ 0.1 }\\
 \label{reg2}
\end{tabular}}	
\end{center}
\end{table}

As it can be seen from table 3, early exposure to UNMIL military has positive and statistically significant associations with the index measure of political participation in national politics and local politics (.17 and .27 standard deviations, respectively, significant at .05 and .01 levels).\


\subsection{Interaction Effects: UNMIL and exposure to violence}

We consider whether or not effects differ depending on individuals' level of exposure to crime and violence as a result of the conflict. We include an interaction term in our regression specification for this analysis, combining the dummy for proximity to a UNMIL base with an index of exposure to crime and violence (these two variables are also included separately in the regressions). We present the results for three such victimization indices below. The first index is comprised of dummies indicating whether or not an individual has experienced looting, assault, vandalism to their property or whether they have witnessed acts of violence. The second index combines binary variables for whether or not respondents have feared assault, looting or vandalism. The final index combines the first two.\

\begin{table}[htb]
	\begin{center}
		\caption{UNMIL, exposure to violence and political participation}
		\vskip 15pt
		\makebox[\textwidth][c]{
		\begin{tabular}{lcc}
			\hline
			\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{National Participation} & \textbf{Local Participation} \\
			\hline
			\hline
			\textbf{UNMIL x Local Victimization} & -0.12** & 0.02 \\
			& (0.06) & (0.06) \\
			& N = 1488 & N = 1488 \\
			
			\hline
			\textbf{UNMIL x Perception of Victimization} & -0.01 & -0.01 \\
			& (0.06) & (0.05) \\
			& N = 1488 & N = 1488 \\
			
			\hline
			\textbf{UNMIL x Actual Victimization} & -0.11* & 0.00 \\
			& (0.06) & (0.06) \\
			& N = 1488 & N = 1488 \\
			
 \hline 
 \hline \\[-1ex]
 
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textbf{Note: }{The effects on each index measure were estimated in separate regressions,}}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{with same set of predictors as in the specifications on individual outcome indicators.}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sampling locations: *** p $<$ 0.01, ** p $<$ 0.05, * p $<$ 0.1 }\\
		\end{tabular}}	
	\end{center}
\end{table}

The results of this analysis are mixed but provide some suggestive evidence of smaller effects of peacebuilding on national measures of political participation for those more exposed to the conflict. Having said this, the regressions imply that victimization itself (not interacted with proximity to UNMIL bases) has a positive effect on political participation.\\

\subsection{Interaction Effects: Norm Shifting Mechanisms}

Drawing on Gilligan et al's study (2013) about political participation in post conflict Nepal, this section considers the possibility that changing social composition and shifting social norms increase political participation by allowing for improved collective action within communities. I first consider the extent to which effects of UNMIL vary depending on the levels of out-migration experienced by local communities. Out-migration is a proxy for changed social composition here, since Gilligan et al hypothesize that those with the least to benefit from collective action are more likely to be the ones to leave an area during conflict. Though it is not possible to test the extent to which leavers compare to those who stay put in terms of their propensity to be social, I consider the impacts of UNMIL for communities with greater and smaller levels of conflict-induced out-migration.\\

Below I present the coefficient on the interaction term between proximity to a UNMIL base and living in a community with significant out-migration during the war (a dummy for whether $>$ 10\% of the population left since the beginning of the war). It is worth noting that 64\% of those who migrated in our sample did so to escape the conflict directly, with 36\% leaving to find work -- also often an indirect consequence of conflict. Though I estimated no significant effects of UNMIL operation on local participation in general, there is some evidence for a relationship here in communities with the greatest war-time out-migration. We do not see differential effects by levels of out migration for national participation. The results presented in Table 5 below.\


\begin{table}[htb]
\small
	\begin{center}
		\caption{Interaction Effects with Wartime Out-Migration}
		\vskip 15pt
		\begin{tabular}{lcc}
			\hline
			\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{National Participation} & \textbf{Local Participation} \\
			\hline
			\textbf{Out-Migration over 10\% x UNMIL} & -0.01 & 0.26* \\
			& (0.16) & (0.15) \\
			& N = 877 & N = 877 \\	
			\hline
			
 \hline 
 \hline \\[-1ex]
 
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textbf{Note: }{The effects on each index measure were estimated in separate regressions,}}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{with same set of predictors as in the specifications on individual outcome indicators.}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sampling locations: *** p $<$ 0.01, ** p $<$ 0.05, * p $<$ 0.1 }\\
			
		\end{tabular}	
	\end{center}
\end{table}



\subsection{Controlling for district fixed effects}

In this section I rerun the analysis presented in tables 2 and 3 in the paper following specifications in equations (1) and (2) by including district-level dummies in order to investigate the possibility that UNMIL effects may be a product of unobserved area characteristics.\footnote{The district is a second tier administrative level below the country and above the clan.} The results are presented in Table 6 below.\

\begin{table}[h!]
\small 
	\begin{center}
		\caption{Controlling for District-Level Effects}
		\vskip 15pt
		\begin{tabular}{lc}
			\hline
			\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{UNMIL Effect} \\
			\hline
			\textbf{Voted 2005} & 0.35** \\
			& (0.17) \\
			& N = 1280 \\
			\textbf{Contributed to campaigns} & -0.07 \\
			& (0.08) \\
			& N = 1459 \\
			\textbf{Attended political rallies} & -0.13 \\
			& (0.10) \\
			& N = 1484 \\
			\textbf{Contacted gov. agency or official} & 0.02 \\
			& (0.10) \\
			& N = 1445 \\
			\textbf{Contacted MP or senator} & 0.35*** \\
			& (0.13) \\
			& N = 1328 \\
			\textbf{Attended community meetings} & -0.29* \\
			& (0.15) \\
			& N = 1401 \\
			\textbf{Spoke at community meetings} & -0.23** \\
			& (0.11) \\
			& N = 1499 \\
			\textbf{Contacted traditional leaders} & -0.24*** \\
			& (0.08) \\
			& N = 1499 \\
			\textbf{Attended peaceful protests} & 0.26** \\
			& (0.12) \\
			& N = 1419 \\
			\textbf{Called radio station to complain about leaders} & 0.18 \\
			& (0.15) \\
			& N = 1235 \\
			\hline
			\textbf{National Participation Index} & 0.13** \\
			& (0.05) \\
			& N = 1499 \\
			\textbf{Local Participation Index} & -0.22** \\
			& (0.09) \\
			& N = 1499 \\
			
\hline 	 			
 \hline 			
		\end{tabular}	
	\end{center}
\end{table}

Overall, the pattern of results is fairly consistent with the results presented in Tables 2 and 3. The effects on both mean effects indices (i.e. participation in national-level politics and in local-level politics) are in the expected direction and statistically significant. With respect to marginal effects on individual variables, the results are somewhat less consistent. Voting in the 2005 elections and contacting one's MP or senator retain statistical significance, whereas contribution to political campaigns and attending political rallies loose significance. The effects on related to participation in local politics are in the expected direction as in the main analysis and even pick up statistical significance. In short, any district-level fixed effects do not appear to be strong enough to alter the overall pattern of empirical results presented in the paper. It is worth noting that many observations are dropped where there is little variation in a particular district for particular modes of political participation. This is likely to be affecting the results for some of these indicators.\\


\subsection{Testing for potential heterogeneity of UNMIL effects}

Another issue concerns possible heterogeneity of the effects of UNMIL. Anthropological studies (for example, Rubinstein 2008, 2003; Duffey 2000) have long suggested that local context matters for outside interventions, but this warning has rarely been heeded in current peacebuilding research and practice.\footnote{"Local contexts" here is broadly defined as a wide range of factors related to histories, cultures, and institutions, as well as the socio-economic and political dynamics in particular settings (Autesserre 2010). The concept is used interchangeably with "local settings".} For example, Hohe (2003, 2002) argues that peacebuilding efforts to promote liberal reforms in East Timor were undermined by a clash between international paradigms of legitimate power and authority under the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) and the existing indigenous paradigm of traditional political authority that prevails among the majority of the population at the local level.\footnote{Ponzio(2011)echoes this argument in the context of Afghanistan and points to a widening gap between local and international conceptions of legitimate power and authority to explain beleaguered international peacebuilding efforts to establish democratic authority in this war-torn country.} At the same time, certain existing paradigms may make a region more ``favorable" to intervention, as civil violence and experiences may foster conditions ripe for greater political awareness and mobilization in the aftermath of war (for example, Wood 2008; Keen 2005; Ferne 2001). Recent micro-level studies (for example, Blattman 2009; Bellows and Miguel 2008) provide empirical evidence of a robust link between civil war violence and postwar political outcomes. What these studies have not done well is identify meaningful variation in aspects of local contexts that may help explain differences in peacebuilding outcomes or explain the precise mechanisms behind the purported links. Therefore, it is clear that peacebuilding research and literature needs further inquiry into the relationship between interventions and contextual factors.\\

Unfortunately, this study was specifically designed to minimize pre-intervention differences, making it difficult to investigate heterogeneity in treatment effects along contextual factors. Thus, it cannot adequately investigate how heterogeneity in local settings shapes peacebuilding performance and its influence on liberal outcomes. Nonetheless, it is still possible to perform cursory, tentative investigation of this issue. Below I examine UNMIL effects, taking into account heterogeneity across the following factors that frequently occur  with regard to peacebuilding interventions (+ sign indicates a positive interaction and -- sign a negative one): ethnic heterogeneity (+); presence of poro (that is, male-dominated) traditional society (-); proportion of foreigners (+); proportion of literate dwellers (+), and proportion of households that lost a family member during the war (+). I have recorded each factor as a dummy to analyze effects across higher and lower values of a particular measure. Table 7 summarizes results of multivariate OLS estimations of UNMIL (objective measure), and liberal political participation.\\



\begin{table}[h!]
\begin{center}
\caption{UNMIL effects by types of local settings}
\vskip 15pt
\begin{tabular}{l c c}
 \hline
 
  \hline
& \textbf{Yes} &   \textbf{No}\\
\hline 
					
Ethnic heterogeneity?& .22** & .39*\\
				& (.1)     & (.2)\\
				& N= 1026   & N= 473\\

\hline 
Chief is \emph{poro}? & .20		& .31**\\
					& (.12)       & (.11)\\
					&N= 883     & N= 616\\

\hline 
Chief was elected?    & .15*		& .60***\\
				& (.08) 		& (.17)\\
				& N = 888          & N= 553\\


\hline 
Proportion of foreigners? & .23        & .33***\\
					& (.14)           & (.10) \\
					& N= 508       & N= 972\\
 
\hline 
Lost relative in war?       & .32*** &      .25**\\
					& (.11) & 	          (.12)\\
					& N=734	&	 N= 678\\


\hline 
Higher literacy levels? & .33**                 & .10\\
					& (.14) 		& (.10)\\
					& N=679            & N= 820\\
 \hline 
 \multicolumn{3}{l}{\textbf{Note:}{The effects on each outcome and variable of interest were estimated in separate }}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{regressions, with same set of predictors as in the specifications on individual outcome indicators.}\\
\multicolumn{3}{l}{Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sampling locations: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 }\\
 \label{reg2}
\end{tabular}	
\end{center}
\end{table}

		
As shown, there is some heterogeneity, and, in some measures, the differences are pronounced. Indeed, effects are concentrated on one side between heterogeneous and homogeneous communities; between more and less literate; between communities that have and do not have chiefs who are poro; and between those where the chief is and is not elected. There also appear to be some differences for the other two measures (lost relatives in war and proportion of foreigners), though these are smaller. These heterogeneous findings, while tentative and ex-post, beg for an explanation and further research. Certainly, critics of the current peacebuilding approach (for example, Ponzio 2011; Hohe 2002), who stress the importance of local settings, may read these results as further vindication of their position and rebuke mainstream peacebuilding research alongside the practice of treating of local settings as undifferentiated wholes, ignoring the local diversity of contexts. Yet this reaction would swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction because the results here do show that there are two sides to the story of how local contexts, measured along different variables, seem to relate to UNMIL operations. One side seems to be more responsive, enabling UNMIL to have greater effects on political participation. The other side seems to be more constraining towards UNMIL. These results point to a fruitful area of future research to investigate systematically when and how different local settings may matter for the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations.\\


\section{Codebook for key variables and summary statistics}

	\includepdf[pages={15}, pagecommand={}]{appendixadds}

\begin{landscape}

	\includepdf[pages={17-24}, pagecommand={}, fitpaper,rotateoversize]{appendixadds}
	
\end{landscape}


\clearpage

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\end{thebibliography}

\end{document} 
