**Appendix A**: Regression tables for logit models of accuracy of voters’ evaluations of specific pledges (DV: 1= Accurate Evaluation, 0= Inaccurate evaluation)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|   | All Pledges | Fulfilled Pledges | Unfulfilled Pledges |
| Proposal | -0.0273 | 0.137\* | -0.378\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0421) | (0.0628) | (0.0738) |
| Government Party ID. | 0.205\*\* | 0.570\*\*\* | -0.520\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0650) | (0.0998) | (0.117) |
| Opposition Party ID. | -0.0993 | -0.147 | 0.00807 |
|  | (0.0575) | (0.0815) | (0.102) |
| Trust | 0.0302\*\* | 0.0717\*\*\* | -0.0588\*\* |
|  | (0.0113) | (0.0174) | (0.0200) |
| Political Knowledge | 0.173\*\*\* | 0.232\*\*\* | 0.0639\* |
|  | (0.0176) | (0.0271) | (0.0305) |
| Media Exposure | 0.0328 | 0.0353 | 0.0505 |
|  | (0.0180) | (0.0271) | (0.0315) |
| Pledge Salience | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.621\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0387) | (0.0411) |  |
| Constant | 0.0878 | -0.381\*\* | 0.665\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0947) | (0.135) | (0.161) |
| N | 13455 | 9913 | 3542 |
| Pseudo R-sq | 0.013 | 0.048 | 0.019 |
| Log lik. | -8342.0 | -5648.3 | -2366.8 |
| Chi-squared | 175.2 | 395.9 | 78.26 |
| Standard errors (clustered by respondent) in parentheses\* = p <0.05, \*\* = p <0.01, \*\*\* = p <0.001” |

**Appendix B**: Regression tables for logit models of accuracy of voters’ evaluations of specific pledges by pledges (DV: 1= Accurate Evaluation, 0= Inaccurate evaluation)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Proposal | 0.0126 | 0.246\* | 0.00350 | 0.402\*\*\* | 0.137 | -0.208\* | -0.685\*\*\* |
|  | (0.105) | (0.110) | (0.0971) | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.0907) | (0.121) |
| Government Party ID. | 0.425\* | 0.671\*\*\* | 0.478\*\* | 1.113\*\*\* | 0.289 | -0.310\* | -0.961\*\*\* |
|  | (0.170) | (0.168) | (0.151) | (0.171) | (0.176) | (0.144) | (0.196) |
| Opposition Party ID. | -0.301\* | -0.0775 | 0.00551 | -0.0234 | -0.307\* | 0.102 | -0.241 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.142) | (0.126) | (0.148) | (0.145) | (0.127) | (0.180) |
| Trust | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.0611\* | 0.0604\* | 0.0754\* | 0.0554 | -0.0336 | -0.114\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0291) | (0.0291) | (0.0268) | (0.0294) | (0.0302) | (0.0246) | (0.0319) |
| Political Knowledge | 0.214\*\*\* | 0.116\*\* | 0.380\*\*\* | 0.234\*\*\* | 0.258\*\*\* | 0.0202 | 0.159\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0442) | (0.0437) | (0.0424) | (0.0438) | (0.0462) | (0.0376) | (0.0478) |
| Media Exposure | 0.0980\* | -0.0405 | 0.0782 | 0.0820 | -0.0102 | 0.0627 | 0.0568 |
|  | (0.0434) | (0.0452) | (0.0404) | (0.0460) | (0.0452) | (0.0385) | (0.0501) |
| Constant | -0.0297 | -0.00949 | -0.366 | -1.484\*\*\* | 0.854\*\*\* | -0.0787 | 1.869\*\*\* |
|  | (0.205) | (0.210) | (0.197) | (0.227) | (0.215) | (0.196) | (0.264) |
| N | 2063 | 1574 | 2294 | 1557 | 2425 | 2001 | 1541 |
| pseudo R-sq | 0.037 | 0.026 | 0.048 | 0.072 | 0.026 | 0.009 | 0.053 |
| Log lik. | -1107.2 | -983.6 | -1274.7 | -1000.4 | -1104.1 | -1369.5 | -857.0 |
| Chi-squared | 84.21 | 53.27 | 127.8 | 154.6 | 58.18 | 23.86 | 95.24 |
|

|  |
| --- |
| Standard errors (clustered by respondent) in parentheses\* = p <0.05, \*\* = p <0.01, \*\*\* = p <0.001” |

 |

**Appendix C:** Regression tables for logit models of accuracy of voters’ evaluations of specific pledges (DV: 1= Accurate Evaluation, 0= Inaccurate evaluation) with pledge dummy.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|   | (1) |
|   | All Pledges |
| Proposal | -0.0149 |
|  | (0.0443) |
| Government Party ID. | 0.239\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0681) |
| Opposition Party ID. | -0.0839 |
|  | (0.0603) |
| Trust | 0.0313\*\* |
|  | (0.0118) |
| Political Knowledge | 0.190\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0186) |
| Media Exposure | 0.0507\*\* |
|  | (0.0189) |
| Pledge 1 | 0.162\* |
|  | (0.0814) |
| Pledge 2 | -0.307\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0866) |
| Pledge 3 | 0.0126 |
|  | (0.0777) |
| Pledge 4 | -0.905\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0850) |
| Pledge 5 | 0.570\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0842) |
| Pledge 6 | -1.159\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0679) |
| Pledge 7 |  |
|  |  |
| Constant | 0.303\*\* |
|  | (0.104) |
| N | 13455 |
| Pseudo R-sq | 0.069 |
| Log lik. | -7875.7 |
| Chi-squared | 1032.9 |
| Standard errors (clustered by respondent) in parentheses\* = p <0.05, \*\* = p <0.01, \*\*\* = p <0.001” |

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