## Online Appendix

## Stopgappers? : The Occupational Trajectories of Men in Female-Dominated Occupations

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Table AI. Odds Ratio Coefficients of Exit From a Female-Dominated Occupation (Time Dummies; Only Men).

|  | Exit |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All workers | High-status occupations | Low-status occupations |
| High-status occupations (r.c.: low-status occupations) | $\begin{aligned} & 0.708^{* * *} \\ & (0.082) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Top manager (r.c.: professionals) |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.877 \\ (0.316) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Managers (r.c.: professionals) |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { I. } 402 \\ (0.43 \mathrm{I}) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Blue-collar (r.c.: service, sales, clerical workers) |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 1.352 \dagger \\ (0.247) \end{array}$ |
| Last occupation (r.c.: female) |  |  |  |
| Male | $\begin{aligned} & 2.031 * * * \\ & (0.197) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.014^{* * *} \\ & (0.517) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.025 * * * \\ & (0.205) \end{aligned}$ |
| Neutral | $\begin{aligned} & 1.740 * * * \\ & (0.179) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} I .724 \dagger \\ (0.483) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.709 * * * \\ & (0.183) \end{aligned}$ |
| Unemployed | 1.596** | 1.495 | 1.549** |

Table AI. (continued)

|  | Exit |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All workers | High-status occupations | Low-status occupations |
|  | (0.306) | (0.890) | (0.315) |
| Work experience |  |  |  |
| Tenure (years) | $0.321^{* * *}$ | 0.403*** | 0.297*** |
|  | (0.014) | (0.044) | (0.016) |
| Tenure ${ }^{2}$ (years) | 1.051 *** | 1.031*** | 1.058*** |
|  | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.005) |
| Tenure of the occupation | 0.984 | 1.010 | 0.969 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.049) | (0.034) |
| Full-time worker | 1.115 | 1.089 | 1.100 |
|  | (0.110) | (0.345) | (0.119) |
| Number of prior jobs | 0.900*** | 0.895** | 0.892*** |
|  | (0.017) | (0.042) | (0.018) |
| Unemployment episodes | 0.928** | 0.949 | 0.924** |
|  | (0.035) | (0.080) | (0.034) |
| Total years of work experience | 0.950*** | 1.031 | 0.933*** |
|  | (0.017) | (0.047) | (0.017) |
| Sociodemographic controls |  |  |  |
| College | 1.865*** | 2.184** | 1.280 |
|  | (0.382) | (0.758) | (0.414) |
| Field of study: female-dominated | 0.891 | 0.759 | 0.916 |
|  | (0.074) | (0.154) | (0.085) |
| Married (r.c.: single) | 1.341*** | 1.112 | 1.403*** |
|  | (0.109) | (0.23I) | (0.12I) |
| Separated or divorced (r.c.: single) | 1.461*** | 1.406 | 1.481*** |
|  | (0.169) | (0.542) | (0.179) |
| $N$ | 5,252 | 1,009 | 4,243 |
| Clusters | 1,293 | 199 | 1,218 |
| $\chi^{2}$ | 1.181.122 | 226.652 | 1.039 .589 |

[^0]Table A2. Probability of Change in Occupations. Odds Ratio Coefficients for Men and Women.


Table A2. (continued)

|  | High-status <br> occupations | Low-status <br> occupations |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Change in parental status | $1.101 * *$ | $1.108^{* * *}$ |
| Time | $(0.042)$ | $(0.028)$ |
|  | $0.897^{* * *}$ | $0.923^{* * *}$ |
| Time $^{2}$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.007)$ |
| $N$ | $0.998^{* * *}$ | $0.997^{* * *}$ |
| $\chi^{2}$ | $(0.000)$ | $(0.000)$ |

Note. Exponentiated coefficients; numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Individuals are clustered. r.c. $=$ reference category.
***p $<.01$. **p $<.05$.

Table A3. Odds Ratio Coefficients of Exit From a Female-Dominated Occupation (Only Women).

|  | Exit |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All workers | High-status occupations | Low-status occupations |
| Top manager (r.c.: professionals) |  | 1.166 |  |
|  |  | (0.458) |  |
| Managers (r.c.: professionals) |  | 1.465** |  |
|  |  | (0.263) |  |
| Blue-collar (r.c.: service, sales, clerical workers) |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 2.112 * * * \\ & (0.218) \end{aligned}$ |
| Last occupation (r.c.: female) |  |  |  |
| Male | 1.046 | 1.023 | 1.041 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.149) | (0.062) |
| Neutral | 0.498*** | 0.336*** | 0.549*** |
|  | (0.025) | (0.043) | (0.029) |
| Unemployed | 0.654*** | 0.569** | 0.678*** |
|  | (0.054) | (0.127) | (0.060) |
| Work experience |  |  |  |
| Tenure (years) | 0.520*** | 0.551*** | 0.509*** |
|  | (0.010) | (0.027) | (0.011) |

Table A3. (continued)

|  | Exit |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All workers | High-status occupations | Low-status occupations |
| Tenure ${ }^{2}$ (years) | $1.020 * * *$ | $1.016^{* * *}$ | $1.022^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| Tenure of the occupation | 0.978** | 1.030 | 0.995 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.015) |
| Full-time worker | 1.156*** | 1.018 | $1.176 * * *$ |
|  | (0.053) | (0.136) | (0.058) |
| Number of prior jobs | 0.958*** | 1.011 | 0.945*** |
|  | (0.009) | (0.022) | (0.010) |
| Unemployment episodes | 0.949*** | 0.963 | 0.946*** |
|  | (0.012) | (0.037) | (0.014) |
| Total years of work experience | 0.979** | 1.004 | 0.995 |
|  | (0.010) | (0.022) | (0.011) |
| Sociodemographic controls |  |  |  |
| College | 1.438** | $1.630 \dagger$ | $1.414 \dagger$ |
|  | (0.246) | (0.446) | (0.279) |
| Field of study: female-dominated | 0.634*** | 0.468*** | 0.689*** |
|  | (0.064) | (0.108) | $(0.076)$ |
| Getting married | 1.002 | 1.141 | 0.975 |
|  | (0.05I) | (0.154) | (0.053) |
| Getting separated or divorced | 1.124† | 0.832 | $1.143 \dagger$ |
|  | (0.079) | (0.167) | (0.084) |
| Change in parental status | 1.004 | 1.076 | 0.982 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.126) | (0.049) |
| Time | 1.209*** | 1.183*** | $1.217^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.017) | (0.05I) | (0.018) |
| Time ${ }^{2}$ | 0.994*** | 0.993*** | 0.994*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) |
| $N$ | 25,144 | 5,905 | 19,239 |
| $\chi^{2}$ | 2.242 .783 | 418.760 | 1.826.061 |
| Clusters | 2,140 | 770 | 2,013 |

[^1]

Figure AI. Probability of wage increase by occupation of destination.


[^0]:    Note. Time dummies not shown. Exponentiated coefficients; numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Individuals are clustered. r.c. = reference category.
    ***p<.01. **p $<.05$. $\dagger p<.01$.

[^1]:    Note. Exponentiated coefficients; numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Individuals are clustered. r.c. = reference category. ***p<.01. ${ }^{* *} p<.05 . \dagger p<.01$.

