Appendix

Theorizing party choice

The following analysis describes the interactions between a party selectorate and their members of Parliament. It is based on expectations derived from a two-period version of Holmström's (1999) canonical model (also related to a political context by Gehlbach, 2013) on career considerations and manager hiring. The limited number of periods implies that voters disregard effort, while paying close attention to ability.

When parties nominated their candidates for the first time, they had already acquired beliefs about how they would perform in office. Prior to the next election, parties update their belief in light of how a candidate has performed in office. More specifically, it uses the positions garnered by the MEP to determine his ability to obtain influence.

Game sequence, types and efforts

Consider two players, the party (P) and an incumbent MEP (M). They play a game in two periods where Nature (N) moves twice.

1. The game starts with *Nature* selecting the quality of the MEP: $\theta_1, \theta_2, ...\theta_j$.

Each type is drawn from a continuous variable which is normally distributed: $\theta_j \sim N(m, \sigma^2_{\theta_j})$. While the players know the shape of the distribution, neither observes the particular quality of the MEP in office. We can think of the type as a bundle of qualities which define the MEP's ability to gain influence. While the MEP might know his own skills, he doesn't know exactly how they translate in the EP.

2. The incumbent *MEP* picks his effort level, e_1, unobserved by the party.

Effort is here understood as any action an MEP can freely undertake which increases his chances of garnering positions.

3. $Nature$ decides the outcome, π_1, of the MEP's term in office.

The parliamentary group allocates positions in Parliament as a function of the MEP type and his efforts: $\pi_1 = \theta_1 + e_1 + \epsilon_1$. In addition there is a random element which introduces uncertainty in the mapping from type and effort to the actual outcome: $\epsilon_1 \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{\epsilon_1})$. In this game, the uncertainty is exogenously given by the legislative procedure. The uncertainty is reduced when allocations are more selective, as they convey more information about MEP type than – say – a proportional allocation according to party size.

4. The *Party* observes the outcome, and decides whether to renominate the incumbent or pick a freshman who is also randomly drawn from a similar distribution. Payoffs are distributed.

At the end of the first period, the party receives π_1. If the MEP is renominated, he gets the payoff $B - c(e_1)$, and 0 otherwise. B denotes the value the MEP puts on being renominated, while $c(e_1)$ denotes the cost of the effort.

The game then starts a second period similar to the first, except that this time, the MEP moves last.

5. *Nature* chooses the type (θ_2): Incumbent members keep their type. For new members, the type is drawn at random from the same distribution as before.
6. The elected *MEP* picks his effort level, e_2.
7. *Nature* decides the outcome, π_2. Payoffs are distributed.

At the end of the game, the MEP who was reelected receives $B - c(e_1) - c(e_2)$, while the party receives $\pi_1 + \pi_2$.

Equilibrium

The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Players proceed by backward induction and sequentially choose weakly dominant strategies, given their knowledge of the other players' options.

In his last period, the MEP cannot increase his payoff by exerting effort. He thus provides none. Hence, the political outcome π_2 from the *second period* only depends on the MEP's type. Knowing this, a forwardlooking party will discount the effort provided during the *first period* in order to deduce his type.

This means that the incumbent MEP has to make believe that his quality is higher than that of the average candidate:

$$\bar{\theta} \leq \theta_1 \tag{1}$$

The party doesn't know the MEP's level of effort, nor his type, so it bases its choice on the outcome and the effort level which it can reasonably expect from any rational incumbent seeking reelection. In order to find the equilibrium we must look for a pair of $e_1^\star$ and $\bar{\pi}$ which maximizes the MEP's chances of reelection:

$$\max_{e_1} \left(Pr(\pi_1 \geq \bar{\pi} | e_1) B - c(e_1) \right) \tag{2}$$

The party's beliefs

To infer a signal, the party uses the outcome, knowing that it is a function of the MEP's quality and effort as well as a stochastic element.

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_1 = \theta_{j1} + e_1 + \epsilon_1 \Leftrightarrow \\ \pi_1 - e_1 = \theta_{j1} + \epsilon_1 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

This implies that the signal has an expected value of θ_j, but is surrounded by some uncertainty: $N(\pi_1 - e^\star, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$. The party's posterior belief depends on both the precision of the signal and its prior belief about the MEP: $N(m, \sigma_\theta^2)$. In this case, the party's belief is informed by the distribution from which the MEP was first drawn. Upon receiving the signal, the party does a Bayesian updating to form new expectations. (This is detailed in the next subsection.) In this case, both the prior and the signal are normally distributed, and thus conjugate. This yields a posterior expectation about the MEP's type which is a weighted sum of the prior belief and the signal.

$$\bar{m} = \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} m + \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} (\pi_1 - e_1) \tag{4}$$

This implies that the party's posterior belief depends on the relative uncertainty about the MEP's type and the group's choice. Figure 6 illustrates how either signal or the prior belief influences posterior beliefs when uncertainty increases. The other is held constant with a standard normal distribution. The figure shows how the effect of the signal increases when the prior uncertainty increases, or when the uncertainty of the signal itself decreases. This article aims at testing implications derived from this insight.



Figure 6: The party's posterior belief is a function of his prior uncertainty and the prediction of new information.

The party then picks her best voting rule in equilibrium: It prefers the incumbent to a freshman as long as his expected quality, $\bar{m}$ is higher than the average candidate running against him, m.

$$\bar{m} \geq m \tag{5}$$

Plotting the party's posterior belief from equation 4 into the voting rule, we see that the MEP's outcome must be at least as good as what an average MEP would obtain by optimizing his effort (detailed in the next subsection). This defines the party's indifference point.

$$\pi_1 \geq m + e_1^{\star} \equiv \bar{\pi} \tag{6}$$

The MEP's beliefs

The MEP doesn't know the outcome when he picks his effort level. Nor does he know his type, so he cannot adjust his level of effort to the average outcome (Persson and Tabellini, 2013, p. 83-84).[17] This also means that – absent any information about his own quality – he assumes that his type is equivalent to the expected value of the prior distribution, m (i.e., any other MEP). The uncertainty surrounding his belief comes both from the uncertainty he has about the future outcome as well as the initial uncertainty about his type: $\sigma^2 = \sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2$. The incumbent thus knows his probability of being renominated to a safe seat with some uncertainty:

$$Pr(Renominated|e_1) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{\pi} - e_1 - m}{\sigma}\right) \tag{7}$$

He will therefore seek to optimize his final payoff by by solving:

$$\max_{e_1} \left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{\pi} - e_1 - m}{\sigma}\right)\right) B - c(e_1) \tag{8}$$

Differentiating with respect to e_1 yields the first order condition. Rearranging, this expresses the effect of the MEP's cost of effort as a function of his value of renomination as well as the informational environment:

$$\phi(\frac{\bar{\pi} - e_1^\star - m}{\sigma})\frac{B}{\sigma} = c'(e_1^\star) \tag{9}$$

Since the prior expectation about MEP type ought to be equal to the average MEP output excepted his maximized effort, the parameter value of the PDF is set to zero.

$$\phi(0)\frac{B}{\sigma} = c'(e_1^\star) \tag{10}$$

The MEP's equilibrium effort is increasing in the value of reelection (B) and decreasing in the uncertainty (σ) surrounding both his type and the realization of the outcome.

[17]It is possible to think of this as if the MEP picks his level of effort before Nature makes the first choice.

Proofs

Conjugate priors and likelihood

Bayes law requires a prior belief and a likelihood derived from data to obtain a posterior probability: $Posterior \propto Prior \times Likelihood$

- Prior: $\theta \sim N(m, \sigma_\theta^2)$
- Likelihood/signal: $s \sim N(\pi - e, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$
- Posterior: $N(\bar{m}, \sigma^2)$

The party's expected belief about the MEP after receiving the signal is the same as the posterior mean prediction:

$$\bar{m} = \frac{\frac{m}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{\sigma_\epsilon^2}}{\frac{1}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{n}{\sigma_\epsilon^2}} \tag{11}$$

Multiplying two distributions, the formula reduces to: $n = 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = \pi - e$.

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{m} &= \frac{\frac{m}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{\pi - e}{\sigma_\epsilon^2}}{\frac{1}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{1}{\sigma_\epsilon^2}} \\
\bar{m} &= (\frac{m}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{\pi - e}{\sigma_\epsilon^2})\frac{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \\
\bar{m} &= \frac{m \times \sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2(\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)} + \frac{(\pi - e) \times \sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\epsilon^2(\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2)} \\
\bar{m} &= \frac{m \times \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} + \frac{(\pi - e) \times \sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \\
\bar{m} &= m\frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} + (\pi - e)\frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2}
\end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

The party's uncertainty about the MEP's type is the same as the posterior variance parameter:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma^2 &= \left(\frac{1}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{n}{\sigma_\epsilon^2}\right)^{-1} \\
\sigma^2 &= \left(\frac{1}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{1}{\sigma_\epsilon^2}\right)^{-1} \\
\sigma^2 &= \left(\frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2} + \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}\right)^{-1} \\
\sigma^2 &= \frac{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2}
\end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

The voting rule

The weighted average of the party's updating is symmetric, so that the two weights may be expressed in terms of each other: $\lambda = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2}$ and $1-\lambda = \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2+\sigma_\epsilon^2}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{m} &\geq m \Leftrightarrow \\
\lambda(\pi_1 - e_1^\star) + (1-\lambda)m &\geq m \Leftrightarrow \\
\lambda\pi_1 - \lambda e^\star - 1 + m - \lambda m &\geq m \Leftrightarrow \\
\lambda\pi_1 &\geq \lambda e^\star - 1 + \lambda m \\
\pi_1 &\geq e_1^\star + m \equiv \bar{\pi}
\end{aligned} \tag{14}
$$

Details on the data sample

	Nationality	Legislature	Elected	Reelected	N.obs
1	Austria	5	1999	2004	15
2	Austria	6	2004	2009	15
3	Austria	7	2009	2014	13
4	Bulgaria	6	2004	2009	15
5	Bulgaria	7	2009	2014	16
6	Estonia	6	2004	2009	6
7	France	6	2004	2009	68
8	France	5	1999	2004	58
9	France	7	2009	2014	70
10	Germany	5	1999	2004	99
11	Germany	6	2004	2009	99
12	Germany	7	2009	2014	99
13	Greece	5	1999	2004	25
14	Greece	6	2004	2009	21
15	Hungary	6	2004	2009	24
16	Hungary	7	2009	2014	18
17	Portugal	5	1999	2004	23
18	Portugal	6	2004	2009	24
19	Portugal	7	2009	2014	22
20	Romania	6	2004	2009	33
21	Romania	7	2009	2014	30
22	Spain	5	1999	2004	63
23	Spain	6	2004	2009	52
24	Spain	7	2009	2014	52
25	Great Britain	5	1999	2004	81
26	Great Britain	6	2004	2009	62
27	Great Britain	7	2009	2014	31

Table 4: Member states using closed list PR for the subsequent election (N=1134). Number of observations included in the analysis are also reported. The Conservative party in the United Kingdom joined the ECR group in the 7th legislature, and is thus excluded from the analysis.

On the selection of countries Daubler and Hix (2013) have studied how list systems used in European Parliament elections (2004 and 2009) function in practice. Austria and Bulgaria have formally flexible list systems, meaning that voters may give preference votes. However, the lists are only reordered if one or several candidates reach a certain (relative) number of preference votes. When the threshold is set high, the system will tend towards a closed-list ballot. The number of candidates on a list further influences negatively the probability of a reordering.

Few candidates passed the hurdle, causing the authors to reclassify Austria and Bulgaria as *de facto* closed list systems.

Missing observations There are few missing values in the data. Missing values on committee attendance (3 percent) are imputed using information from plenary attendance and EP leadership status (a simple linear regression). All other missing observations are treated as missing at random. They are given prior distributions with mean and deviation informed by the observed data.

The most substantial imputation is done in the lagged dependent variable (7 percent). Most of these unobserved values concern the 2009 election (reelection of the 6^{th} Parliament). The lagged dependent variable requires information on party seat share following the 1999 election as well as list placement in the 2004 election. This information does not exist for new member states which joined the EU in the 2004/2007 EU enlargement. Where this information was available and meaningful (i.e. the parties were represented prior to the first EP elections), I used the number of appointed observers to the EP. These members were appointed from the national parliament on the basis of their representation at home.

A similar problem exists for France which switched from a national circumscription in the late 1990-ies to several subnational units. A listwise exclusion would remove many of the newer member states from the analysis, which would lessen the generalizability of the present results. In these cases, I therefore treat the information as missing at random by giving the variable a prior binomial distribution with a probability informed by the data.

Details on the main model

Random intercepts and convergence statistics are only reported for model 1.

Random intercepts

It is evident from figure 7 that there is no baseline time trend in the allocation of safe seats. There is also little cross-national variation in the propensity to reselect MEPs, with the exception of Greece and Hungary (which tend to reselect to a lesser extent) and Spain (which tends to reselect more often than the general mean). We also see that MEPs seating in the two largest EP groups (the socialists and the conservatives) tend to be reselected more often. This may be because these groups include large national parties with more safe seats to allocate.



Figure 7: Random intercepts (median values surrounded by 95% HDI) from model 1. The number of observations within each group are reported in parantheses.

Convergence statistics

The analysis is done in a Bayesian framework using MCMC methods. Regression coefficients, β_i, γ_i and δ_i, are given a multivariate normal prior with a of mean zero and precision parameter 10. All effects are therefore vaguely assumed to be independent, although allowing variables to control for each other. Detailed BUGs code is available with the online reproduction material. The model is run with 50,000 iterations. I use a 2000-iterations burn-in, keeping every 10^{th} iteration. The two chains show no signs of non-convergence.



Figure 8: Equation 1: traceplots and density plots for main parameters.



Figure 9: Equation 1: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.



Figure 10: Equation 1: Autocorrelation (chain 1).

	Point est.	Upper C.I.
Reports	1.000	1.001
Reports2	1.000	1.000
EPLeadership	1.000	1.000
NationalPolitician	1.000	1.001
Incumbent	1.000	1.000
BarelyElected	1.000	1.001
Ambition	1.001	1.003
SafeSeatLastElection	1.001	1.004
Intercept	1.001	1.004

Table 5: Equation 1: Gelman and Rubin's scale reduction factors

	Chain 1	Chain 2
Reports	0.403	0.235
Reports2	0.208	0.307
EPLeadership	0.341	0.456
NationalPolitician	0.205	-0.783
Incumbent	-1.035	1.435
BarelyElected	-0.231	-0.484
Ambition	-0.289	-1.505
SafeSeatLastElection	-0.267	-0.573
Intercept	0.087	0.230

Table 6: Equation 1: Geweke's z-scores for both chains.





Figure 12: Equation 2: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.



Figure 13: Equation 2: Autocorrelation (chain 1).

	Point est.	Upper C.I.
Intercept	1.001	1.004
Age	1.000	1.003
Party Size	1.000	1.000
MEPs To National Politics	1.000	1.000
Committee Attendance	1.000	1.001

Table 7: Equation 2: Gelman and Rubin's scale reduction factors

	Chain 1	Chain 2
Intercept	1.586	0.873
Age	-0.943	-0.856
Party Size	-0.416	-1.450
MEPs To National Politics	0.987	-1.293
Committee Attendance	-0.981	-1.182

Table 8: Equation 2: Geweke's z-scores for both chains.



Figure 14: Equation 3: traceplots and density plots for main parameters.



Figure 15: Equation 3: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.



Figure 16: Equation 3: Autocorrelation (chain 1).

	Point est.	Upper C.I.
Intercept	1.002	1.005
Safe Seat	1.002	1.012
Years of Term Served	1.002	1.004

Table 9: Equation 3: Gelman and Rubin's scale reduction factors

	Chain 1	Chain 2
Intercept	-0.711	-1.017
Safe Seat	1.472	-1.329
Years of Term Served	0.625	1.169

Table 10: Equation 3: Geweke's z-scores for both chains.

The BUGs code for the model

```
model{


for(i in 1:N){

SafeSeat[i]~dbern(p[i])


logit(p[i])<-mu.SafeSeat[i]


mu.SafeSeat[i]<-a

+a.group[EPGroup[i]]

+a.nat[National[i]]

+a.ep[EP[i]]

+a.list[1]*Reports[i]

+a.list[2]*Reports[i]*Reports[i]

+a.list[3]*EPLeader[i]

+a.list[4]*NatPol[i]

+a.list[5]*Inc[i]

+a.list[6]*Uncert[i]

+a.list[7]*Future[i]

+a.list[8]*SS_lag[i]


########################
```

```
##Impute missing variables##
########################

##Predictors of missing values on Future##
FutureNA[i]~dbern(p.fut.na[i])

logit(p.fut.na[i])<-mu.fut.na[i]

mu.fut.na[i]<-betaNA[1]
+betaNA[2]*SafeSeat[i]
+betaNA[3]*Time[i]

##Impute missing values on Future##
Future[i]~dbern(p.fut[i])

logit(p.fut[i])<-mu.fut[i]

mu.fut[i]<-
beta[1]
+beta[2]*Age[i]
+beta[3]*Seats[i]
+beta[4]*Career[i]
+beta[5]*AttCom[i]



##Impute missing values on committee attendance##
AttCom[i]~dnorm(mu.att[i], tau.att)

mu.att[i]<-beta.att[1]
+beta.att[2]*Attend[i]
+beta.att[3]*NoCom[i]
```

```
##Priors on missing values; other variables##

#Binary variables#

NatPol[i]~dbin(NatPol.m, 1)

EPLeader[i]~dbin(EPLead.m, 1)

Inc[i]~dbin(Inc.m, 1)

Uncert[i]~dbin(Uncert.m, 1)

Career[i]~dbin(Career.m, 1)


#Count variables#

Time[i]~dnorm(Time.m, Time.sd)

Seats[i]~dnorm(Seats.m, Seats.sd)

Attend[i]~dnorm(Attend.m, Attendsd)

Age[i]~dnorm(Age.m, Age.sd)

SS_lag[i]~dbin(Lag.m, 1)


}


##Set general mean##

a.star<-a+mean(a.group[])+

mean(a.ep[])+

mean(a.nat[])






################################

###Priors on regression coefficients:###

################################


###Prior for general mean###
```

```
a~dnorm(a.mu, a.tau)
a.mu~dnorm(0,1)
a.tau~dgamma(0.001, 0.001)


###Priors for national intercepts###
for(j in 1:N.nat){
a.nat[j]~dnorm(mu.nat, tau.nat)
}
mu.nat~dnorm(0,1)
tau.nat~dgamma(0.001, 0.001)

for(j in 1:N.nat){
a.nat.star[j]<-a.nat[j]-mean(a.nat[])
}


###Priors for EP intercepts###
for(j in 1:N.ep){
a.ep[j]~dnorm(mu.ep, tau.ep)
}
mu.ep~dnorm(0,1)
tau.ep~dgamma(0.001, 0.001)

for(j in 1:N.ep){
a.ep.star[j]<-a.ep[j]-mean(a.ep[])
}

###Priors for group intercepts###
for(j in 1:N.group){
a.group[j]~dnorm(mu.group, tau.gr)
```

```
}
mu.group~dnorm(0,1)
tau.gr~dgamma(0.001, 0.001)

for(j in 1:N.group){
a.group.star[j]<-a.group[j]-mean(a.group[])
}


a.list[1:N.fixef]~dmnorm(a0[], A[,])

##Priors on fixed effects##
beta[1:N.beta]~dmnorm(b0[], B[,])
betaNA[1:N.betaNA]~dmnorm(c0[], C[,])
beta.att[1:N.b.att]~dmnorm(d0[], D[,])

tau.att~dgamma(0.001, 0.001)
}
```

Alternative models

I have fitted a number of alternative models to explore the validity of the dependent variable, as well as the measure of MEPs' ambition.

Table 11 displays the results from the interaction included in the main models so that the reader may evaluate the size and the precision of the *difference* in effect of reports between groups.

Table 14 displays the effect of performance and ambition on the probability of being renominated, renominated to a safe seat and reelected, respectively.

Table 12 displays the effect of excluding the control for ambition: The first column displays the model fit reported in the article. The second column displays the effect of excluding the control. From the results, we see that the inclusion of ambition mainly alters the effect of incumbency. This is logical, given that MEPs who have stayed in Parliament several terms are more likely to retire. Columns 3 and 4 displays the same model fit run only on respondents to the EPRG survey. While the direction of effects remains consistent with the main model, we see that the low number of observations makes it difficult to effectively test the effect of performance on renomination.

Table 13 displays the results using other ways of modelling ambition. The first column displays the model fit reported in the article. The second column displays effects on safe seat allocation only among MEPs who figured on the electoral list ("renominated"). This is another way of including only MEPs who are likely to wish reelection. The third column displays a kitchen-sink model in which all covariates used to measure ambition are directly included into the main model. The fourth column displays the results from a model in which unobserved values on ambition are drawn from a binomial distribution with an empirically informed probability ($p = 0.27$). This is the Bayesian version of "replacement by mean". Results in all models are similar.

	Dependent variable: "Safe seat"	H1	H2	H3 (Nat. Pol.)	H3 (Incumbent)	H3 (Barely elected)
	Intercept	-2.437	-2.535	-2.429	-2.662	-2.394
		[-3.239 , -1.693]	[-3.385 , -1.768]	[-3.295 , -1.679]	[-3.543 , -1.886]	[-3.245 , -1.63]
H1:	Reports	0.121				
		[0.06 , 0.184]				
	Reports2	-0.003				
		[-0.005 , -0.001]				
	EP Leadership	0.487	0.525	0.493	0.505	0.508
		[0.036 , 0.944]	[0.061 , 0.986]	[0.047 , 0.944]	[0.046 , 0.971]	[0.062 , 0.968]
H2:	Low-Impact Reports		0.058			
			[-0.017 , 0.136]			
	Low-Impact Reports2		-0.001			
			[-0.004 , 0.002]			
	High-Impact Reports		0.28			
			[0.158 , 0.404]			
	High-Impact Reports2		-0.017			
			[-0.028 , -0.007]			
H3:	Reports (trunc. 10)			0.086	0.179	0.084
				[0.027 , 0.145]	[0.092 , 0.27]	[0.027 , 0.139]
	Reports*Group with Prior Uncertainty			0.065	-0.112	0.14
	(Nat.Pol/Incumbent/Barely elected)			[-0.014 , 0.15]	[-0.22 , -0.008]	[-0.003 , 0.285]
Controls:	National Politician	-0.126	-0.117	-0.226	-0.109	-0.12
		[-0.448 , 0.205]	[-0.437 , 0.211]	[-0.556 , 0.102]	[-0.43 , 0.222]	[-0.444 , 0.205]
	Incumbent	-0.737	-0.77	-0.757	-0.432	-0.74
		[-1.046 , -0.43]	[-1.086 , -0.464]	[-1.066 , -0.446]	[-0.851 , -0.022]	[-1.048 , -0.435]
	Barely elected	1.207	1.302	1.249	1.279	0.924
		[0.494 , 1.951]	[0.574 , 2.086]	[0.542 , 2.024]	[0.561 , 2.075]	[0.135 , 1.805]
	Ambition	1.171	1.22	1.172	1.174	1.158
		[0.637 , 1.729]	[0.688 , 1.774]	[0.582 , 1.733]	[0.624 , 1.721]	[0.61 , 1.694]
	Safe Seat Last Election	1.856	1.973	1.889	1.898	1.877
		[1.195 , 2.602]	[1.266 , 2.728]	[1.218 , 2.657]	[1.229 , 2.677]	[1.194 , 2.659]
	Number of observations	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134

Table 11: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems. Median effects from binary logit model. 95 percent HDI reported in parantheses.

Binary logit model:	Ambition	Ambition not incl.	Ambition listwise excl.	Listw. excl., Amb. not incl.
Intercept	-2.437	-1.998	-2.168	-1.824
	[-3.239 , -1.693]	[-2.731 , -1.321]	[-3.532 , -1.064]	[-3.121 , -0.763]
Reports	0.121	0.12	0.025	0.017
	[0.06 , 0.184]	[0.06 , 0.181]	[-0.088 , 0.133]	[-0.095 , 0.125]
Reports2	-0.003	-0.003	0	0
	[-0.005 , -0.001]	[-0.005 , -0.001]	[-0.003 , 0.005]	[-0.003 , 0.005]
EP Leadership	0.487	0.506	0.694	0.79
	[0.036 , 0.944]	[0.061 , 0.954]	[-0.115 , 1.575]	[-0.03 , 1.634]
National Politician	-0.126	-0.157	-0.369	-0.368
	[-0.448 , 0.205]	[-0.473 , 0.157]	[-0.952 , 0.219]	[-0.965 , 0.229]
Incumbent	-0.737	-0.793	-0.764	-0.868
	[-1.046 , -0.43]	[-1.084 , -0.502]	[-1.331 , -0.218]	[-1.432 , -0.338]
Barely Elected	1.207	1.163	2.039	1.975
	[0.494 , 1.951]	[0.48 , 1.87]	[0.913 , 3.382]	[0.822 , 3.293]
Ambition	1.171		0.76	
	[0.637 , 1.729]		[0.152 , 1.366]	
Safe Seat Last Election	1.856	1.737	2.409	2.252
	[1.195 , 2.602]	[1.1 , 2.436]	[1.358 , 3.721]	[1.176 , 3.528]
Number of observations	1134	1134	305	305

Table 12: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems: Controlling for MEP ambition.

Binary logit model:	Main model	Among renominated	Kitchen sink	Ambition imputed
Intercept	-2.437	-1.626	-1.117	-2.245
	[-3.239 , -1.693]	[-2.533 , -0.821]	[-2.399 , 0.202]	[-3.054 , -1.509]
Reports	0.121	0.111	0.08	0.124
	[0.06 , 0.184]	[0.032 , 0.194]	[0.017 , 0.144]	[0.063 , 0.185]
Reports2	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	[-0.005 , -0.001]	[-0.006 , 0]	[-0.004 , 0]	[-0.006 , -0.001]
EP Leadership	0.487	0.928	0.604	0.475
	[0.036 , 0.944]	[0.292 , 1.612]	[0.151 , 1.074]	[0.036 , 0.926]
National Politician	-0.126	-0.025	-0.001	-0.155
	[-0.448 , 0.205]	[-0.444 , 0.395]	[-0.321 , 0.32]	[-0.474 , 0.159]
Incumbent	-0.737	-0.644	-0.729	-0.778
	[-1.046 , -0.43]	[-1.043 , -0.252]	[-1.042 , -0.418]	[-1.084 , -0.48]
Barely Elected	1.207	1.295	1.33	1.194
	[0.494 , 1.951]	[0.535 , 2.136]	[0.603 , 2.102]	[0.509 , 1.96]
Ambition	1.171	0.608		0.672
	[0.637 , 1.729]	[-0.101 , 1.366]		[0.098 , 1.268]
Age			-0.051	
			[-0.069 , -0.033]	
Party Size			0.133	
			[0.016 , 0.253]	
MEPs to National Politics			0.961	
			[-1.657 , 3.266]	
Committee Attendance			0.483	
			[-0.365 , 1.326]	
Years of Term Served			0.288	
			[0.12 , 0.473]	
Safe Seat Last Election	1.856	2.066	1.792	1.806
	[1.195 , 2.602]	[1.332 , 2.891]	[1.089 , 2.537]	[1.141 , 2.544]
Number of observations	1134	781	1134	1134

Table 13: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems: Different ways of controlling for MEP ambition.

Binary logit model:	Renomination	Safe Seat	Reelection
Intercept	0.24	-2.437	-0.46
	[-0.452 , 0.922]	[-3.239 , -1.693]	[-1.116 , 0.173]
Reports	0.085	0.121	0.096
	[0.022 , 0.15]	[0.06 , 0.184]	[0.037 , 0.155]
Reports2	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
	[-0.003 , 0]	[-0.005 , -0.001]	[-0.003 , 0]
EP Leadership	0.11	0.487	0.22
	[-0.386 , 0.624]	[0.036 , 0.944]	[-0.231 , 0.683]
National Politician	-0.239	-0.126	0.029
	[-0.571 , 0.103]	[-0.448 , 0.205]	[-0.299 , 0.351]
Incumbent	-0.675	-0.737	-0.644
	[-0.991 , -0.354]	[-1.046 , -0.43]	[-0.945 , -0.35]
Barely Elected	0.14	1.207	-0.567
	[-0.537 , 0.821]	[0.494 , 1.951]	[-1.184 , 0.064]
Ambition	1.604	1.171	1.107
	[0.961 , 2.373]	[0.637 , 1.729]	[0.529 , 1.681]
Safe Seat Last Election	0.451	1.856	0.386
	[-0.181 , 1.094]	[1.195 , 2.602]	[-0.196 , 0.98]
Number of observations	1134	1134	1134

Table 14: Alternative operationalizations of candidate selection in closed-list systems.