## Supplementary Materials to the manuscript "Digital Political Talk and Political Participation: Comparing Established and Third

 Wave Democracies"
## 1. Replication of Analyses in Table 2 (Models 1a and 2a) Employing an Alternative Index for Institutional Participation

Table A1 replicates models 1a and 2a in Table 2 of the manuscript by employing an alternative (0-5) index of institutional participation that excludes the electoral persuasion item (i.e. trying to convince others to vote for a specific party or candidate).

Table A1 - Dependent Variable: 0-5 Institutional Political Participation Index (Excluding Electoral Mobilization)

|  | Institutional Participation (0-5) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Model 1a |  | Model 2a |  |
|  | B | s.e. | B | s.e. |
| Political talk on SNS | .651*** | . 084 | .461*** | . 049 |
| Political talk on MIMS | .256*** | . 045 | .273*** | . 057 |
| Established Democracy (ED) | .161*** | . 037 | -. 047 | . 042 |
| Political talk on SNS * ED |  |  | .355*** | . 089 |
| Political talk on MIMS * ED |  |  | -. 041 | . 072 |
| Political talk offline | .144*** | . 038 | .137*** | . 037 |
| Exposure to political information | .044*** | . 007 | .042*** | . 007 |
| Interest in politics | .053** | . 020 | .060** | . 021 |
| Political efficacy | .050*** | . 016 | .051*** | . 016 |
| Gender (male) | . 009 | . 033 | . 011 | . 034 |
| Age | -. 001 | . 002 | -. 001 | . 002 |
| Education | . 009 | . 039 | . 012 | . 039 |
| Income | -. 009 | . 010 | -. 010 | . 010 |
| Constant | $-1.640^{* * *}$ | . 177 | $-1.515^{* * *}$ | . 176 |
| F |  |  |  |  |
| Prob $>$ F |  |  |  |  |

Note: $\mathrm{N}=12,136$ for both models. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients for negative binomial regressions, with robust standard errors clustered by country. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p} \leq .001^{* *} \mathrm{p} \leq .01{ }^{*} \mathrm{p} \leq .05$

## 2. Single Country Models Predicting Institutional Participation

Table A2 presents the results of seven Poisson regressions replicating the analysis presented in Table 2 Model 1a of the manuscript for each of the seven Western democracies included in the study. We employed Poisson instead of Negative Binomial specification to better account for the frequency distribution of our dependent variable within some of the national datasets.

Table A2 - Single Country Models Predicting Institutional Political Participation

|  | Institutional Participation (0-6) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Denmark | Greece | France | Poland | Spain | UK | USA |
| Political talk on SNS | $.518^{* * *}$ | $.372^{* * *}$ | $.538^{* *}$ | $.417^{* * *}$ | $.515^{* * *}$ | $.866^{* * *}$ | $.714^{* * *}$ |
| Political talk on MIMS | $.283^{* *}$ | $.199^{*}$ | .159 | $.394^{* * *}$ | $.259^{* * *}$ | $.283^{* * *}$ | $.146^{* *}$ |
| Political talk offline | .128 | $.200^{* *}$ | .136 | $.149^{* *}$ | .031 | .075 | $.241^{* * *}$ |
| Exposure to political info | $.039^{*}$ | .021 | $.070^{* * *}$ | .017 | $.028^{*}$ | $.030^{*}$ | $.043^{* * *}$ |
| Interest in politics | .020 | .091 | -.035 | $.135^{*}$ | .102 | .071 | .083 |
| Political efficacy | $.115^{*}$ | .022 | $.086^{*}$ | $.058^{* *}$ | $.061^{* * *}$ | .012 | .033 |
| Gender (male) | .145 | .029 | -.044 | .054 | .051 | .047 | -.087 |
| Age | . .005 | .005 | -.000 | -.001 | -.005 | $-.011^{* * *}$ | -.002 |
| Education | .014 | -.037 | -.041 | .046 | .038 | $-.194^{* *}$ | -.096 |
| Income | .008 | -.033 | .003 | -.007 | $-.029^{*}$ | .009 | .025 |
| Constant | $-1.161^{* * *}$ | $-.987^{* * *}$ | $-1.270^{* * *}$ | $-1.000^{* * *}$ | $-.713^{* * *}$ | -.321 | $-1.120^{* * *}$ |
| $N$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| F | 1,627 | 1,688 | 1,577 | 1,643 | 1,646 | 1,612 | 2,343 |
| Prob > F | 13.97 | 11.85 | 15.58 | 29.56 | 20.01 | 21.42 | 33.73 |

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients for Poisson regressions.
${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p} \leq .001^{* *} \mathrm{p} \leq .01^{*} \mathrm{p} \leq .05$

## 3. Single Country Models Predicting Extra-Institutional Participation

Table A3 presents the results of seven Poisson regressions replicating the analysis presented in Table 2 Model 2a of the manu script for each of the seven Western democracies included in the study. We employed Poisson instead of Negative Binomial specification to better account for the frequency distribution of our dependent variable within some of the national datasets.

Table A3 - Single Country Models Predicting Extra-Institutional Political Participation

|  | Extra-institutional Participation (0-6) |  |  |  |  |  | Cpain |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Denmark | Greece | France | Poland | UK | USA |  |
| Political talk on SNS | .294 | $.269^{* *}$ | $.736^{* * *}$ | $.696^{* * *}$ | $.539^{* * *}$ | $1.654^{* * *}$ | $.947^{* * *}$ |
| Political talk on MIMS | .314 | $.183^{*}$ | $.279^{* *}$ | $.369^{* * *}$ | $.215^{* *}$ | $.320^{* *}$ | .121 |
| Political talk offline | .088 | .091 | .083 | .079 | .009 | .079 | $.232^{*}$ |
| Exposure to political info | $.084^{*}$ | .009 | $.038^{*}$ | $.038^{*}$ | .017 | $.095^{* * *}$ | $.082^{* * *}$ |
| Interest in politics | .021 | .102 | $-.178^{*}$ | -.041 | .049 | -.094 | .045 |
| Political efficacy | .079 | .000 | .010 | .022 | .031 | -.038 | -.001 |
| Gender (male) | .045 | -.135 | -.134 | .173 | .022 | .198 | .114 |
| Age | $-.017^{*}$ | .001 | -.001 | .002 | $-.013^{* * *}$ | $-.019^{* * *}$ | $-.021^{* * *}$ |
| Education | .076 | -.043 | -.044 | .108 | -.055 | .065 | -.106 |
| Income | .027 | -.036 | -.019 | -.018 | -.004 | -.022 | .037 |
| Constant | $-1.905^{*}$ | -.227 | -.286 | $-1.747^{* * *}$ | -.176 | $-2.053^{* * *}$ | $-1.815^{* * *}$ |
| $N$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| F | 1,627 | 1,688 | 1,577 | 1,643 | 1,646 | 1,612 | 2,343 |
| Prob > F | 4.31 | 5.07 | 7.93 | 10.39 | 10.68 | 17.82 | 29.74 |

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized coefficientsfor Poisson regressions.
${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p} \leq .001{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p} \leq .01^{*} \mathrm{p} \leq .05$

