ANNEXE 1: LIST OF THE ARTICLES USED IN THE META-ANALYSIS

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ANNEXE 2: COMPLETE LIST OF MODELS USED IN THE META-ANALYSIS

Articles	Models
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI SCORE −8.368* (2.953)
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI SCORE −7.491*** (1.302) with country-fixed effect
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI SCORE −6.794*** (1.314) + GDP growth −0.207 (0.228) + Unemployment −0.277 (0.392) + Population density 0.246 (0.632) + Log of regional GDP per capita −11.654* (4.863) + Education 0.323 (0.237) + Non-native speakers −6.283 (8.719) + Ideology 6.489 (7.734) with country-fixed effect
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI SCORE −5.594*** (1.268) + GDP growth −0.212 (0.331) + Unemployment −0.112 (0.313) + Population density 0.687 (0.662) + Log of regional GDP per capita −7.878 (3.854) + Education 0.319 (0.199) + Non-native speakers −10.083 (17.885) + Ideology 7.878 (7.928) + Nativism 2.321* (0.808) with country-fixed effect
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI SCORE −7.584** (2.629) + GDP growth −0.248 (0.238) + Unemployment −0.229 (0.261) + Population density 0.215 (0.662) + Log of regional GDP per capita −9.940** (3.015) + Education 0.240 (0.128) + Non-native speakers −8.299 (13.069) + Ideology 6.684 (6.445) + Log of regional GDP per capita 25.250 (30.574) + WGI −5.494 (6.831) + Effective number of parties −1.419 (2.024) + Western Europe −0.547 (14.222)
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI SCORE −5.087* (2.578) + GDP growth −0.187 (0.233) + Unemployment −0.070 (0.270) + Population density 0.493 (0.644) + Log of regional GDP per capita −6.893* (3.188) + Education 0.251* (0.117) + Non-native speakers −4.643 (13.104) + Ideology 5.329 (5.906) + Nativism 1.777*** (0.450) (0.808) + Log of regional GDP per capita 23.528 (26.648) + WGI −10.430 (5.818) + Effective number of parties 0.240 (1.739) + Western Europe 9.182 (12.791)
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI score −6.540*** (1.223)
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI score −5.265*** (1.067)
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI −5.138*** (1.018)
1	The total share of the voters in a given NUTS region that voted for a populist party in the national parliamentary election = EQI score −4.471* (1.984)
2	Public support for the Danish Progress Party = Support (t-1) 0.87** + Var. Unemployment rate 4.69** + Inflation 0.05
2	Public support for the Danish Progress Party = Support (t-1) 0.91** + National election 0.58** + Referendum (-0.39) + Glistrup court event (-0.23) + Glistrup expulsion 0.33 + Left government 0.65

2	**Public support for the Danish Progress Party = Support (t-1)0.85** + Foreign population0.03* + National election0.51** + Referendum (-0.55)+ Glistrup court event (-0.10)+ Glistrup explusion (-0.38) + Left government 0.97***
2	**Public support for the Danish Progress Party = Support (t-1)0.91** + Government Trend (-0.01)+ Backswing (-0.09) + Post-election (0.09)**
2	**Public support for the Danish Progress Party = Support (t-1) 0.81** + Var. Unemployment rate 3.67* + Inflation 0.02 + Foreign population 0.03 + National election 0.44** + Referendum (-0.36) + Glistrup court event (-0.01) + Glistrup explusion 0.01 + Left government 0.85**
2	**Public support for the Danish Progress Party = Support (t-1) 0.78** + Var. Unemployment rate 3.49* + Inflation (-0.04) + Foreign population 0.03* + National election 0.39* + Referendum (-0.39) + Glistrup court event 0.08 + Glistrup explusion -0.33 + Left government 1.09* + Government Trend (-0.03) + Backswing 0.09 + Post-election 0.03**
2	**Public support for the Norwegian Progress Party = Support (t-1)0.90** + Var. Unemployment rate(-0.02) + Inflation (-0.04)**
2	**Public support for the Norwegian Progress Party = Support (t-1)0.91** + National election (-0.08) + Left government 0.32**
2	**Public support for the Norwegian Progress Party = Support (t-1)0.80** + Foreign population 0.03** + National election (-0.08) + Left government 0.17**
2	**Public support for the Norwegian Progress Party = Support (t-1)0.91** + Government Trend 0.00+ Backswing 0.01 + Post-election (-0.03)**
2	**Public support for the Norwegian Progress Party = Support (t-1) 0.80** + Var. Unemployment rate (-0.34) + Inflation 0.05 + Foreign population 0.03** + National election -0.09 + Left government 0.15**
2	**Public support for the Norwegian Progress Party = Support (t-1) 0.80** + Var. Unemployment rate (-0.32) + Inflation 0.06 + Foreign population 0.03** + National election (-0.14) + Left government 0.12 + Government Trend 0.04 + Backswing 0.19 + Post-election 0.03**
3	**Kestilä & Söderlund's model + Le Pen vote (added by the article) = District magnitude 1998 (ln) -0.352 (0.475) + Effective number of lists 1998 -0.058 (0.256) + Turnout 2004 (%) -0.107 (0.075) + Immigrants born outside EU (%) -0.079 (0.062) + Unemployment (%) 0.432* (0.185) + Vote for Le Pen 2002 0.979*** (0.061)**
3	**Kestilä & Söderlund's model + Le Pen vote in 2002 (added by the article) = Vote for Le Pen 2002 1.042*** (0.045)**
3	**Effective number of party lists + Le Pen vote model : FN support in the French 2004 regional election = Effective number of lists (1998) -0.037 (0.249) + Vote for Le Pen (2002) 1.044*** (0.047) Adjusted R2= 0.850**
3	**Effective number of party lists model : FN support in the French 2004 regional election = Effective number of lists (1998) 1.402* (0.607) ======Adjusted R2= 0.044**
3	**Ideological competition model : FN support in the French 2004 regional election = MNR running 3.181** (1.076) + Moderate right lists: 2) -6.411*** (1.423)+ (Moderate right lists: 3+) -3.206 (1.434) Adjusted R2= 0.879**
3	**Ideological Competition + Le Pen vote model: FN support in the French 2004 regional election = (Vote for Le Pen 2002) 1.125*** (0.050) + MNR running -2.167*** (0.483) + (Moderate right lists: 2) -0.255 (0.620)+ (Moderate right lists: 3+) -1.112 (0.567) Adjusted R2= 0.879**
4	**Estimates of vote (FN) (1988-2002) = UNEMit 0.03* + TURNit -0.29***
4	**Estimates of vote (FN) (1988-2007) = UNEMit 0.08*** + TURNit -0.32***

5	**Share of vote (%) 1984 = 1.904 + 0.021Unemployment in 1984 -0.019 Unemployment in1983 ===========R^ = 0.93**
6	**Support for the Norwegian Progress Party 1987 = The share of non-western immigrants (4.10*)+ Unemployment rate (–0.51*) ============< R2= 28%**
6	**Support for the Norwegian Progress Party 1995 = The share of non-western immigrants (1.31*)+ Unemployment rate (–0.04) ============< R2=14%**
6	**Support for the Norwegian Progress Party 1997 = The share of non-western immigrants (1.18*)+ Unemployment rate (–0.06) ============< R2=11%**
6	**Support for the Norwegian Progress Party 2003= The share of non-western immigrants (1.00*)+ Unemployment rate (0.00) ============< R2=6%**
6	**Support for the Norwegian Progress Party 2005= The share of non-western immigrants (0.83*)+ Unemployment rate (0.02) ============< R2=5%**
7	**Anti-immigrant populist party support (1990 to 2002)= Moving average (t- 1) (-0.37***) ======= RMS=43.81**
7	**Anti-immigrant populist party support (1990 to 2002)= Moving average (t- 1) (-0.46***)+ Rise Fortuyn (1.18***)+ Dead Fortuyn (t -4)(-1.18***) ======= RMS=40.06**
7	**Anti-immigrant populist party support (1990 to 2002)= Moving average (t- 1) (-0.37***)+ Rise Fortuyn (0.76*)+ Dead Fortuyn (t -4)(-1.16***)+ Immigration (t -1) (0.50**) + Unemployment (t - 2) (-3.59***)+ Unemployment × immigration (t -7) (0.33***)====== RMS=34.65**
7	**Anti-immigrant populist party support (1990 to 2002)= Moving average (t- 1) (-0.39***)+ Rise Fortuyn (0.79*)+ Dead Fortuyn (t -4)(-1.09***)+ Immigration (t -1) (0.73***) + Unemployment (t - 2) (-3.51***)+ Unemployment × immigration (t -7) (0.29**)+ News on immigration (t-3)(0.38**)+ News on economy (t -1)(0.40*)====== RMS=33.25**
8	**UKIP support = Religious minorities –0.30** + Economically deprived –0.24** + Young mobile –0.22** + Low status employees 0.17****
8	**BNP support = Religious minorities –0.28** + Economically deprived –0.10** + Young mobile –0.28** + Low status employees 0.54****
8	**UKIP support = Religious minorities –0.29** + Economically deprived –0.23** + Young mobile –0.21** + Low status employees 0.18** + Party's candidate at 2002 election (dummy variable) 0.04 + Conservative ward (dummy variable) 0.03 + Labour ward (dummy variable) –0.05**
8	**BNP support = Religious minorities –0.27** + Economically deprived –0.09** + Young mobile –0.28** + Low status employees 0.54** + Party's candidate at 2002 election (dummy variable) 0.27** + Conservative ward (dummy variable) 0.02 + Labour ward (dummy variable) –0.03**
9	**The support for British National Party 2002 = % Black, district (4.22*) + % Indian, district 0.52 (1.64) + % Pakistani/Bangladeshi, district (2.81**)+ % Black, ward (-2.44*)+ % Indian, ward (-1.15)+ % Pakistani/Bangladeshi, ward (-0.96**)+ Population density (0.08)+ % With high education (-2.42**)+ Change in median house price (-0.58*)+ % Living in council housing (-1.03)+ Homeownership rate (0,00)+ % Living in over-crowded home (2.86*)+ Unemployment rate (- 4.94)+ % Employed in manufacturing (-0.01)+ Crime rate (0.12)+ Labour control of council (0.07)========= Segma= 0.40**

9	The support for British National Party 2003 = % Black, district (-1.22) + % Indian, district (0.91)+ % Pakistani/Bangladeshi, district (3.23**)+ % Black, ward (-8.10**)+ % Indian, ward (-0.56)+ % Pakistani/Bangladeshi, ward (-1.11*)+ Population density (0.21*)+ % With high education (-1.55**)+ Change in median house price (-0.28)+ % Living in council housing (0.37)+ Homeownership rate (0.12)+ % Living in over-crowded home (2.37**)+ Unemployment rate (- 1.58)+ % Employed in manufacturing (0.42)+ Crime rate (0.30)+ Labour control of council (0.01)========== Segma= 0.34
10	ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEW RIGHT = Foreign Population (-1.932*)+ Crime (3.561 *)+ Unemployment (-0.024) =======< R2= 0.705
11	ΔUKIP vote intentions at time t = ΔEU Membership(t) −0.160*** 0.033 + UKIP Support(t − 1) −0.112** 0.047 + EU Membership(t − 1) −0.049* 0.022
11	ΔUKIP vote intentions at time t = EGARCH-M(t) 0.373*** 0.062 + ΔEU Membership(t) −0.068*** 0.010 + UKIP Support(t − 1) −0.164*** 0.022 + EU Membership(t − 1) −0.018*** 0.003 + ΔEconomic Reactions(t) −0.081*** 0.025 + ΔNational Health Service(t − 1) −0.344*** 0.030 + ΔAnti-Immigration Attitudes(t − 2) 0.091* 0.028 + 2004 EP Election(t) 2.400*** 0.362 + 2009 EP Election(t) 1.02 0.931 + 2005 General Election(t) 1.509*** 0.359 + 2010 General Election(t) −0.029 0.320 + 2012 Budget(t) 1.279*** 0.160 + Cameron EU Speech(t) 3.687*** 0.338 + UKIP Councillor Suspended(t) −1.366** 0.412
12	Tobit I estimation of Vlaams Blok's (latent) vote share = Per capita income (0.024***) + Unemployment (-0.799**)+ Income inequality (-0.004***) + Population from Maghreb and Turkey (1.810***)+ Population from other countries (-0.174)+ Crime (0.284*) +Associational life (-11.132) + population density (22.803*)+District magnitude (0.005***)+ Effective number of parties in government(0.021**) + Maximum ideological distance government (-0.004)======< Sigma= 0.067
12	Tobit II estimation of Vlaams Blok's electoral success (FIML) = Per capita income (0.073***) + Unemployment (-1.102)+ Income inequality (-0.006) + Population from Maghreb and Turkey (13.516***)+ Population from other countries (-0.901)+ Crime (0.273) +Associational life (-232.710***) + population density (192.268***)+District magnitude (-0.004)+ Effective number of parties in government(0.066) + Maximum ideological distance government (-0.035)======< Sigma= 0.359
12	OLS estimation of Vlaams Blok's vote share in federal elections 1999 = Per capita income (0.052*) + Unemployment (2.344)+ Population from Maghreb and Turkey (7.096***)+ Population from other countries (-1.542*)+ Crime (0.804) +Associational life (-111.149**) + population density (277.534**)+District magnitude (0.006)======< R2= 0.518
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Ln (SD share 2006) 0.64*** (0.02) + Mean toughness 1.08*** (0.27)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Ln (SD share 2006) 0.66*** (0.02) + Max toughness 0.16 (0.13)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Ln (SD share 2006) 0.60*** (0.04) + Mean toughness 1.03*** (0.32) + % Men 2009 0.02 (0.04) + Median income 2009 (1000 SEK) 0.00 (0.00) + Ln (Proportion of highly educated 2009) - 0.44*** (0.14) + Ln (Population 2009) 0.07 (0.05) + Ln (Area 2009) 0.03 (0.03) + % Non-Nordic immigrants 2009 0.02*** (0.01) + Crime/1000 cap. 2010 0.00 (0.00) + Unemployment 2009 0.00 (0.04) + New Democracy vote share 1991 0.01 (0.01) + Nationalist vote share 1936 0.02 (0.01) + Mean age in the population 2009 0.87*** (0.22) + (Mean age)2 -0.01*** (0.00) + Left party 0.01 (0.01) + Green party 0.01 (0.01) + Center party 0.00 (0.00) + Liberals -0.01 (0.01) + Christian Democrats 0.00 (0.01) + Conservatives 0.01 (0.00) + Other parties 0.01* (0.00)

13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Ln (SD share 2006) 0.62*** (0.03) + Max toughness 0.06 (0.13) + % Men 2009 0.01 (0.04) + Median income 2009 (1000 SEK) - 0.00 (0.00) + Ln (Proportion of highly educated 2009) - 0.42*** (0.14) + Ln (Population 2009) 0.03 (0.05) + Ln (Area 2009) 0.03 (0.03) + % Non-Nordic immigrants 2009 0.02*** (0.01)+ Crime/1000 cap. 2010 0.00 (0.00) + Unemployment 2009 0.00 (0.04) + New Democracy vote share 1991 0.01 (0.01) + Nationalist vote share 1936 0.01 (0.01) + Mean age in the population 2009 0.93*** (0.23) + (Mean age)2 - 0.01*** (0.00)+ Left party 0.01 (0.01) + Green party 0.01 (0.01) + Center party 0.00 (0.00) + Liberals -0.01 (0.01) + Christian Democrats 0.00 (0.01) + Conservatives 0.01* (0.00) + Other parties 0.01** (0.00)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Ln (SD share 2006) 0.42*** (0.05)) + Mean toughness 0.83*** (0.27) + % Men 2009 0.01 (0.03) + Median income 2009 (1000 SEK) 0.00 (0.00) + Ln (Proportion of highly educated 2009) - 0.45*** (0.16) + Ln (Population 2009) 0.07 (0.05) + Ln (Area 2009) 0.05* (0.03) + % Non-Nordic immigrants 2009 0.02*** (0.01) + Crime/1000 cap. 2010 -0.00 (0.00) + Unemployment 2009 -0.00 (0.04) + New Democracy vote share 1991 0.02 (0.01) + Nationalist vote share 1936 0.01 (0.02) + Mean age in the population 2009 0.36* (0.20) + (Mean age)2 -0.00* (0.00) + Left party -0.01 (0.01) + Green party 0.01 (0.01) + Center party 0.00 (0.00) + Liberals -0.02** (0.01) + Christian -Democrats 0.01 (0.01) + Conservatives-0.00 (0.00) + Other parties -0.00 (0.00)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Ln (SD share 2006) 0.44*** (0.05) + Max toughness 0.02 (0.13) + % Men 2009 0.01 (0.03) + Median income 2009 (1000 SEK 0.00 (0.00) + Ln (Proportion of highly educated 2009) -0.45*** (0.16) + Ln (Population 2009) 0.04 (0.05) + Ln (Area 2009) 0.05* (0.03) + % Non-Nordic immigrants 2009 0.02*** (0.01)+ Crime/1000 cap. 2010 -0.00 (0.00) + Unemployment 2009 0.00 (0.04) + New Democracy vote share 1991 0.02 (0.02) + Nationalist vote share 1936 0.01 (0.02) + Mean age in the population 2009 0.37* (0.23) + (Mean age)2 - 0.00* (0.00)+ Left party 0.00 (0.01) + Green party 0.00(0.01) + Center party 0.00 (0.00) + Liberals -0.01** (0.01) + Christian Democrats 0.01 (0.01) + Conservatives 0.00 (0.00) + Other parties 0.00 (0.00)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Left toughness 0.54**(0.21) + Right toughness 0.35(0.24) + Ln (SD share 2006) (Beta value not specified)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Left toughness 0.48** (0.23) + Right toughness 0.28 (0.26) + Control variables (Beta value not specified)
13	Log of the share of vote obtained by the Swedish democrats in 2010 = Left toughness 0.36* (0.23) + Right toughness 0.21 (0.25) + Control variables (Beta value not specified)
14	Model 1 (aggregate) (Y = vote share LPF) ====== Vote share for List Pim Fortuyn= Immigration rate (0.380)+ Crime rate (0.297)+Unemployment rate (2.27)+ Income (0.174)+Economic equality (0.064)+Population density (0.001)+Social capital (-0.371)========R2=0.346
15	Party scores for legislative elections (Extreme right) = Presidential score 0.71*** + Previous legislative election score 0.2***+ Difference in turnout 0.04 *** + Midterm, opposition 0.05 ***+ Honeymoon, opposition - 0.05
16	Regression models of FN vote (1984–2007) = Presidential (election type) 3.26 (1.71)
16	Regression models of FN vote (1984–2007) (without 2007 presidential election) = Presidential (election type) 4.50 (1.86)*
16	Regression models of FN vote (1984–2007) (without 2007 presidential election) = Presidential (election type)5.49 (1.16)* + Variation Immigration 0.11 (0.02)* + variation Unemployment 2.96 (0.64)* + Variation Crime -0.08 (0.14)
16	Regression models of FN vote (1984–2007) (without 2007 presidential election) = Presidential (election type) 4.93 (0.87)* + Variation Immigration 0.11 (0.02)* + variation Unemployment 2.16 (0.53)* + opposition popularity 0.11 (0.03)*

17	**FN voting in FIRST ORFER elections as percent of valid cast (1974–2007) =** Type of elections (presidential 1/ legislative 0) 4.56 (0.59)* + Variation immigration 0.12 (0.01)* + Unemployment 2.15 (0.14)
17	**FN voting in SECOND ORDER elections as percent of valid cast (1984–2011) =** per cent vote FN in previous election 0.36 0.08* + FN popularity as measured by SOFRES 1.38 0.13* + per cent time elapsed in first-order cycle 0.02 0.01* + Regional election 1.05 0.68 + European election -1.22 0.58
18	**Share of vote of the Finns =** Factor 1 wealth –0.391 + Factor 2 Living situation 0.620 + Factor 3 Crime –0.079 + Factor 4 Population Growth –0.079
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round =** Left coalition -2.07*** (5.24) + FNt-1 0.70*** (41.99)
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round=** Right coalition 1.52*** (6.53) + FNt-1 0.68*** (42.45)
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round=** Left coalition -2.01*** (5.15) + Right coalition 1.49*** (6.46) + FNt-1 0.70*** (42.68)
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round=** Left coalition -1.96*** + Right coalition 0.51** (2.40) + FNt-1 0.81*** (51.28) + Number of parties -0.46***
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round=** Right UDF coalition 2.07*** (10.44) + FNt-1 0.69*** (43.89)
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round=** Right coalition 0.88*** (3.68) + Right UDF coalition 1.84*** (8.87) + FNt-1 0.69*** (44.08)
19	**National Front total vote share in National Assembly elections, first round=** Left coalition -1.79*** (4.67) + Right UDF coalition 2.65*** (10.07) + Right RPR coalition 0.87*** (3.69)+ FNt-1 0.72*** (44.13)
20	**Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 =** In-commune workers .05 (.01)* + Strength majority language .24 (.03)* + Owner occupied housing .13 (.01)* + Unemployment .23 (.19) + Foreign population .39 (.03)* + Non-European language 1.90 (.79)* + Low education .20 (.03)* + Medium education .34 (.04)*+ Primary sector workers .20 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .004 (.01) +Agricultural land .06 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.03 (.002)*
20	**Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 =** Cohesion index .26 (.03)* + Unemployment .01 (.18) + Foreign population 0.30(0.03)* + Non-European langauge2.19 (.80)* + Low education .19 (.03)* + Medium education .41 (.04)*+ Primary sector workers .22 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .01 (.01) +Agricultural land .07 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.03 (.002)*
20	**Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 =** Cohesion index .50 (.04)* + Unemployment 6.23 (.83)* + Foreign population .27 (.03)* + Non-European language 2.46 (.79)* + Low education .13 (.03)* + Medium education .36 (.04)*+ Primary sector workers .19 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .01 (.01) +Agricultural land .08 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.03 (.002)* + Cohesion X Unemployment -.11 (.01)*
20	**Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 =** Cohesion index .42 (.04)* + Unemployment .07 (.18) + Foreign population .74 (.09)* + Non-European language 2.30 (.80)* + Low education .14 (.03)* + Medium education .38 (.04)*+ Primary sector workers .20 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .01 (.01) +Agricultural land .08 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.03 (.002)* + Cohesion X Foreign -.01 (.002)*

20	**ROBUST CHEKS Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 = Cohesion index .26 (.03)* + Unemployment .01 (.18) + Foreign population .31 (.03)* + Low education .19 (.03)* + Medium education .41 (.04)* + Primary sector workers .22 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .01 (.01) +Agricultural land .07 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.03 (.002)***
20	**ROBUST CHEKS Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 = Cohesion index .21 (.03)* + Unemployment -2.45 (.29)* + Foreign population .04 (.04) + Non-European language 2.25 (.78)* + Low education .18 (.03)* + Medium education .38 (.04)*+ Primary sector workers .18 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .01 (.01) +Agricultural land .08 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.03 (.002)*** + Cohesion X Foreign .09 (.01)*
20	**ROBUST CHEKS Predicting commune level SVP support, 2003 = Cohesion index .26 (.04)* + Unemployment -.85 (.24)* + Foreign population .20 (.04)* + Non-European language 2.09 (1.11) + Low education .17 (.03)* + Medium education .38 (.04)*.20 (.04)*+ Primary sector workers .14 (.01)*+ Secondary sector workers .01 (.01) + Agricultural land .07 (.01)* + Population (/1000) -.05 (.02)***
21	**The vote for extreme right parties= Threshold (0.276*)+ Effective number of parties (1,172*) +Effective number of parties x Threshold (-0.103*) +Unemployment (0.066*)** ======R2= 0.731
21	**The vote for extreme right parties= Threshold (0.165*)+ Effective number of parties (0,837) +Effective number of parties x Threshold (-0.065*) +Unemployment (0.091*)** ======R2=0.637
21	**The vote for extreme right parties= Threshold (- 0.027)+Unemployment (0.097*)** ======R2=0.601
22	**Vote share vote of Extreme Right Parties Combined = UNEMP 0.01 (0.16) + IMMIG 2.39** + LOGMAG 2.11* + UPPER 0.51**** ====== Log likelihood = –258.84
22	**Vote share of Neo-fascist Parties Separate = UNEMP –0.18** + IMMIG 0.30 + LOGMAG 1.56** + UPPER –0.08** =======Log likelihood = –85.67
22	**Vote share of Populist Parties =UNEMP 0.48 + IMMIG 2.05** + LOGMAG 3.43** + UPPE 1.63****=====Log likelihood = –157.39
22	**Vote share Received by Extreme Right Parties Combined= UNEMP –0.22 + IMMIG 2.02**** + UNEMP*IMMIG 0.06 + **LOGMAG 2.00* + UPPER 0.51**** ======Log likelihood = –257.99
22	**Vote share Received by Neo-fascist Parties Separately: Populist Parties Separately= UNEMP -0.20** + IMMIG 0.25** + UNEMP*IMMIG 0.01 + **LOGMAG 1.54** + UPPER –0.08** ========Log likelihood = –85.67
22	**Vote share Received by Populist Parties Separately = UNEMP –0.86 + IMMIG 0.87** + UNEMP*IMMIG 0.22** + **LOGMAG 3.69** + UPPER 1.97**** ========Log likelihood =–154.55
22	**Vote share Received by Populist Parties= IMMIG 0.87 (1.33) + LOGMAG 1.69 (2.38)** + IMMIG*LOGMAG 0.45 (0.46) + **UNEMP 0.52* (0.30)+ UPPER 1.40** (0.50)**=====Log likelihood –156.93
23	**Extreme Right-Wing Party Support= THRESH (-0.022)+ ENPP(0.343) + UNEMP (0.074*)**=========R2= 0.656
23	**Extreme Right-Wing Party Support= THRESH (0.276*)+ ENPP(1.172*) + THRESH*ENPP(- 0.103*)+UNEMP(0.066*)**=========R2= 0.731
23	**Extreme Right-Wing Party Support= THRESH (0.410*)+ ENPP(1.362*) + THRESH*ENPP(-0.145*)+UNEMP(0.022)**=========R2= 0.896

24	**National Front vote share (VFNP1) = National Front at past legislative elections 0.56 (9.33*) + Unemployment change 2.00 (3.83*) + Local Sarkozy's electoral puncture -4.82 (6.08*) + FN's areas of weakness -3.57 (6.53*) + Outliers Corsica in 2002 -6.36 (6.53*)**
25	**Percent vote for extreme right parties = Immigration rate (0.062) +Unemployment rate (-0.088***) + (income inequality)(-0.005) + Fiscal redistribution (0.016)**
25	**Percent vote for extreme right parties = Immigration rate (-0.517) +Unemployment rate (-0.168) + (income inequality)(-0.047) + Fiscal redistribution (0.059**)+Immigration*unemployment (0.027)** + Immigration *redistribution (-0.013)***+ Immigration income inequality (0.002)**
26	**Progress Party voter support (local election) = Non-Western Immigrants 0.07 + Western Immigrants -0.021 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Progress Party voter support (local election) = Non-Western Immigrants 1.208*** + Quadratic Non-Western Immigrants -0.147*** + Western Immigrants 0.443+ Western Immigrants (quadratic term)-0.039*+ control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Progress Party voter support (local election) = Non-Western Immigrants 1.366*** + Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.199*** + Western Immigrants 0.141 + Western Immigrants -0.032 (quadratic term) + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Progress Party voter support (national election) = Non-Western Immigrants 0.296* + Western Immigrants 0.020 + control variables(Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Progress Party voter support (national election) = Non-Western Immigrants 0.977** + Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.096*** + Western Immigrants -0.014+ Western Immigrants 0.002 (quadratic term) + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Progress Party voter support (national election) = Non-Western Immigrants 0.792*** + Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.099*** + Western Immigrants -0.159 + Western Immigrants 0.012 (quadratic term) + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Difference in Progress Party voter support (local election) = Non-Western Immigration 0.584* + Quadratic Non-Western Immigration -0.079** + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Difference in Progress Party voter support (local election) = Non-Western Immigration 0.618 + Quadratic Non-Western Immigration -0.087* + The percentage of non-Western immigrants living in the economic region 0.188 + Quadratic The percentage of non-Western immigrants living in the economic region -0.049 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Difference in Progress Party voter support (National election) = Non-Western Immigration 0.637* + Quadratic Non-Western Immigration -0.018* + The percentage of non-Western immigrants living in the economic region-0.787 + Quadratic The percentage of non-Western immigrants living in the economic region 0.503** + control coefficients (Beta coefficients not reported)**

26	**Difference in Progress Party voter support (local election)** = The accumulated settlement requests (of immigrants to relocate) 0.681* + **Quadratic The accumulated settlement requests (of immigrants to relocate) -0.087**** + The number of decisions made by municipal council about the requests (of immigrants) -0.255 + Quadratic The number of decisions made by municipal council about the requests (of immigrants) 0.025 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**Difference in Progress Party voter support (local election)** = The accumulated settlement requests (of immigrants to relocate) 0.095 + Quadratic The accumulated settlement requests (of immigrants to relocate) -0.003 + The number of decisions made by municipal council about the requests (of immigrants)0.083 + Quadratic The number of decisions made by municipal council about the requests (of immigrants)-0.010 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**ROBUST MODEL Progress party voter support (local election)** = Non-Western Immigrants 1.167*** + **Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.271**** + Western Immigrants 0.158 + Western Immigrants -0.022 (quadratic term) + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**ROBUST MODEL Progress party voter support (local election)** = Non-Western Immigrants 1.366*** + **Quadratic Non-Western Immigrants -0.199**** + Western Immigrants 0.141 + Quadratic Western Immigrants -0.032 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**ROBUST MODEL Progress party voter support (national election)** = Non-Western Immigrants 0.846*** +**Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.128**** + Western Immigrants -0.007 + Western Immigrants 0.007 (quadratic term) + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**ROBUST MODEL Progress party voter support (national election)** = Non-Western Immigrants 0.792*** +***Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.099**** + Western Immigrants -0.159 + Western Immigrants 0.012 (quadratic term) + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**Progress party voter support (local election)** = Non-Western Immigrants 0.917*** +**Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.013 + Western Immigrants 0.161 + Western Immigrants -0.000 (quadratic term) + Number of years since immigrants have been present in the municipality 0.118* + Non-Western Immigrants* Number of years since immigrants have been present in the municipality -0.053*** + Western Immigrants* Number of years since immigrants have been present in the municipality -0.019 + control variables (coefficients not reported)
26	**Progress party voter support (local election)** = Variation of Non-Western Immigrants 0.791** + Variation of Non-Western Immigrants *Non-Western Immigrants -0.318*** + **Variation of Western Immigrants 0.077 + Variation of Western Immigrants * Western Immigrants -0.064 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**Progress party voter support (national election)** = Non-Western Immigrants 0.792*** +**Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.034 + Western Immigrants -0.115 + Western Immigrants 0.012 (quadratic term) + Number of years since immigrants have been present in the municipality 0.028 + Non-Western Immigrants* Number of years since immigrants have been present in the municipality -0.018* + Western Immigrants* Number of years since immigrants have been present in the municipality -0.011 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)
26	**Progress party voter support (national election)** = Variation of Non-Western Immigrants 0.325** + Variation of Non-Western Immigrants *Non-Western Immigrants -0.083* + **Variation of Western Immigrants -0.012 + Variation of Western Immigrants * Western Immigrants 0.011 + control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)

26	**Progress party voter support (local election) = Non-Western Immigrants 1.387*** +Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.201*** + Western Immigrants 0.124 + Western Immigrants-0.030 (quadratic term) + Unemployment rate 0.301** + Non-Western Immigrants * Unemployment rate -0.038 + Western Immigrants * Unemployment rate -0.019 + **control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
26	**Progress party voter support (national election) = Non-Western Immigrants 0.738*** +Non-Western Immigrants (quadratic term) -0.094*** + Western Immigrants 0.003 + Western Immigrants-0.014 (quadratic term) + Unemployment rate -0.407***** + Non-Western Immigrants * Unemployement rate 0.062 + Western Immigrants * Unemployment rate 0.167*** + **control variables (Beta coefficients not reported)**
27	**Election results by ward from 2010 to 2012 for The BNP = % Minority (non-European) 2001 -0.124* + Minority change (non-European) 2001e11 0.188** + Total population 0.000* + % Working class 0.214*** + % Elderly -0.228*****
27	**Election results by ward from 2010 to 2012 for the UKIP = % Minority (non-European) 2001 -0.059* + Minority change (non-European) 2001-11 -0.049 + Total population 0.000*** + % Working class 0.218*** + % Elderly 0.120***
28	**THE VOTE SHARE OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY IN MUNICIPALITIES (Parliamentary elections 2005) = LnDM 3.913*** + ENEP 1.482*** + TURNOUT 0.035 + IMMIG 1.132*** +UNEMP 0.183 ========== Schwarz criterion= 6.34**
28	**THE VOTE SHARE OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY IN MUNICIPALITIES (Parliamentary elections 2001) = LnDM 2.017*** + ENEP 0.993*** + TURNOUT 0.104 + IMMIG 0.675*** + UNEMP 0.330 ========== Schwarz criterion=5.74**
28	**THE VOTE SHARE OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY IN MUNICIPALITIES (Parliamentary elections 1997) = LnDM 0.859 +ENEP 3.015*** + TURNOUT 0.192***+IMMIG 0.999*** + UNEMP 0.416* ========== Schwarz criterion=5.45**
28	**THE VOTE SHARE OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY IN MUNICIPALITIES (Municipal council elections. 2003) = LnDM 13.502*** +ENEP 3.995***+ TURNOUT 0.195 +IMMIG 0.201 + UNEMP 0.714* ========= Schwarz criterion= 5.77**
28	**THE VOTE SHARE OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY IN MUNICIPALITIES (Municipal council elections.1999) = LnDM 12.282*** + ENEP 3.445*** + TURNOUT 0.091 +IMMIG 0.667* + UNEMP -0.224 ========== Schwarz criterion= 4.66**
28	**THE VOTE SHARE OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRESS PARTY IN MUNICIPALITIES (Municipal council elections. 1995) = LnDM 15.240*** +ENEP 2.557***+ TURNOUT 0.206*+ IMMIG 1.081*** +UNEMP -0.319 ========== Schwarz criterion= 3.7**
29	**Electoral support for FN list (%)= District magnitude (ln) (-3.447***) + Effective number of party lists in 1998 (1.137*)+ Turnout (%) (-0.736***) + Immigration (%) (0.150) + Unemployment (%) (1.582***)**
29	**Index of electoral success= District magnitude (ln) (-0.122**)+ Effective number of party lists in 1998 (0.051**)+ Turnout (%) (-0.031***) + Immigration (%) (0.005) + Unemployment (0.049***)======= Adjusted R2= 0.454**
30	**Latent electoral support for extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe = Support for extreme right-wing parties (lag 1) 0.69** + Unemployment -0.29** + Inflation -0.49 + Immigration 0.64* + Immigration*Unemployment + Dissatisfaction with democracy** 0.13** + Denmark 2.09 ** + France -0.60 + Germany (west) 0.40 + Italy -1.11 + Netherlands 0.63**
31	**Determinants of public opinion support for Pim Fortuyn, 2001–2002 = Moving average (t–1) -0.47*** + The impact of 9/11(t–1) 0.07 + Unemployment (t–1) 1.55 + Immigration (t–1) -0.52 =========RMS= 0.040**

31	**Determinants of public opinion support for Pim Fortuyn, 2001–2002= Moving average (t–1) -0.59*** + 9/11(t–1) 0.08 + Unemployment (t–1) 0.71 + Immigration (t–1) -1.27 + Claims Fortuyn (t–1) 0.04 + Visibility (t–1) 0.06*** + Consonance (t–2) 0.07** + Dissonance (t–2) -0.01 + Negative claims immigration (t–1) -1.42 ===========RMS =0.029**
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2002) = Number of candidates for office 17.75*** + candidates for office2 −14.66*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.884*****
32	**changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2002) = Number of candidates for office 16.67*** + candidates for office2 −13.80*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.856*** + Share of immigrants −0.00420 + Accepted refuges prior to election 0.0135 + Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.00193 + Unemployment 0.0114 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.00436 + Ln (Population in municipality) 0.112 + Number of electoral districts −0.0435 + Number of parties in local council −0.0165 + Grand coalition prior to election 0.0153 + Mainstream party toughness on immigration −0.450**
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2002) = Number of candidates for office 41.33*** + candidates for office2 −11.19*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 1.069*** + Share of immigrants −0.00144 + Accepted refuges prior to election 0.0185+ Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.00503 + Unemployment0.00882 + Proportion with post-secondary education 0.00387 + Ln (Population in municipality) 0.0764+ Number of electoral districts −0.0744 + Number of parties in local council −0.00357+ Grand coalition prior to election 0.00485 + Mainstream party toughness on immigration −0.174** + Number of candidates for office*Candidates' level of qualification −14.17***
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2006) = Number of candidates for office 7.537*** + candidates for office2 −7.078*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.176*** + Organizational stability 0.724*****
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2006) = Number of candidates for office 0.659 + candidates for office2 −0.0973 + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.150*** + Organizational stability 0.613** + Share of immigrants −0.00455 + Accepted refuges prior to election−0.00805 + Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.0373** + Unemployment 0.0256 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.0485*** + Ln (Population in municipality) 0.264*** + Number of electoral districts −0.262*** + Number of parties in local council 0.0217 + Grand coalition prior to election 0.149+ Mainstream party toughness on immigration 0.710 + Ln (SD votes in previous election) 0.0546**
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2006) = Number of candidates for office 7.383*** + candidates for office2 −1.634 + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.171*** + Organizational stability 0.526** + Share of immigrants −0.00340 + Accepted refuges prior to election−0.00503+ Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.0372** + Unemployment 0.0246 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.0460*** + Ln (Population in municipality) 0.238** + Number of electoral districts −0.248** + Number of parties in local council 0.0220 + Grand coalition prior to election 0.139+ Mainstream party toughness on immigration 0.538 + Ln (SD votes in previous election) 0.0624*** + Number of candidates for office*Candidates' level of qualification −2.651***
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2010) = Number of candidates for office 6.672***+ candidates for office2 −6.938*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.0980*** + Organizational stability 0.205****
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2010) = Number of candidates for office 2.799***+ candidates for office2 −3.338***+ Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.0717*** + Organizational stability 0.102* + Share of immigrants −0.00164 + Accepted refuges prior to election0.0470***+ Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.00189 + Unemployment 0.0139 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.0319*** + Ln (Population in municipality)0.101** + Number of electoral districts −0.0459 + Number of parties in local council0.0272 + Grand coalition prior to election0.0944**+ Mainstream party toughness on immigration0.588** + Ln (SD votes in previous election) 0.221*****

32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2010)** = Number of candidates for office 5.734*** + candidates for office2 −2.425*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.103*** + Organizational stability 0.114* + Share of immigrants −0.00105 + Accepted refuges prior to election 0.0487*** + Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.00197 + Unemployment 0.0110 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.0311*** + Ln (Population in municipality) 0.101** + Number of electoral districts−0.0441 + Number of parties in local council 0.0250 + Grand coalition prior to election 0.0899** + Mainstream party toughness on immigration 0.564** + Ln (SD votes in previous election) 0.218*** + Number of candidates for office*Candidates' level of qualification −1.374***
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2014)** = Number of candidates for office 4.222*** + candidates for office2 −3.414*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.0640* + Organizational stability 0.0750
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2014)** = Number of candidates for office 1.960*** + candidates for office2 −1.589*** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.0702*** + Organizational stability−0.0550 + Share of immigrants −0.00272 + Accepted refuges prior to election 0.0190 + Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.0144** + Unemployment 0.00343 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.0209*** + Ln (Population in municipality)−0.0712* + Number of electoral districts −0.0162 + Number of parties in local council 0.0440** + Grand coalition prior to election−0.00473 + Mainstream party toughness on immigration 0.0205 + Ln (SD votes in previous election) 0.427***
32	**Changed levels of support for the SD (Local election 2014)** = Number of candidates for office 4.139*** + candidates for office2 −1.631** + Candidates' level of Candidates' qualification 0.129*** + Organizational stability−0.0655 + Share of immigrants−0.00001 + Accepted refuges prior to election 0.0172 + Reported violent crimes per 1000 inhabitants 0.0138** + Unemployment 0.00283 + Proportion with post-secondary education −0.0187*** + Ln (Population in municipality)−0.0679* + Number of electoral districts −0.00432 + Number of parties in local council 0.0285 + Grand coalition prior to election0.00493 + Mainstream party toughness on immigration 0.159 + Ln (SD votes in previous election) 0.393*** + Number of candidates for office*Candidates' level of qualification −1.056***
33	**Share of Seats for the SD in a Municipal Council after the 2006 Local Elections** = Average unemployment prior to election 2006 −0.02 (0.16) + Number of reported violent crimes in 2005 0.14*** (0.04) + Share of non-Nordic immigrants in 2006 0.17*** (0.05) + Share of male industrial workers 2002 0.04*** (0.01) + Percentage within the lowest income quartile 0.14*** (0.05) + Number of parties in council 2002–2006 0.96*** (0.16) + Number of electoral districts (fewer seats) −0.66** (0.29)
33	**Share of Seats for the SD in a Municipal Council after the 2006 Local Elections** = Average unemployment prior to election 2006 −0.02 (0.13) + Number of reported violent crimes in 2005 0.11*** (0.03) + Share of non-Nordic immigrants in 2006 0.11*** (0.04) + Share of male industrial workers 2002 0.04*** (0.01) + Percentage within the lowest income quartile 0.13*** (0.05) + Number of parties in council 2002–2006 0.29** (0.13) + Number of electoral districts (fewer seats) −0.47** (0.23) + SD controlling the balance of power 2002 2.16*** (0.80) + Share of SD seats in 2002 1.23*** (0.14) + Minority government (2002–2006 0.69 (0.55) + Grand coalition 2002–2006 −0.15 (0.33)
33	**Share of Seats for the SD in a Municipal Council after the 2006 Local Elections** = Average unemployment prior to election 2006 −0.07 (0.13) + Number of reported violent crimes in 2005 0.11*** (0.03) + Share of non-Nordic immigrants in 2006 0.09** (0.04) + Share of male industrial workers 2002 0.04*** (0.01)) + Percentage within the lowest income quartile 0.13*** (0.05) + Number of parties in council 2002–2006 0.36*** (0.13) + Number of electoral districts (fewer seats) −0.44** (0.23) + SD controlling the balance of power 2002 1.53 (0.94) + Share of SD seats in 2002 1.19*** (0.15) + Minority government (2002–2006 −0.04 (0.61)) + Grand coalition 2002–2006 −0.10 (0.34) + SD controlling the balance of power in minority government 2002–2006 3.98*** (1.40) + SD potentially controlling the balance of power in grand coalition 2002–2006 −1.95 (1.32)
34	**Radical right voting** = Corr (economy, culture) 0.76 (5.25) + GDP increase -0.0003 (0.002) + Unemployment increase -1.45 (2.17)

34	**Radical right voting = Corr (economy, culture) -8.06 (5.44) + Foreign born 0.14 (0.2) + Social spending 1.16 (0.48)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (economy, culture) -2.1 (7.03) +Disproportionality 0.11 (0.21) + Effective N parties -0.18 (1.83)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (economy, culture) -1.02 (3.19) + Convergence right-left main parties -2.41 (6.48)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -9.25 (7.64) + GDP increase 0.001 (0.002) + Unemployment increase 0.57 (2.03)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.04 (2.58)+ Foreign born 0.05 (0.12) + Social spending 0.73 (0.22)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.62 (4.49) +Disproportionality 0.13 (0.31) + Effective N parties -0.12 (0.65)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.15 (4.26) + Convergence right-left main parties -2.09 (8)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.25 (2.74) + GDP increase -0.00003 (0.002) + Unemployment increase -1.1 (1.96)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 3.55 (5.04)+ Foreign born -0.22 (0.17) + Social spending 0.35 (0.39)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.51 (6.57) +Disproportionality -0.002 (0.42) + Effective N parties -0.02 (0.43)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.45 (3.32) + Convergence right-left main parties -0.63 (7.57)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (economy, culture) -0.91 (3.48)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr(economy, culture) -1.49 (6.82) + Effective threshold 0.03 (0.15)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (economy, culture) (0.12 (2.88) + Saliency economic dimension -2.44 (0.81) + Saliency cultural dimension -0.46 (0.5)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.16 (3.64)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.47 (3.92) + Effective threshold 0.04 (0.08)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.55 (2.22) + Saliency economic dimension -2.56 (0.71) + Saliency cultural dimension 0.24 (0.55)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.52 (2.76)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 8.52 (8.95) + Effective threshold - 0.05 (0.12)**
34	**Radical right voting = Corr (immigration, culture) 12.08 (7.02) + Saliency economic dimension -3.07 (0.96) + Saliency cultural dimension -1.2 (0.42)**
34	**Radical Right Voting = Corr (economy, culture) -0.91 (2.95)**
34	**Radical Right Voting = Corr (economy, culture) 0.76 (3.22) + GDP increase -0.0003 (0.001)+ Unemployment increase -1.45 (1.26)**

34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (economy, culture) -8.06 (4.37)+ Foreign born 0.13 (0.19) + Social spending 1.16 (0.4)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (economy, culture) -1.83 (2.72) + Disproportionality 0.03 (1.14) + Effective N parties -0.48 (0.43)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (economy, culture) - 0.59 (2.84) + Effective threshold 0.007 (0.06)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (economy, culture) -0.38 (2.59) + Convergence 1.66 (5.91)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (economy, culture) 0.89 (2.69) + Saliency economic dimension -1.01 (0.96) + Saliency cultural dimension -0.71 (0.68)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.16 (2.89)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) -9.25 (3.54) + GDP increase 0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment increase 0.57 (1.18)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.04 (2.52) + Foreign born 0.05 (0.1) + Social spending 0.73 (0.17)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.62 (2.78) + Disproportionality 0.13 (0.13) + Effective N parties -0.12 (0.4)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) - 8.47 (2.88)+ Effective threshold 0.04 (0.05)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.15 (2.88) + Convergence -2.09 (5.59)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, economy) -8.55 (2.45) + Saliency economic dimension -1.01 (0.96) + Saliency cultural dimension -0.71 (0.68)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.52 (4.06)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.25 (3.89) + GDP increase -0.0004 (0.001) + Unemployment increase -1.1 (1.04)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 3.55 (3.43) + Foreign born -0.22 (0.1) + Social spending 0.35 (0.24)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 0.35 (0.24) + Disproportionality -0.002 (0.16)+ Effective N parties -0.02 (0.47)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 8.52 (4.8) + Effective threshold -0.05 (0.07)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 6.45 (4.11) + Convergence -0.64 (6.37)
34	**Radical Right Voting** = Corr (immigration, culture) 12.08 (2.95) + Saliency economic dimension -3.07 (0.73) + Saliency cultural dimension -1.2 (0.49)
35	**Vote for Vlaams Blok 1987**= Turkey Maghreb immigrants 0.106* + European immigrants 0.009 + Unemployment 0.044 + Per capita income 2.810*** + Crime 0.261 (significant at 0.10%.) + Social capital -0.251 + Urbanization -0.018 ============pseudo-R2= 0.489
35	**Vote for Vlaams Blok 1991** = Turkey Maghreb immigrants 0.181*** + European immigrants 0.059 (significant at 0.10%) + Unemployment 0.218* + Per capita income 2.411*** + Crime 0.113 + Social capital -0.286* + Urbanization 0.018 ============pseudo-R2= 0.643

35	**Vote for Vlaams Blok 1995= Turkey Maghreb immigrants 0.121*** + European immigrants 0.056** (significant at 0.10%) **+ Unemployment 0.152** (significant at 0.10 %.)**+ Per capita income (0.700) 0.995*** + Crime 0.081 + Social capital -0.228* + Urbanization 0.006** ===========pseudo-R2= 0.550
35	**Vote for Vlaams Blok 1999= Turkey Maghreb immigrants 0.098*** + European immigrants 0.016 + Unemployment 0.174* + Per capita income 0.918*** + Crime 0.108 + Social capital -0.203* + Urbanization 0.017** ===========pseudo-R2= 0.517
35	**Vote for Vlaams Blok 2003= Turkey Maghreb immigrants 0.083*** + European immigrants -0.0001 + Unemployment 0.130 (significant at 0.10%.) + Per capita income 0.401(significant at 0.10%) + Crime 0.077 + Social capital -0.195* + Urbanization 0.012** ===========**pseudo-R2= 0.381**
35	**Vote for Vlaams Blok 2007 = Turkey Maghreb immigrants 0.071** + European immigrants 0.007 + Unemployment 0.315 *** + Per capita income.970***+ Crime 0.028 + Social capital -0.185* + Urbanization 0.007** ===========**pseudo-R2= 0.384**
36	**Differences in voting results for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 national election, across voting districts: 2010 general election Income - .0.018 (.001)+ Unemployment .134 (.034)+ Welfare -0.124 (.012)+ health .050(.004)**
36	**Differences in voting results for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 national election, across voting districts: 2010 general election = Immigration (1) .163 (.018) + Immigration (2) .130 (.025) + Immigration (3) -.,017 (.005)========Adjusted R2= .021 Standard error in parentheses**
36	**Differences in voting results for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 national election, across voting districts: 2010 general election = Neighbour .003 (.003)======Adjusted R2= .000 Standard error in parentheses**
36	**Differences in voting results for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 national election, across voting districts: 2010 general election = Immigration(1) .170 (.018) + Immigration(2) .140 (.026) + Immigration(3) -.012 (.006) + Neighbour -.007 (.004)======Adjusted R2= .022**
36	**Differences in voting results for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 national election, across voting districts: 2010 general election = Income - .022 (.001)+ Unemployment .149 (.033)+ Welfare .056 (.015)+ health .041 (.004)+ Immigration(1) ..047 (.017) + Immigration (2) .327 (.025) + Immigration(3) -..169 (.009)+ Neighbour .031 (.004)====== Adjusted R2= .203 Standard error in parentheses**
36	**Differences in voting results for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 national election, across voting districts: 2010 general election = Income - .022 (.001)+ Unemployment .069 (.042)+ Welfare .026 (.016)+ health .041 (.004) + Immigration(1) .259 (.33) + Immigration(2).089 (.047) + Immigration(3) -.191 (.013)+ Neighbour .028 (.007)** + Unemployment*Immigration (1) - .034 (.005 + Unemployment*Immigration (2) .041 (.007)+ Unemployment*Immigration (3) .004 (.002) + Unemployment*Neighbour .001 (.001)====== Adjusted R2= .217 Standard error in parentheses
36	**The halo effect in municipalities with a low proportion of immigrants (0-9.9 per cent) : 2010 general election = Neighbour .002 (.006)======Adjusted R2= .000 Standard error in parentheses**
36	**The halo effect in municipalities with a medium-sized proportion of immigrants (10-19.9 per cent): 2010 general election = Neighbour -.016 (.007)========= Adjusted R2 = .003**
36	**The halo effect in municipalities with a high proportion of immigrants (>20 per cent) : 2010 general election = Neighbour -.017 (.006)=======Adjusted R2= .007**
36	**The halo effect in municipalities with a low proportion of immigrants (0-9.9 per cent) : 2010 general election = Income -.042 (.002)+ Unemployment -.108 (.051) + Welfare -.182 (.039) + Ill-health .012 (.008) + Neighbour .032 (.006) ======Adjusted R2= .138 Standard error in parentheses**

36	The halo effect in municipalities with a medium-sized proportion of immigrants (10-19.9 per cent): 2010 general election = Income -.020 (.002) + Unemployment .336 (.062) + Welfare -.161 (.031) + Ill-health .074 (.008) + Neighbour .014 (.006) ========= Adjusted R2 = .293 Standard error in parentheses
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a high proportion of immigrants (>20 per cent) : 2010 general election = Income .003 (.003) + Unemployment .263 (.066) + Welfare -.069 (.020) + Ill-health .055 (.009) + Neighbour -.014 (.006) =======Adjusted R2= .090 Standard error in parentheses
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a low proportion of immigrants (0-9.9 per cent) : 2010 general election = Income -.043 (.002)+ Unemployment .067 (.054) + Welfare -.178 (.039) + Ill-health .013 (.008)+ Neighbour .044 (.008) + Unemployment * Neighbour .002 (.001) =======Adjusted R2= .139 Standard error in parentheses
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a medium-sized proportion of immigrants (10-19.9 per cent): 2010 general election = Income -.020 (.002) + Unemployment .317 (.074) + Welfare -.162 (.031) + Ill-health .075 (.008) + Neighbour .011 (.008) + Unemployment* Neighbour .001 (.001) ========= Adjusted R2 = .293 Standard error in parentheses
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a high proportion of immigrants (>20 per cent) : 2010 general election = Income .003 (.003) + Unemployment .134 (.102) + Welfare -.071 (.020) + Ill-health .058 (.009) + Neighbour -.029 (.001) + + Unemployment*Neighbour .003 (.002)=======Adjusted R2= .091 Standard error in parentheses
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a low proportion of immigrants (0-9.9 per cent) : 2010 general election = Income -.039 (.002) + Unemployment .017 (.053) + Welfare -.100 (.041)+ Ill-health -.017 (.008)+ Neighbour .027 (.008)+ Unemployment * Neighbour .000 (.001) + Immigration (1) .397 (.048) + Immigration (2) .663 (.057) + Immigration (3) -.142 (.042)=======Adjusted R2= ..206 Standard error in parentheses
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a medium-sized proportion of immigrants (10-19.9 per cent): 2010 general election = Income -.021 (.002) + Unemployment .270 (.073) + Welfare -.021 (0.35)+ Ill-health (.066)(.008) + Neighbour .016 (.009)+ Unemployment* Neighbour .003 (.001) + Immigration (1) .031 (.039) + Immigration (2) .187 (.049) + Immigration (3) -.193 (.029)========= Adjusted R2 =.003
36	The halo effect in municipalities with a high proportion of immigrants (>20 per cent) : 2010 general election = Income -.011 (.003) + Unemployment .396 (.096) + Welfare .050 (.020) + Ill-health .062 (.008) + Neighbour .039 (.012) + Unemployment*Neighbour .001 (.002)+ Immigration (1)-.110 (.025) + Immigration (2) .249 (.036) + Immigration (3) -.204 (.014)=======Adjusted R2= .275 Standard error in parentheses
37	Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = GRP -0.002 (0.002) + Unemployment 0.194 (0.187) + Education 0.014 (0.034) ========Adjusted R2= -0.003 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election: Local elections, 2010 = GRP -0.003 (0.002) + Unemployment 0.756 (0.204) + Education -0.007 (0.037) Adjusted R2= 0.053 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010: Local elections (lagged) = GRP 0.000 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.002 (0.127) + Education -0.058 (0.023) =========Adjusted R2 = 0.015 Standard errors in parentheses.

37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= GRP -0.002 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.158 (0.108) + Education -0.058 (0.020) =========Adjusted R2 = 0.043 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = GRP -0.003 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.201 (0.152)+ Education -0.112 (0.028)=========Adjusted R2 = 0.095 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010: General elections (lagged) = GRP -0.001 (0.001)+ Unemployment 0.020 (0.069)+ Education -0.070 (0.013)============Adjusted R2 0.118 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = Immigrants (total) 0.98 (0.034) =========Adjusted R2= 0.025 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election: Local elections, 2010 = Immigrants (total) 0.152 (0.035) =======Adjusted R2= 0.058 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010: Local elections (lagged) = Immigrants (total) 0.049 (0.022)=========Adjusted R2 = 0.014 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= Immigrants (total) 0.044 (0.020) =========Adjusted R2 = 0.013 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = Immigrants (total) 0.056 (0.027)=========Adjusted R2 = 0.011 Standard errors in parentheses.1 (0.152)+ Education -0.112**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010: General elections (lagged) = Immigrants (total) 0.007 (0.013)============Adjusted R2 = -0.002 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = Nordic immigrants -0.063 (0.053)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 1.052 (0.232)+ Non-European immigrants -0.006 (0.070)=====Adjusted R2= 0.109 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election: Local elections, 2010 = Nordic immigrants -0.065 (0.058)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 1.011 (0.189)+ Non-European immigrants 0.070 (0.063) ======= Adjusted R2= 0.162 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010: Local elections (lagged) = Nordic immigrants -0.015 (0.039)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.183 (0.125)+ Non-European immigrants 0.056 (0.041) =========Adjusted R2 = 0.023Standard errors in parentheses.**

37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= Nordic immigrants -0.029 (0.031)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.930 (0.135)+ Non-European immigrants -0.115 (0.041)=========Adjusted R2 = 0.152 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 =Nordic immigrants 0.006 (0.046)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.879 (0.149)+ Non-European immigrants -0.120 (0.049) =========Adjusted R2 = 0.105 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010: General elections (lagged) =Nordic immigrants 0.020 (0.022)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.100 (0.072)+ Non-European immigrants -0.024 (0.024) =========Adjusted R2 =-0.001Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = GRP -0.004 (0.002)+ Unemployment 0.185 (0.184) + Education -0.111 (0.033) + Nordic immigrants -0.128 (0.050) + EU/EFTA immigrants 1.218 (0.244) + Non-European immigrants -0.107 (0.077) + Crime 0.032 (0.007) ====Adjusted R2= 0.228 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election: Local elections, 2010 = GRP -0.005 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.329 (0.202)+ Education -0.153 (0.036) + Nordic immigrants -0.167 (0.054) + EU/EFTA immigrants 1.097 (0.178) + Non-European immigrants -0.004 (0.072) + Crime 0.031 (0.007) ====Adjusted R2= 0.326 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010: Local elections (lagged) = Local elections, 2010 = GRP -0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.225 (0.144) + Education -0.119 (0.025) + Nordic immigrants -0.045 (0.038) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.189 (0.127)+ Non-European immigrants 0.134 (0.051) + Crime 0.003 (0.005) ====Adjusted R2= 0.089 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= Local elections, 2010 = GRP -0.003 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.056 (0.099) + Education -0.145 (0.018) + Nordic immigrants -0.081 (0.027) + EU/EFTA immigrants 1.111 (0.131)+ Non-European immigrants -0.119 (0.041) + Crime 0.017 (0.004) ====Adjusted R2= 0.367 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = Local elections, 2010 = GRP -0.004 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.003 (0.153) + Education -0.196 (0.027) + Nordic immigrants -0.085 (0.041))+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.930 (0.135)+ Non-European immigrants -0.121 (0.055) + Crime 0.025 (0.005)====Adjusted R2= 0.335 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010: General elections(lagged)= Local elections, 2010 = GRP -0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.103 (0.078) + Education -0.096 (0.014) + Nordic immigrants -0.015 (0.021) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.110 (0.069)+ Non-European immigrants -0.003 (0.028) + Crime.009 (0.003)====Adjusted R2= 0.335 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = GRP -0.004 (0.002) + Unemployment 0.205 (0.195) + Education -0.089 (0.037) + Nordic immigrants-0.133 (0.050) + EU/EFTA immigrants1.192 (0.245) + Non-European immigrants -0.085 (0.078) + Crime 0.035 (0.007) + S+V 0.004 (0.017) + Population size -0.005 (0.003) ====Adjusted R2= 0.229 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election = GRP-0.004 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.523 (0.212) + Education -0.164 (0.040) + Nordic immigrants -0.159 (0.054)+ EU/EFTA immigrants0.953 (0.183) + Non-European immigrants 0.007 (0.072)) + Crime 0.035 (0.007) + S+V -0.046 (0.018)+ Population size -0.005 (0.003)) ====Adjusted R2= 0.341 Standard errors in parentheses.**

37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010 : Local elections (lagged) = GRP -0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.123 (0.152) +Education -0.135 (0.029) + Nordic immigrants -0.038 (0.038) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.120 (0.131) + Non-European immigrants 0.132 (0.052)** + **Crime 0.004 (0.005)** + **S+V -0.026 (0.013)+ Population size 0.000 (0.002)** ====Adjusted R2= 0.096 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= GRP -0.002 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.055 (0.115) + Education -0.152 (0.022) + Nordic immigrants -0.079 (0.027) + EU/EFTA immigrants 1.069 (0.132) + Non-European immigrants -0.108 (0.042) + Crime 0.017 (0.004) + S+V -0.019 (0.012)+ Population size -0.003 (0.002)** ====Adjusted R2= 0.374 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = GRP -0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.467 (0.162) + Education -0.260 (0.030) + Nordic immigrants -0.053 (0.039) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.662 (0.134) + Non-European immigrants -0.142 (0.052) + Crime 0.025 (0.005) + S+V -0.094 (0.015)+ Population size -0.003 (0.002)** ====Adjusted R2= 0.414 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010 : General elections (lagged) = GRP 0.000 (0.001)+ Unemployment 0.078 (0.085) + Education-0.123 (0.016) + Nordic immigrants -0.002 (0.020) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.009 (0.070) + Non-European immigrants -0.013 (0.028) + Crime 0.009 (0.003) + S+V -0.037 (0.008)+ Population size -0.001 (0.001)** ====Adjusted R2= 0.231Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = GRP -0.004 (0.002) + Unemployment -0.408 (0.385)+ Education -0.068 (0.041) + Nordic immigrants -0.290 (0.173) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.046 (0.872) + Non-European immigrants -0.049 (0.265) + Crime 0.035 (0.007) + S+V 0.005 (0.017) + Population size -0.007 (0.003)** + Unemployment *Nordic immigrants 0.038 (0.037) + Unemployment * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.349 (0.251) + Unemployment *Non-European immigrants -0.021 (0.071) ====Adjusted R2= 0.231 Standard errors in parentheses. K131
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election = GRP -0.003 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.411 (0.397) + Education -0.122 (0.045) + Nordic immigrants -0.404 (0.268) + EU/EFTA immigrants -0.315 (0.751) + Non-European immigrants -0.133 (0.233) + Crime 0.035 (0.007)+ S+V -0.044 (0.018) + Population size -0.006 (0.003)** + Unemployment *Nordic immigrants 0.056 (0.056)+ Unemployment * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.328 (0.185) + Unemployment *Non-European immigrants 0.016 (0.052) ====Adjusted R2= 0.353 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010 : Local elections (lagged) = GRP -0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.116 (0.288) + Education -0.146 (0.033) + Nordic immigrants -0.043 (0.194) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.221 (0.545) + Non-European immigrants 0.296 (0.169) + Crime 0.005 (0.005) + S+V -0.028 (0.013) + Population size 0.000 (0.040)** + Unemployment *Nordic immigrants 0.000 (0.040) + Unemployment * EU/EFTA immigrants -0.029 (0.134) + Unemployment *Non-European immigrants -0.035 (0.038) ====Adjusted 0.095 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= GRP -0.002 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.338 (0.213) + Education -0.133 (0.024) + Nordic immigrants -0.163 (0.092) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.132 (0.466) + Non-European immigrants -0.014 (0.142) + Crime 0.018 (0.004) + S+V -0.018 (0.012) + Population size -0.004 (0.002)** + Unemployment *Nordic immigrants 0.021 (0.020) + Unemployment * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.284 (0.134)+ Unemployment *Non-European immigrants -0.034 (0.038) ====Adjusted 0.381 Standard errors in parentheses.

37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = GRP-0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.027 (0.292) + Education -0.229 (0.034) + Nordic immigrants -0.171 (0.193) + EU/EFTA immigrants -0.612 (0.541) + Non-European immigrants 0.028 (0.168) + Crime 0.025 (0.005) + S+V -0.096 (0.015) + Population size -0.004 (0.002)** + Unemployment *Nordic immigrants 0.028 (0.040) + Unemployment * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.325 (0.133) + Unemployment *Non-European immigrants -0.048 (0.038) ====Adjusted 0.422 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010 = General elections (lagged) GRP 0.000 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.054 (0.155) + Education -0.116 (0.018) + Nordic immigrants 0.041 (0.103) + EU/EFTA immigrants -0.298 (0.287) + Non-European immigrants 0.061 (0.089) + Crime 0.008 (0.003) + S+V -0.037 (0.008) + Population size -0.001 (0.001)**+ Unemployment *Nordic immigrants -0.008 (0.021) + Unemployment * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.078 (0.071) + Unemployment *Non-European immigrants -0.019 (0.020) ====Adjusted Adjusted R2 = 0.227 Standard errors in parentheses.
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = GRP -0.004 (0.002) + Unemployment 0.208 (0.202) + Education -0.087 (0.038)+ Nordic immigrants 0.024 (0.211)+ EU/EFTA migrants 0.481 (0.783) + Non-European immigrants 0.152 (0.254) + Crime 0.037 (0.012) + S+V 0.003 (0.017) + Population size -0.005 (0.004)** + Crime * Nordic immigrants -0.002 (0.002) + Crime * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.007 (0.007) + Crime * Non-European immigrants -0.002 (0.002) =======Adjusted R2= 0.226
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election = GRP -0.004 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.494 (0.214) + Education -0.169 (0.040)+ Nordic immigrants 0.088 (0.265)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.023 (0.627) + Non-European immigrants 0.373 (0.234) + Crime 0.038 (0.013) + S+V -0.046 (0.018) + Population size -0.004 (0.004)** + Crime * Nordic immigrants -0.002 (0.002) + Crime * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.008 (0.005) + Crime * Non-European immigrants -0.003 (0.002)=======Adjusted R2= 0.345
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010 : Local elections (lagged) = GRP -0.001 (0.001) + Unemployment -0.130 (0.155) + Education -0.140 (0.029) + Nordic immigrants 0.050 (0.191)) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.397 (0.452) + Non-European immigrants 0.157 (0.169) + Crime 0.013 (0.009) + S+V -0.026 (0.013)+ Population size 0.000 (0.003)** + Crime * Nordic immigrants -0.001 (0.002) + Crime* EU/EFTA immigrants -0.002 (0.004) + Crime * Non-European immigrants 0.000 (0.001)=======Adjusted R2= 0.090
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= GRP -0.002 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.111 (0.117) + Education-0.157 (0.022) + Nordic immigrants 0.017 (0.112) + EU/EFTA immigrants 0.546 (0.416) + Non-European immigrants 0.244 (0.135) + Crime 0.023 (0.006) + S+V -0.023 (0.012)+ Population size -0.001 (0.001)** + Crime * Nordic immigrants -0.001 (0.001) + Crime * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.005 (0.004)+ Crime * Non-European immigrants -0.003 (0.001)=======Adjusted R2= 0.388
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = GRP -0.001 (0.001)**+ **Unemployment 0.441 (0.161) + Education-0.268 (0.030) + Nordic immigrants 0.237 (0.189) + EU/EFTA immigrants-0.145 (0.450) + Non-European immigrants 0.198 (0.167) + Crime 0.031 (0.009) + S+V -0.096 (0.015) + Population size-0.002 (0.003)** + Crime * Nordic immigrants -0.003 (0.002)+ Crime * EU/EFTA immigrants 0.007 (0.004) + Crime * Non-European immigrants -0.003 (0.001) =======Adjusted R2= 0.425
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010 = GRP 0.000 (0.001) + Unemployment 0.064 (0.086)+ Education -0.128 (0.016) + Nordic immigrants 0.127 (0.101)+ EU/EFTA immigrants 0.083 (0.239) + Non-European immigrants 0.022 (0.089)+ Crime 0.015 (0.005) + S+V -0.037 (0.008) + Population size 0.000 (0.001)** + Crime * Nordic immigrants -0.001 (0.001) + Crime * EU/EFTA immigrants -0.001 (0.002) + Crime * Non-European immigrants 0.000 (0.001) =======Adjusted R2= 0.231
37	Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2006 Election: Local elections, 2006 = **Crime 0.034 (0.005)**========Adjusted R2= 0.119 Standard errors in parentheses.

37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections across Municipalities in the 2010 Election: Local elections, 2010 = Crime 0.038 (0.006) =======Adjusted R2= 0.136 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in Local Elections between 2006 and 2010: Local elections (lagged) = Crime 0.007 (0.004)========Adjusted R2 = 0.008 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2006 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2006= Crime 0.014 (0.003) =========Adjusted R2 = 0.058 Standard errors in parentheses.**
37	**Differences in Voting for the Sweden Democrats in the 2010 National Election across Municipalities: General election, 2010 = Crime 0.019 (0.004)========Adjusted R2 = 0.054 Standard errors in parentheses.1 (0.152)**
37	**The Change in Electoral Support for the Sweden Democrats in the National Elections between 2006 and 2010: General elections (lagged) = Crime 0.004 (0.002) ============Adjusted R2 = 0.011 Standard errors in parentheses.**
38	**Influence of demonization on electoral support for Groep Wilders (subsequently Groep Wilders-PVV) between September 2004 and November 2006 = Autocorrelation (t-12) (-0.38)*** + Party is demonised (t-1) (-26.10)** + Party is demonised (t-2)(-28.54)*** **
38	**Influence of demonization on electoral support for Groep Wilders (subsequently Groep Wilders-PVV) between November 2006 and June 2010 = Party is demonised (t-1) (1.95) + Party is demonised (t-2)(0.54)**
38	**Influence of demonization on electoral support for Groep Wilders (subsequently Groep Wilders-PVV) between september 2010 and December 2011 = Party is demonised (t-1) (-5.43) + Party is demonised (t-2)(-2.36)**
39	**The vote share of all populist right parties = Crime 2.14** + Immigration 1.21** + Unemployment -0.13 + "Effective" Number of Parties 1.59**+ "Effective" Threshold 0.03 =======Log likelihood =-211.13**
39	**The vote share of all populist right parties = Crime 1.48** + Immigration 0.05 + Unemployment -0.13 +"Effective" Number of Parties 1.84**+ "Effective" Threshold 0.03 + Crime*immigration 0.15* =======Log likelihood =--209.01**
39	**The vote share of all populist right parties = Crime 1.50** + Immigration 0.74* + Unemployment -0.42* +"Effective" Number of Parties 2.07**+ "Effective" Threshold -0.08 + Electoral support (lagged) 0.41**=======Log likelihood =-211.13**
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election = Disproportionality 0.389* (0.182) + Federalism 2.269 (1.247) + Unemployment -0.004 (0.174) + Foreign-born population 0.728** (0.203)======Log pseudo-likelihood = 7262.066**
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election= Disproportionality 0.311 (0.182) + Federalism 1.812 (1.286) + Unemployment -0.071 (0.168) + Foreign-born population 0.507* (0.226) + General left–right scale : Convergence 3.407* (1.367) + General left–right scale : Position mainstream right 2.693* (1.154) + General left–right scale: Party system polarisation 1.463* (0.728) ======Log pseudo-likelihood = 7257.041**
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election= Disproportionality 0.391* (0.184) + Federalism 2.566 (1.314) + Unemployment -0.032 (0.177) + Foreign-born population 0.685** (0.208) + Economic scale : Convergence -0.014 (1.064) + Economic scale : Position main-stream right 1.191 (0.897) + Economic scale : Party system polarisation -0.529 (0.463) =====Log pseudo-likelihood = 7260.006**

40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election**= Disproportionality 0.260 (0.169) + Federalism 0.645 (1.180) + Unemployment 0.0250 (0.158) + Foreign-born population 0.696** (0.203)+ Non-economic scale : Convergence 2.725** (0.762) + Non-economic scale : Position mainstream right .724 (0.665) + Non-economic scale : Party system polarisation 2.544** (0.590) ========== Log pseudo-likelihood =7251.097
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election**= Disproportionality 0.225 (0.168) + Federalism 0.996 (1.200) + Unemployment -0.017 (0.157) + Foreign-born population 0.623** (0.195) + Economic scale : Convergence 0.395 (0.995) + Economic scale : Position main-stream right 1.817* (0.830) + Economic scale : Party system polarisation -0.755 (0.432) + Non-economic scale : Convergence 2.651** (0.750) + Non-economic scale : Position mainstream .673 (0.658) + Non-economic scale : Party system polarisation 2.766** (0.571) ==========Log pseudo-likelihood= 7246.517
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election**= Disproportionality 0.219 (0.164) + Federalism 1.323 (1.185) + Unemployment -0.182 (0.173) + Foreign-born population 0.356 (0.232) + Economic scale : Convergence 0.661 (0.984) + Economic scale : Position main-stream right 2.12* (0.828) + Economic scale : Party system polarisation -0.683 (0.424) + Non-economic scale : Convergence 2.728** (0.737) + Non-economic scale : Position mainstream 0.616 (0.644) + Non-economic scale : Party system polarisation 2.851** (0.560) + Interaction effects of both part scales Unemployment* foreign-born pop -0.092* (0.045) ==========Log pseudo-likelihood = 7244.477
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election**= Disproportionality 0.171 (0.164) + Federalism 1.246 (1.168) + Unemployment -0.077 (0.155) + Foreign-born population 0.628** (0.189) +Economic scale : Convergence 0.935 (0.988) + Economic scale : Position main-stream right 1.754* (0.807) + Economic scale : Party system polarisation -0.146 (0.478) + Non-economic scale : Convergence 2.882** (0.739) + Non-economic scale : Position mainstream .267 (0.657) + Non-economic scale : Party system polarisation 3.453** (0.614) + Interaction effects of both part scales : Convergence 70.539** (0.203)=======Log pseudo-likelihood 7242.996
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election**= Disproportionality 0.242 (0.170) + Federalism 1.019 (1.199) +Unemployment -0.021 (0.157) + Foreign-born population) 0.645** (0.199) + Economic scale : Convergence 0.525 (1.022) + Economic scale : Position main-stream right 1.918* (0.850) + Economic scale : Party system polarisation -0.760 (0.432) + Non-economic scale : Convergence 2.612** (0.752) + Non-economic scale : Position mainstream .717 (0.664) + Non-economic scale : Party system polarisation 2.744** (0.571) + Interaction effects of both part scales :Position mainstream right 0.151 (0.275) ===========Log pseudo-likelihood 7246.367
40	**The sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election**= Disproportionality 0.102 (0.169) + Federalism 1.041 (1.167) + Unemployment -0.088 (0.155) + Foreign-born population 0.644** (0.189) + Economic scale : Convergence 1.307 (1.032) + Economic scale : Position main-stream right 2.243** (0.824) + Economic scale : Party system polarisation 70.200 (0.473) + Non-economic scale : Convergence 2.910** (0.740) + Non-economic scale : Position mainstream .319 (0.654) + Non-economic scale : Party system polarisation 3.527** (0.632)+ Interaction effects of both part scales : Party system polarisation -0.285* (0.112)======= Log pseudo-likelihood = 3.008 (0.219)
41	**SVP vote share** = Vote share of the Christian democratic party -0.54*** + Vote share of the free democratic party -0.66*** + No. of foreigners -0.07* + Unemployment -2.47*** + Population density -0.0009** + No. of citizens without post-secondary education 0.29*** + No. of individuals age 64 and over -0.21***
42	**The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties (1981–98) (Baseline model)** = Trade openness (merchandise tradet1) -0.0040 (0.0062) + Capital mobility (liberalizationt1) 0.1221 (0.3035) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.5206** (0.1622) + Social welfare protection -1.7633** (0.4566) + De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.0571 (0.0492) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.1481 (0.1055) + Proportional representation 0.5982* (0.4382) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.1200** (0.0508) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0117 (0.0156) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.1757** (0.0489) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.2206** (0.0446) ==========Pseudo R2 = 0.8351

42	The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties (1981–98) (Trade openness*social protection)= Trade openness (merchandise tradet1) 0.0021 (0.0066) + Capital mobility (liberalizationt1) 0.3309 (0.3130) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.4199** (0.1628) + Social welfare protection 1.1102 (1.0693) + Trade openness*social protection -0.0641** (0.0216) + ¨De-industrialization (manufacturing jobst1) -0.1159** (0.0546) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.0927 (0.1026) + Proportional representation 0.7478** + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.1162** (0.0510) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0309** (0.0166) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.1995** (0.0482) + RRWP vote(e-1) 0.1919** (0.0462) =========Pseudo R2 = 0.8715
42	The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties (1981–98)(Capital mobility*social protection)= Trade openness (merchandise tradet1) -0.0056 (0.0063) + Capital mobility (liberalizationt1) 0.3320 (0.3524)+ Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.5576** (0.1634) + Social welfare protection 1.2536 (1.6203) + Capital mobility*social protection 0.9508** (0.4910) + De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.0846* (0.0519) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.1420 (0.1036) + Proportional representation 0.9404** (0.4722) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.1169** (0.0509) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0180 (0.0165) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.1882** (0.0516) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.2173** (0.0451) =========Pseudo R2 = 0.8509
42	The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties (1981–98)(Foreign immigration*social protection)= Trade openness (merchandise tradet1) -0.0056 (0.0063) + Capital mobility (liberalizationt1) 0.0612 (0.3091) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.6665** (0.1907) + Social welfare protection -1.5825** (0.4764) + Foreigners*social protection -0.1733* (0.1184) + De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.0690* (0.0501) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.1259 (0.1193) + Proportional representation 0.5900* (0.4088) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.0991** (0.0527) + Established right party vote—long-term share 0.0166 (0.0159) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.1839** (0.0500) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.2244** (0.0450) =========Pseudo R2 = 0.8474
42	Tobit coefficient (asymptotic standard error) Trade openness (merchandise trade t-1) 0.0049 (0.0072) + Capital mobility (liberalization t-1) 0.4368 (0.3982) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.4186** (0.1902) + Social welfare protection 1.4500 (1.4390) + Trade openness*social protection -0.0860** (0.0296) + Capital mobility*social protection -0.7097* (0.5236) + Foreign immigration *social protection -0.2159** (0.1278) + De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.2371** (0.0672) + Economic growth rate(t-1) 0.2704* (0.1464) + Proportional representation 2.2660** (1.1848) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.0174 (0.0617) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0049 (0.0238) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.2453** (0.0604) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.1995* (0.0567) ========Pseudo R2= 0.8534
42	The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties Mediterranean nations excluded) = Tobit coefficient (asymptotic standard error) Trade openness (merchandise trade t-1) 0.0010 (0.0070) + Capital mobility (liberalization t-1) 0.2282 (0.3303) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.3954** (0.1692) + Social welfare protection 1.0954 (1.1486) + Trade openness*social protection -0.0629** (0.0224) + Capital mobility*social protection -0.8568** (0.5014) 0.5342 + Foreign immigration *social protection -0.1652* (0.1185) + De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.1272** (0.0571) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.0710 (0.1050) + Proportional representation 0.8189** (0.4512) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.1058** (0.0820) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0285* (0.0177) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.1833** (0.0529) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.1940** (0.0462) ========Pseudo R2= 0.8592
42	The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties ('Conservative' polities excluded)= Tobit coefficient (asymptotic standard error) Trade openness (merchandise trade t-1) -0.0032 (0.01320) + Capital mobility (liberalization t-1) 0.2834 (0.3898) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.7102** (0.2753) + Social welfare protection -0.4468 (0.2016) + Trade openness*social protection -0.0690** (0.0310) + Capital mobility*social protection -0.5342 (0.5598) + Foreign immigration *social protection -0.1814 (0.2031) + De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.1640** (0.0898) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.2507 (0.1839) + Proportional representation 0.9952* (0.7028) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.0046 (0.0820) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0845** (0.0367) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.3491** (0.1037) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.3017** (0.0870) ========Pseudo R2= 0.7956

42	**The electoral success of radical right-wing populist parties ('Universalist' systems excluded)= Tobit coefficient (asymptotic standard error) Trade openness (merchandise trade t-1) 0.0004 (0.0107) + Capital mobility (liberalization t-1) 1.2951** (0.7601) + Foreign immigration (asylum seekers mean (t-1 to t-3)) 0.2649 (0.2396) + Social welfare protection 3.0576* (1.7716)** + Trade openness*social protection -0.0966** (0.0346) + Capital mobility*social protection -2.9709** (1.0044) + Foreign immigration *social protection -0.7811** (0.4823) + **De-industrialization (manufacturing jobs t-1) -0.0187 (0.0801) + Economic growth rate (t-1) 0.1194 (0.1500) + Proportional representation 0.5810 (0.5322) + Left libertarian party vote (e-1) 0.2474** (0.0896) + Established right party vote—long-term share -0.0632** (0.0266) + Tax burdens (t-1) 0.2608** (0.0795) + RRWP vote (e-1) 0.2078** (0.0726)** =========Pseudo R2= 0.9368
43	**Tests of Existing Explanations of Anti-Immigrant Party Support : electoral potential = Lack of support for democracy 0.12(0.11) + Number of asylum applications 9.19 (27.59) + Change in unemployment (in 1 year) 0.03 (2.05) + Change in inflation (in 1 year) 0.69(2.13) + Economic growth (in 1 year) -1.48 (2.05)** ====== Adjusted R2= –0.066
43	**Tests of Existing Explanations of Anti-Immigrant Party Support : electoral potential = Lack of support for democracy 0.026 (0.12)* + Number of asylum applications 7.93 (24.67) + Relative unemployment -1.25(0.64) + Relative inflation -1.69(0.42)** + Relative economic growth -3.10 (1.11)**** =====Adjusted R2 = 0.156
43	**Tests of Existing Explanations of Anti-Immigrant Party Support: electoral success = Lack of support for democracy 0.06 (0.06) + Number of asylum applications 2.33 (14.87)+ Change in unemployment (in 1 year) -1.14 (1.32) + Change in inflation (in 1 year) -1.08 (1.52) + Economic growth -0.72(0.65)** ======= Adjusted R2 = -0.105
43	**Tests of Existing Explanations of Anti-Immigrant Party Support: Dependent variable is electoral success = Lack of support for democracy 0.06* + Number of asylum applications 5.04 (15.14) + Relative unemployment -0.68 (0.58) + Relative inflation (0.93)0.32* + Relative economic growth -1.53 (1.17)** ===== Adjusted R2 = 0.028
43	**Tests of Existing Explanations of Anti-Immigrant Party Support: electoral potential (Standard Coefficents) = Relative inflation -1.33 (0.39)** + Relative economic growth -2.88 (1.06)**** ======Adjusted R2 = 0.081
43	**Tests of the authors Explanation of the Electoral Potential of Anti-Immigrant Parties (Unstandardized Regression; Standard Coefficents Error ;β) = The electoral potential= Extent to which a party is evaluated according to its policies (43.08) (6.51)*** + Percentage of radical right-wing voters in electorate (0.379) 0.201*** =======Adjusted R2 = 0.631
43	**Explanation of the Electoral Success of Anti-Immigrant Parties : = Extent to which party is evaluated according to its policies 22.03 (7.24) ** + Percentage of radical right-wing voters in electorate –0.09 (0.28)** ========= Adjusted R2 = 0.390
43	**Explanation of the Electoral Success of Anti-Immigrant Parties (Unstandardized Regression; Standard Coefficents Error ;β) = Extent to which party is evaluated according to its policies 20.66 (2.91) *** + Percentage of radical right-wing voters in electorate 0.46 (0.17) ** + Left/right position of main competitor 4.72 (0.67) *** + Extent to which a party is evaluated according to its policies—left/right position of main competitor–9.39 (1.75) *** + Emphasis of main competitor on core issues of anti-immigrant party –0.03 (0.10) + Proportional representation –1.26 (0.45)* + Size of largest competitor –10.25 (0.19)** ============Adjusted R2 = 0.852

43	Explanation of the **Electoral Success** of Anti-Immigrant Parties = Extent to which party is evaluated according to its policies 21.28 (2.51)*** + Percentage of radical right-wing voters in electorate 0.50 (0.16)** + Left/right position of main competitor –4.99 (0.61)*** + Extent to which a party is evaluated according to its policies—left/right position of main competitor –9.91 (1.71) *** ==========Adjusted R2 = 0.830
44	**Public support for PVV = Visibility (t -1) 0.02 + Public support (t -1) 0.45** + Vision (t -1) –0.01**
44	**Public support for PVV = Visibility (t -1) 0.02 + Public support (t -1) 0.46** + Self-confidence (t -1) 0.02**
44	**Public support for PVV = Visibility (t -1) 0.02 + Public support (t -1) 0.45** + vision (t-1) –0.01 + Self-confidence (t -1) 0.01**
44	**Public support for PVV = Visibility (t-1) 0.02 + Public support (t -1) 0.45** + Vision (t-1) –0.01**
44	**Public support for PVV = Visibility (t -1) 0.02 + Public support (t -1) 0.46** + Self-confidence (t-1) 0.02**
44	**Public support for PVV = Visibility (t -1) 0.02 + Public support (t -1) 0.45** + vision (t-1) –0.01 + Self-confidence (t -1) 0.01**
45	**Regression model PVV predicting polls = Polls (t-1) -0.05 + Polls(t-2) -0.10* + party visibility(t-1)0.04 + party visibility(t-2) 0.22** + leader visibility(t-1)0.06** + leader visibility(t-2)0.10*** + immigration(t-1)0.04 + immigration(t-2) 0.06* + unemployment(t-1)-0.08 + unemployment(t-2)-0.13 + immigration news(t-1)0.04** + immigration news(t-2)0.04** + elections dummy 0.26***
45	**Regression model DVU predicting polls = Polls (t-1) -0.02 + party visibility(t-1) -0.07 + leader visibility(t-1)0.38*** + immigration(t-1) -0.15* + unemployment(t-1)-0.09* + elections dummy 0.75****
45	**Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang PARTY MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.59*** + visibility party(t-1) 0.07** + unemployment(t-1) -0.07* + immigration(t-1) 0.03 + immigration news (t-1) 0.04 + elections dummy -0.10***
45	**Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang LEDAER MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.58*** + visibility party(t-1) 0.01 + unemployment(t-1) -0.03 + immigration(t-1) 0.00+ immigration news (t-1) 0.07 + elections dummy 0.02**
45	**CD PARTY MODEL = polls (t-1) -0.25** + visibility party(t-1) 0.03+ immigration(t-1) 0.04* + unemployment(t-1) -0.40* + immigration news (t-1) 0.30** + elections dummy -0.03**
45	**CD LEADER MODEL = polls (t-1) -0.28*** + polls (t-2) -0.15* + visibility party(t-1) 0.00 + visibility party(t-2) 0.02 + immigration(t-1) 0.03 + immigration(t-2) 0.01 + unemployment(t-1) -0.61* + unemployment (t-2) 1.35** + immigration news (t-1) 0.29* + immigration news (t-2) 0.07 + elections dummy -0.04**
45	**PVV PARTY MODEL = polls (t-1) -0.06* + polls (t-2) -0.09* + visibility party(t-1) 0.07** + visibility party(t-2) 0.11*** + immigration(t-1) 0.04* + immigration(t-2) 0.05* + unemployment(t-1) -0.08 + unemployment(t-2) -0.09+ immigration news (t-1) 0.04* + immigration news (t-2) 0.04** + elections dummy 0.28***
45	**PVV LEADER MODEL = polls (t-1) -0.06* + polls (t-2) -0.08* + visibility party(t-1) 0.08** + visibility party(t-2) 0.09** + immigration(t-1) -0.05 + immigration(t-2) -0.10 + unemployment(t-1) 0.04* + unemployment (t-2) 0.04**+ immigration news (t-1) 0.04* + immigration news (t-2) 0.06* + elections dummy 0.30***

45	**Republikaner PARTY MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.22*** + polls (t-2) 0.23*** + visibility party(t-1) 0.21** + visibility party(t-2) -0.02 + immigration(t-1) -0.14* + immigration(t-2) 0.17** + unemployment(t-1) 0.32* + unemployment(t-2) -0.20* + elections dummy 0.02**
45	**Republikaner LEADER MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.22*** + polls (t-2) 0.24*** + visibility party(t-1) 0.13** + visibility party(t-2) -0.03 + immigration(t-1) -0.11* + immigration(t-2) 0.16* + unemployment(t-1) 0.29* + unemployment(t-2) -0.19* + elections dummy 0.03**
45	**NPD PARTY MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.10* + polls (t-2) 0.10* + polls (t-3) -0.18* + visibility party(t-1) 0.26** + visibility party(t-2) -0.01 + visibility party(t-3) 0.13* + immigration(t-1) -0.43* + immigration(t-2) 0.10 + immigration(t-3) -0.50*** + unemployment(t-1) 0.14 + unemployment(t-2) -1.01** + unemployment(t-3) 0.87 ** + elections dummy 0.03**
45	**NPD LEADER MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.13* + polls (t-2) 0.19* + polls (t-3) -0.09* + visibility party(t-1) 0.05 + visibility party(t-2) 0.08* + visibility party(t-3) 0.04 + immigration(t-1) -0.35** + immigration(t-2) 0.07 + immigration(t-3) -0.50** + unemployment(t-1) 0.04 + unemployment(t-2) -0.68* + unemployment(t-3) 0.64** + elections dummy 0.13**
45	**DVU PARTY MODEL = polls (t-1) 0.02 + visibility party(t-1) 0.29*** + immigration(t-1) -0.23** + unemployment(t-1) -0.03* + elections dummy 0.72****
45	**DVU LEADER MODEL = polls (t-1) -0.02 + visibility party(t-1) 0.39*** + immigration(t-1) -0.16* + unemployment(t-1) -0.09* + elections dummy 0.75****
45	**CD party model (quarterly data) = polls (t-1) 0.06 + visibility (t-1) 0.00 + immigration (t-1) 0.00 + unemployment (t-1) 0.20* + immigration news (t-1) 0.07* + elections dummy -0.07***
45	**CD LEADER MODEL (quarterly data) = polls (t-1) 0.04 + visibility (t-1) 0.03* + immigration (t-1) 0.04 + unemployment (t-1) -0.01 + elections dummy -0.12***
45	**Republikaner PARTY MODEL (quarterly data) = polls (t-1) 0.18* + visibility (t-1) 0.09 + immigration (t-1) -0.25** + unemployment (t-1) 0.06 + elections dummy 0.31***
45	**Republikaner LEADER MODEL (quarterly data) = polls (t-1) 0.19* + visibility (t-1) 0.08 + immigration (t-1) -0.24** + unemployment (t-1) 0.05 + elections dummy 0.33****
45	**DVU PARTY MODEL (quarterly data) = polls (t-1) 0.25** + visibility (t-1) 0.59*** + immigration (t-1) -0.08 + unemployment (t-1) -0.05 + elections dummy -0.10**
45	**DVU LEADER MODEL (quarterly data) = polls (t-1) 0.31** + visibility (t-1) 0.71*** + immigration (t-1) 0.08 + unemployment (t-1) -0.07 + elections dummy -0.03**
46	**Vlaams Blok scores (INRA voting intentions) = Immigration coverage De Standaard: 4–6 months before poll (0.355844) (prob. 0.000) + Immigration coverage De Standaard: 7–9 months before poll (0.213828) (prob. 0.084) + Immigration coverage De Standaard: 10–12 months before poll (0.408269)(prob. 0.000)** ======== Adjusted R2 = 0.563467
46	**Vlaams Blok scores (INRA voting intentions) = Theft coverage Het Laatste Nieuws: 7–9 months before poll (0.308269)(prob.0.001) + Theft coverage Het Laatste Nieuws: 10–12 months before poll 0.392510 (prob.0.000)** ======== Adjusted R2 =0.471323

46	**Vlaams Blok scores (INRA voting intentions)** = Immigration coverage De Standaard: 4–6 months before poll (0.418114)(prob. 0.000) + Immigration coverage De Standaard: 7–9 months before poll (0.233539)(prob.0.036) + Theft coverage TV: 7–9 months before poll 0.595124 (prob. 0.009) + Theft coverage TV: 10–12 months before poll 0.881959 (prob.0.000) ========= Adjusted R2 =0.670189
47	**Electoral support for parties (%) for True Finns** = Density of population −0.03 + Share of immigrants 0.17 + Share of Industrial & construction workforce 0.11*** + Unemployment rate in April 2011 −0.18* + Share of Finnish-Swedes −0.24*** + 'No' for EU in 1994 0.06
47	**Electoral support for parties (%) for True Finns** = Share of Industrial & construction workforce 0.10*** + Unemployment rate in April 2011 −0.18* + Share of Finnish-Swedes −0.24*** + 'No' for EU in 1994 0.08**
47	**Electoral support for parties (%) for True Finns** = Share of immigrants -0.22 + Share of Industrial & construction workforce 0.08*** + Unemployment rate in April 2011 −0.16+ Share of Finnish-Swedes −0.23***
47	**Electoral support for parties (%) for True Finns** = Density of population −0.05** + Share of Industrial & construction workforce 0.11*** + Unemployment rate in April 2011 −0.18* + Share of Finnish-Swedes −0.24***
48	**Conservative: UKIP ratio** = Factor Professionals 0.26***(0.01) + Factor Economically deprived 0.12***(0.01) + Owner-occupiers 0.09***(0.02) + Rural and older -0.02 (0.01) + Number of other hard Eurosceptic parties 0.06***(0.02)
48	**Labour UKIP ratio** = Factor Professionals - 0.08*** (0.02) + Factor Economically deprived 0.40***(0.02) + Owner-occupiers -0.45*** (0.03) + Rural and older -0.38*** (0.02) + Number of other hard Eurosceptic parties -0.16***(0.05)
48	**BNP UKIP ratio** = Factor Professionals -0.22∗∗∗ (0.02) + Factor Economically deprived 0.14∗∗∗ (0.02) + Owner-occupiers -0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) + Rural and older -0.28∗∗∗ (0.02) + Number of other hard Eurosceptic parties -0.03 (0.04)

- Blue means that the beta coefficient in the regression analysis is positive and significant.

- Red means that the beta coefficient in the regression analysis is negative and significant.

- Green means that the beta coefficient is not significant.

- No color means that the beta coefficient represents an interaction term (in our counting of success, failure and no link, we do not include interaction terms).